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An Illustrated History

Special Services Group

1953-2015

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Chapter I

Historical Perspective of Special Forces

Special Service Group of Pakistan Army traces its history and origin to the Cold War and a continuation of Great Game. Great Britain during its two hundred odd years of rule in India was embroiled in Russian phobia; in which Russia was perceived as the main enemy which can attack India. After Pakistan's independence in 1947, the international affairs were as such where world was divided into two camps the Capitalist and Communist; despite being allies in war the relationship between these two camps was at rock bottom, Korean War in 1948-49 further cemented this theme. Small countries which took birth after the WW2 were mainly aligned with either of the two blocks; Pakistan culturally, politically and ideologically was aligned with the Free World or USA. Founder of Pakistan Muhammad Ali Jinnah in his inaugural speech to constituent assembly did read a portion of the American president's letter felicitating on gaining independence. Military traditions and culture of newly born Dominion of Pakistan had the British military traditions, organisation and culture embedded, majority of the officers in all three services including the chiefs were British officers, so was the military equipment, all training was undertaken at British military institutions in United Kingdom.

Pakistan is the modern name of the Indus Civilisation, military history of Indus Valley takes its birth from the campaigns of Alexander The Great in 323 BC, he was given stiff resistance in almost every major town of the valley, from Swat in north to the Mekran in south. Indus Valley was paying tribute to the Persians before the Greek invasion, Persians called it Hindu or Hind, for the reason that in Persian 'S' is represented by 'H', thus Sind became Hind. In later millennium the Indus Valley developed into two distinct halves, the upper or Northern valley and the Southern or lower valley. After Greeks came Sakans and later with the advent of Islam in 7th century, the mountainous region of the modern day Afghanistan {Ghazna-Ghor} by virtue of its military brilliance ruled India as far as modern day Bangladesh which was known as Bengal then. Between 1000-1500 AD, Slave Dynasty was ruling India, they had to face the Mongol wrath too. Mughul empire {1530-1857} was established by Babur of Ferghana, it extended from Kabul and beyond in west to Dacca and beyond in east. British East India

Company{1600 AD} in later years expanded from a small trading post to an all-conquering military giant, and by 1800 were the real king makers finally dethroning the last of Mughul emperor in 1857. It was the British which laid the modern foundation of the army regiments, culture, rank and organisation, later this military culture and might was divided among the two new dominions Pakistan and India in 1947.

British military culture is centred around Esprit de Corps {loyalty to regiment}, strict discipline with a liberal sprinkling of class distinction. Thus the interests of the regiment comes above everything even the national interest, discipline was strictly enforced with commanding officer having powers of life and death over soldiers, the officers were treated as a class apart in which the family lineage weighs more heavily than the competence. All in all a bureaucratic system of military organisation in which even a mundane issue can fill up volumes of files. Every act had to follow the tradition and convention ; logic took the second place in such system. The raising and induction of aircraft in British army is one such classic example. It was during the Boer War {1898-1900} that the term Commando¹ first appeared , it denotes the native white Afrikaans mostly German and Dutch, who had to arrange their own horse and weapon, wears no uniform and draw no pay. They would strike with a lightning speed at the British troops and withdrew rather than engaging in a pitch battle. On a historical note, it were the Pathan tribes of North Western Frontier which in true sense can be termed as pioneer Commandos; they from 1849 onwards carried out successful hit and run operations against the British army units causing great damage to material and lives. In America, the USA Marines were authorised by the Congress in 1774, mainly to protect the ships , they were disbanded in 1784



¹ Charles Messenger *The Commandos 1940-1946* { London, Kimber,1985},p-17-19.

and reraised in 1794.

Airborne. Present day Special Forces are invariably linked with the air and sea, thus it is pertinent to have a brief history of aircraft and raising of air forces. Aircraft were used in First Great War primarily for artillery observation and correction of fire, subsequently parachute was invented and used. Parachute first employed in 1917 were mainly for the artillery observers. After the armistice, the utility of air forces were heatly debated in which British Army resisted the raising of a new service , Royal Air Force{RAF} took birth in such environments. RAF thus historically emerged as the very first special force, meant to destroy the enemy by hitting it in the rear and deep at strategic targets. The inter great wars era in Europe's military thinking thus had the aircraft as the main threat and its destruction as the first priority of any strategy; airfields became the primary targets. Royal Navy also contemplated on capturing the seaports through amphibious landings of own troops, thus Royal Marines took birth. British Army in 1938 had set up a branch headed by a major in War Office, for research on 'irregular operations'², this branch initially worked under general staff and later came under military intelligence staff.

On the onset of WWII, the belligerents {Britain, France and USA} had no clear cut policy on the employment of aircraft and the airborne troops. Germany on the contrary employed the paratroops in a bold, innovative and strategic manner . Adolf Hitler incorporated the concept of airborne troops as part of air force{Luftwaffe}, thus air force was not meant only to destroy the cities or support the army, it was to conduct independent operations where it will not only have the command of air but will also hold the ground by itself, it had integral troops, two airborne divisions. Some of the classic employment of airborne troops were.

Norway; 9th April 1940. Norway was important for Germany because of its iron ore and the facility to attack the British fleet from air. But in the presence of Royal Fleet its capture by Germany was never given a serious thought by the Britain. The air assault and use of airborne troops by the Luftwaffe caught allies by surprise and Norway was captured by Germany despite the presence of strong British naval fleet; rather forcing it to retrieve back to safe water .

Major Geoffery Langlands, the oldest living commando. Major Langland is 98 years old, living in the Aitchison College, Lahore . He had taught in the same very school 1954-1979, later established the Razmak Cadet College in 1979, and Langlands School in Chitral in 1989. He was commissioned in British Army in 1939, and was among the pioneer irregular companies, he narrates ‘. ‘Training was tough, physically demanding, we were taught the use of explosives, with an aim to carryout commando raids on Germany's occupying forces in Norway’ The said operation never took place and Lieutenant Langland was later transferred to India .

² Ibid, p-18.

Eben Emael; 10/11th May 1940. The Belgium defence revolved around strategic complex of forts, of which Eben Email was the most formidable, and from German point of view their over all strategy of offense centred around its capitulation. One option was to destroy it from aerial bombing, but it was lengthy and not result oriented approach, thus Luftwaffe troops undercommand Lieutenant Wuttzing stormed it with gliders and captured it intact. The strategic result was overwhelming.

Rotterdam; 14th May 1940. Germany had 4500 parachute troops and 4000 were used in attack on Holland, they were backed up by a light infantry division consisting of 12000 men carried in transport aircraft, in the words of General Student 'we dared not fail, for if we did the whole invasion would have failed'.³

Commando Concept

Britain had a wave of defeats in the WW2, much is attributed to its faulty system of military culture and warfare, both Royal Navy and RAF failed to live up to the pre war much hyped capabilities. The defeats in summer of 1940 prompted Winston Churchill to write to War Office, to contemplate on employing troops in an unconventional manner in order to wrest this defeatist mentality which has set upon the British morale. Lieutenant Colonel Dudley Clarke in July 1940, wrote the very first military paper outlining the concept of *commando*. 'I think, suggested the name **Commando**, from the very onset'. The concept visualised, raising of irregular volunteers into Commandos, without any fixed establishment; arming, organising and equipping the commando for hit and run operation not lasting more than 24 hours. The Commando in the initial days were volunteers, each command⁴ would nominate one commando officer, who in turn would select his troop leaders and these troop leaders would pick the troops; thus each troop had ten commandos and each command in turn



³

Ibid, p-73.

⁴ In 1940, Britain or United Kingdom was divided into commands like eastern, southern etc etc.

had approximately 100-150 troops designated as Commando. They were not housed in any army building neither provided with army ration, rather they were given cash and had to secure own food and lodgings. They would train on sea side and wait for task, which invariably involved crossing of English Channel and operating behind German forces in France for a short period and then evacuated. These commandos had no standard equipment, rather it was issued on the type of mission. As the Commando missions involves navy and air force thus a joint coordination command was setup in Britain.

Beside the setbacks in mainland Europe, Great Britain suffered morale sapping retreats and defeats in Africa. African Campaign 1940, onwards provided the ideal playground for such innovative ideas. Long Range Desert Group was created to strike at the Field Marshall Rommel's advancing armour in Africa in 1941. It was, Lieutenant Sterling who, in search of adventure and in order 'to do something about the Germans' came up with an idea of **Special Air Service** {SAS}, a force comprising of small teams of four men, dropped behind Germans through parachute; inflicting damage which were primarily Luftwaffe aircraft⁵. This SAS carried out few operations with Long Range Desert Group, with partial success. Later the SAS was employed in Italy and France, two battalions were raised and in the end a brigade was formed; after the war the SAS was disbanded and re-raised in 1950 at Malaya.

British also had to wage a long and tough war against the Japanese on the east in Burma, the pattern of the this war was no different from the Europe; British were on the retreat and morale had sapped to dangerous level. Field Marshall Slim was the commander, he had eighteen infantry divisions under his command. One of the highpoint of the campaign was the Brigadier Wingate's '**Chindits**' highly trained paratroopers meant to carry out infiltration and sabotage among the occupied and advancing Japanese army in Burma. An infantry brigade {111} was inserted in the jungle employing gliders and aircraft, later another brigade was also dropped through parachutes. The success was not much in terms of military gains but it at the minimum raised the morale of the troops. Field Marshal Slim, later wrote 'special forces are a waste of effort, the output does not match with the input that is given to special forces, these special forces are meant only for short period of time and then they have to be evacuated, moreover they create a sense in army, where it is believed that such and such operation can only be performed by special forces. Slim, further wrote, that there is nothing which an normal infantry cannot perform, it is only the paratroops which are an exception. Slim's final words, on special forces, reflects that there is a need to have special forces mainly for creating sabotage and assassination among the enemy, to create propaganda and acts like this.'⁶

⁵ Tony Geraghty *Who Dares Wins The story of Special Air Service 1950-1980* {Arms & armour, London, 1980}pp,2-11.

⁶ Field Marshall William Slim *Defeat into Victory* {London, 1954},pp, 515-546.

Para Regiment in India

In 1943-44, Indian Para Regiment was formed comprising of four battalions, the 1st Para was all Hindus, 2nd and 3rd were all Gurkha and 4th Para Battalion was all Muslims { the commanding officer was British}. These battalions comprised of all volunteer, and it was instructed by the higher headquarters that no officer or soldier will be stopped from forwarding his application to join the Para Battalions. However very few officers volunteered, mostly by those who have been posted out from their parent regiments to the other regiments. The Para training centre was established at Rawalpindi, 4th Para Battalion was stationed at Soan Camp and later move to the Ojhari. Present day Dhamial was one of the airfield constructed exclusively for Para training. Officers were initially tested in map reading and endurance, after one month of probation period the officers were finally selected for service with Para Regiment. The parachute training itself was conducted at Chaklala airfield by RAF sergeants, seven jumps were mandatory and there used to be only one parachute during jump; unlike American who were employing two parachutes during one jump. The Para Regiments had a liberal style of working in which paratroopers were allowed to have long bobbed hair style. There was no wing award ceremony rather an army order would be published allowing the officer or soldier who have completed the mandatory jumps to put on a wing on the right chest. In 4th Para Battalion as in other battalions, the commanding officer and second in command had no experience of para trooping. These Para battalions played a very minor role during the war, as the war itself came to an end before these battalions could be matured. Captain Abu Bakr Osman Mitha {later major general, raised the Special Service Group} served in 4th Para Battalion. After the war, the Para Regiment was disbanded and instead, every third battalion of ten selected regiments were earmarked as Para Battalions and an airborne division was raised.⁷

Paratroops, Airborne, Guerrilla, Commando & Special Forces; 1950-2000

By the end of the WW2, paratroops have become the key factor in achieving the surprise and paralysing the enemy, resultantly the Allies final assault was spearheaded by the paratroops and they emerged as the ultimate formation which can tilt the battle to winning side. The military culture of Britain, America and Germany had its impact on the overall concept, organisation and employment of paratroops or airborne forces. In Britain, from the moment the Royal Air Force took birth in 1917, the friction and tussle started between the army and newly born air force, to an extent where army accused air force on moral grounds. Thus till the end of the war, army and air force were embroiled over the control of the aircraft where army was desperate to have some control over the aircraft purely as its own; in the end Royal Air Observation Corps was formed which is today known as Army Aviation. In USA, during the WW2, army had the full control over the air as well, thus an independent air force in America took birth after the end of the war.

⁷ Major General Abu Bakr Osman Mitha *Unlikely Beginnings, A Soldier's Life* {Oxford, Karachi, 2003}, pp, 87-102.

World military affairs in post WW2 were no different from the past, the world was as unsafe as it was in past; it was now divided into two distinct camps the west and the communist. Between 1947-1960, western military organisations were mainly focussed on the employment of small army units which are light, able to operate behind the enemy line, in hostile territory and carry out such operations along with the heavy use of fighter aircraft; events in Malaysia, Greece, Korea , Iran and Suez supplemented this theory. Countries and colonies became free from imperialism , mostly by employing guerrilla warfare, name like Mao Tse Tung and Che Guerra along with Ho Chi Minh, Yasser Arafat, became household. It was Vietnam which brought into limelight the use of helicopters and it changed the face of military operations. Now armies can insert and extricate the Special Forces which by end sixties had been divided into airborne and heliborne forces. The wave of terrorism took the world by surprise in early seventies where aircraft hijacking became a standard operation by any terrorist organisation seeking world attention; the line between the revolution and terror became shrouded in ideology and politics.

The most daring act of Special Forces was the Entebbe raid by Israeli commandos in 1974, where they freed the hijack El Al aircraft, it is regarded at par in planning and execution with the raid to free Mussolini in 1944 by German commandos. American Green Berets failure in 1978 to free their embassy hostages in Iran again put a dark cloud on the utility of the special operation forces. United Kingdom employed SAS with some success in Falklands War. In the last quarter of last millennium, the focus of war shifted to urban area where handful of terrorist or political activists through use of violence crippled the political system of a country. Ireland , Cyprus are one such example, on the other hand the fiasco at Waco Texas {USA} in which over a hundred people were killed by the American forces in order to overcome the fundamentalist highlights the limitation of such forces. Thus special forces itself were compartmentalised into two distinct spheres, one dealing with such acts of violence within the country mostly hijacking and hostage taking, and other meant for action against the enemy forces in war.

Helicopters first introduced in 1948 during Korean War have brought a major change in military affairs. It was during decade long Vietnam War in which the helicopters were employed for insertion behind the enemy and for extrication of own Special Forces. In early seventies the gunship helicopters were introduced {Cobra} and soon every major military power had the gunships in one variant or the other. Thus the Special Forces now revolved around having transport and attack helicopters; paratroopers and their insertion using fixed wing aircraft soon became obsolete.

Afghanistan between 1978-2000 and even now provides an ideal ground for the use and study of special forces employment both , in order to curb the insurgency and also as how to defeat a super power through the guerrilla warfare. Russian much feared Spetsnaz units failed to overcome the Mujahedeen's and in the end the very existence of Soviet Union was catalysed by the guerrilla warfare of native population. In the

Afghanistan, the decade and half war on terror, in which Special Forces of USA, Britain, France and host of other countries have taken part, highlights the advantage which the native by virtue of his knowledge of area enjoys over the technology possessed by Special Forces.

Today the original Paratroopers are known with various nomenclature ranging from Air Assault, Air Borne, Guerrillas, Commandos, Heliborne and also collectively as Special Forces. Thus Special Forces today represents abstractly a small body of troops who as an individual or as a small team can operate underwater, have snipers, demolition experts, can fly aircraft, ride horses and camel, surviving at their own for long period of time in isolation, for whom desert, mountain, urban and snow-capped peaks have no restrictions in carrying out the assigned missions. They are better paid and fed as compared to regular troops, allowed more freedom of action, not bounded by traditions and customs other than that of own, are more educated than ordinary soldier, physically they are trained to the maximum which a human can take and beyond. Their equipment is light and lethal, they are swift and loyal; and above all are expected to have less human emotions and liabilities as compared to conventional soldier and troops. In short the Special Forces are the elite of the elite; an ideal body of warriors.



Chapter II

Evolution of Special Service Group 1950-1964

Pakistan, 1947

Pakistan soon after independence found itself in a confrontation with both India and Afghanistan, with India; it was the refugees' problem, accession of states which included the Kashmir and Kalat, over and above the hatred that has been brewing for centuries between the two religions now became open. Afghanistan had the issue of legitimacy of the Durand Line.

General Douglas Gracey the last of the British ,Commander-in-Chief {C-in-C} of Pakistan Army 1949-1951, took keen interest in the Para abilities of army, he in 1949, detailed Major A.O.Mitha to carry out detailed survey of all ordinance depots in Pakistan to compile the stockpiles of parachuting equipment; there was not much in the stores. However the basic infrastructure was available in the forms of training facilities. The Indian Parachute Depot before partition was established at Rawalpindi. In the same time period the idea of raising a commando unit was first highlighted by Brigadier Muhammad Yahya Khan {later President and C-in-C} who was serving in Military Training Directorate. Resultantly a Close Quarter Battle School was established in 1950, in Infantry School at Quetta under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Grant Taylor .

CQB School was meant to train the troops and officers in as the name suggests in close quarter battle techniques, however it was more oriented towards a proficiency in shooting with pistol and revolvers apart from imparting basic elementary training in explosives. 'Grant was a fat man but an excellent shooter with pistol and revolvers, he would enter a room where there would be six targets, cut out of men, and in no time he would take all of them down, all his bullets passing through the heart of targets...he would in spare time just toss the bottles in air and shoot them in air, never missing even one bottle'.¹ Soon after the death of the Lieutenant Colonel Taylor, a Pakistan officer Lieutenant Colonel Ali Haider took over the command, Ali was commissioned in Indian Army in 1943, he was a police inspector before joining the army. In 1952,


¹ Mitha, *Unlikely Beginnings*.

Lieutenant Colonel Ali Haider was sent for a commando course at England, he however failed to pass the course, main reason was his being old in age. The school was thus transferred to Attock Fort; later in 1952 the school was put in suspended animation. A year later the same institution was reorganised as **312 Garrison Company {Frontier Force}** under the command of Lieutenant Suleiman with Major Abu Bakr Osman Mitha, who was performing the duty of Grade Staff Officer {GSO-2} in General Headquarters, as the overall officer in charge for training and doctrine.

In 1954, Major Mitha after having undergone the Staff College at Quetta and having served as brigade major in an infantry brigade was posted back in Military Directorate; he was sent to England to undergo Senior Officers Course at Devizes. After the course he also had an attachment with Commando School and later underwent attachment with Royal marines and was trained as Frogman. Major Mitha had an interesting interaction with General Ayub Khan. One day Mitha was playing squash at present day Rawalpindi Club, he was a vocal player, ‘soon I saw the General Ayub standing on the gallery in sports dress, he was playing tennis in adjoining courts, he inquired ‘‘young man are you always so noisy in playing squash’’, I nodded in affirmative, he asked my name, and inquired about my grandfather Sir Suleiman Mitha whom he knew, few questions about my career and When I told him that I have been a paratrooper and taken part in few actions behind the Japanese in last war, he nodded in appreciation’ thus started a long professional relationship between Major Mitha and General Ayub Khan.

Pakistan was already a pro-western democratic country and in 1954 it formally joined the military alliances created by USA which included SEATO and CENTO. Resultantly Americans agreed to raise ‘Four and Half Divisions’ of army with the latest equipment along with aircraft for Pakistan Air Force. This force was meant to stop, retard and delay the perceived Russian or Communist invasion. For well over a century the policy of British India ‘Forward Policy’ was meant to stop the Russian invasion and after independence the same policy remained in place. Americans highlighted the fact that a special organization, an outfit, a unit is required to be raised which should be able to protect and retrieve downed pilots in the event of an Russian invasion, act as a nucleus around which guerrilla activities can be launched; around this cardinal point was raised the present day Special Service Group .

In May 1955, Deputy Chief of General Staff {DCGS} Brigadier Yahya Khan had a meeting with Lieutenant Colonel Don Bunte in which the idea of a 'Stay Behind Unit' was discussed. Later Lieutenant Colonel Mitha who was now the Inspector of Physical Training and also the Commandant of Physical Training School at Abbottabad was called to GHQ and had a meeting with Don Bunte. The American in the first stage was more interested in having a reconnaissance of entire Pakistan; thus Mitha and Bunte drove from Peshawar to Quetta, from Quetta to Jiwani and back and later to Rawalpindi via Multan. After this month long reconnaissance Lieutenant Colonel went back to USA, he later wrote a paper on the utility of Stay Behind Activities Unit; he was able to convince his higher officials on the idea and as such by the end of the year he came back to Pakistan with his team of officers which included Captain Russ Taylor and Lieutenant Shoepe.



In Pakistan, Major Mitha was the natural choice and he was posted to 17th Baluch Regiment. This regiment was raised in 1942 at Karachi and in September 1955 it had arrived at Nowshera from Bannu; where on 26th September 1955, Lieutenant Colonel Mitha took over the command². It had been decided in principle to form the new 'special' unit around the nucleus of 17th Baluch Regiment. Choice of Baluch regiment was more due to the fact that Brigadier Yahya himself was commissioned and commanded a Baluch regiment; Yahya was one of the biggest supporter of the commando concept in Pakistan.

Another reconnaissance was undertaken for the selection of the 'home and training base' for the new regiment. The selection of a 'home' for this newly born force was a delicate issue, unlike other regiments, secrecy was the key factor for SSG, thus the sites initially reconnoitred included Fort Munro, Khan Pur, Razmak, Wana Chaman, Hamsharian, Kakul, Attock and Cherat; in the end Attock Fort and Cherat were chosen as the home station and training centre; there could not have been a better choice than these.

² *History of Baluch Regiment*, papers sent by 19th Baluch to the centre, SSG Archives, Tarbela.

Raising and Organisation of SSG- 19th Baluch Regiment

By the end December 1955, the 17th Baluch had returned all its surplus equipment, weapons and ammunition. The present strength of the battalion were given the option of serving in the new role as volunteer provided they pass the physical tests; Selection standards were high that only one company of 17th Battalion the Baluch Regiment was retained, more for administrative purpose than for actual operation or training. 312 Garrison Company (Special Service Group) after undergoing the tests, only volunteers were retained. Major Shariff, Captain Riaz were retained from the Baluch Regiment where as Lieutenant Saleem Zia who was Mitha's adjutant at PT School also volunteered and was appointed as adjutant. He in later years rose to the rank of brigadier and commanded the SSG, he was also among a handful of officers of Pakistan Army who were qualified both as commando and an aviator.

On 4th February 1956, part of battalion including the headquarters moved to Cherat and on 14th February the remaining segment of the battalion arrived at Attock Fort. Simultaneously recruiting parties including the commanding officer went on a tour of regimental centres and various stations to select the volunteers from all arms and services. A new company was thus raised from these new volunteers, This company was the first company of the Special Service Group and was named as 'A Company'. Major Gadeen Khan Abdullai was the first Company Commander and he had Captain R. B. Baluch, Captain Muhammad Suleiman Khan and Captain Abdul Shakur Jan as his platoon commanders

Lieutenant Colonel Mitha on the raising of SSG was called personally by General Ayub Khan discussed the very character of the new unit; General Ayub Khan placed the unit directly under his own command and instructed Lieutenant Colonel Mitha to report directly to him or to Brigadier Yahya for any administrative issue. It was customary, that whenever lieutenant colonel Mitha would be in GHQ he had to inform the military secretary to the commander in chief about his presence in the headquarters. The SSG was a top secret unit thus majority of the paper



work were burnt after reading and instructions were passed verbally. No officer from regular army no matter what the rank is, could not visit Cherat without the permission from GHQ.

In March 1956, Mitha was advised by the American team to have a visit of American training institutions, thus Mitha spent over six weeks in USA. He was taken around different organisations and briefed by Central Intelligence Agency{CIA} staff as well. He was given preliminary training in guerrilla warfare concept, taken to Fort Bragg to undergo parachute training, Americans were using two parachutes during the jump. Later few days of frogman training, Americans were having the compressed gas and as such they were diving down to hundred feet. A short but useful stay at the mountain training school was the culmination point of Lieutenant Colonel's Mitha's tour and training. More than anything else, it gave an insight into American way of life and culture. As Major General Mitha later wrote in his autobiography, ' I had first interaction with American army and soldiers in Burma, at that time they looked a bunch of undisciplined and sex maniac uniform personals...during my stay at USA, I Found them highly disciplined and adhering to strict protocol among themselves...they had a notion of that everything which is American as to be the best and must be applied across the globe...by and large the majority of Americans are ignorant about the world'.³

The induction of men and officers was a meticulous system, Mitha and his officers visited the centres and selected men who had very abinitio training, the reason given by the Mitha was that, he wanted to have men who have not yet polluted by the ceremonial aspect of regular army. Similarly in case of officers, the main emphasis apart from the physical fitness was the honesty and integrity. Any one. found even giving a hint of disclosing the facts was sent home packing; usually before the lunch was even consumed. Men and officers were made aware of the fact that they will not share anything regarding the SSG with anyone, although they were encouraged to enlist men whom they know and trust.

On 23rd May 1956, the nomenclature of the battalion was changed into 19th Battalion Baluch Regiment {SSG}; it was in 1964 that it was modified into 19th {Para} Battalion the Baluch Regiment {SSG}. Initially the 19th Baluch had the standard infantry organisation, having four companies and a headquarters company, however in new role Lieutenant Colonel Mitha organised it into three wings namely the administrative, training and operation wings;. Lieutenant Colonel Mitha remained in command from September 1955 – June 1961. Major Aslam {Military Cross} was his second in command, Captain Ghulam Muhammad as adjutant, Captain Muhammad Riaz as quartermaster, station staff officer was Captain Saleem Zia. There were three companies namely A, E and I{Signal company}. Major Gaiden Khan and Captain Shakoor Jan in A Company, Captain Saeed Nawaz, Captain Azam Khattak{E Company} Captain Sindhu in I Company. Other officers who joined in this period

³ Mitha *Unlikely Beginnings*, pp

included Major Shuaib, Major R.B. Baluch, Captain Akram, Captain Imtiaz, Captain Suleiman and Captain Mahmood Kamal. In GHQ, Major Shariff was the officer dealing with the affairs of the SSG, which was included as part of infantry directorate{Infantry-8}.

Captain Mahmood Kamal raised the M company in 1958-59, Mahmood was from Guides Cavalry, this company was known as the Frogman company, with the task of operating underwater, providing support not only to own battalion but also to Pakistan Navy as well, it was initially stationed at Mangla and later moved to Karachi. Captain Mahmood underwent courses at USA alongwith handful of soldiers. Captain Hakim Arshad Qureshi{later major general} was the other officer selected for the frogman company, he did not knew swimming and as such was reluctant to join it, Lieutenant Colonel Mitha, consoled him and said 'I am not picking you up for swimming but for drowning'; later Captain Hakim went on to command the company as well.⁴ SSG officers were not wearing regular army uniform, they were authorised to drive vehicles which had civilian number plates and they were authorised to drive army vehicles as well, this caused many a delicate scenes in which field formations wrote letters against the SSG officers but every time the reply was that it is authorised by army chief. Later an authority letter was issued by GHQ but only to SSG, which as and when required basis was sent to the concerned formations.

The newly raised SSG was keenly observed by the senior officers of Pakistan Army{Pakarmy}, Brigadier Yahya Khan as DCGS{deputy chief of general staff} visited it on 24th August 1956, he again visited the unit on 23rd May 1958 as CGS{chief of general staff}. Brigadier Syed Peerzada as DMO{director military operations} inspected the unit on 3rd November 1959. Field Marshall Ayub Khan twice visited the battalion, first on 11th October 1956 and then on 4th April 1957 when he was accompanied by the CGS Major General Habib Ullah Khan.. Commander in Chief General Musa Khan was among the SSG troops on 23rd May 1959; he was taken around the training and shown the hideout drills. General Musa observed a commando cooking frogs, and he inquired about it, General remarked to the extent that it is more of a showpiece arranged for him. The soldier promptly replied in negative and Commander in Chief made a statement that if he will also eat the frog, if the soldiers are eating it, 'the soldier cooked few frogs and ate them in front of General Musa, I must give credit to General Musa as he kept his words, I do not know whether he ate it or gulped it but he took one frog and simple swallowed it'.⁵

Training. The training of the SSG in the initial days was primarily focussed on physical fitness, American instructors taught about the menace of communism. Essays and articles translated from French formed the core component of the indoctrination, 'What is Revolountary Warfare' was a first choice of literature in which Viet Minh, Communist Insurrection in Greece and Iranian Tudeh were taught. Later in the course counter resistance measures was taught in second week, demolition constituted a four hours of teaching, improvised firing techniques,

⁴ Lieutenant Colonel Ghulam Gilani, *SSG Tareekh Kay Ainay Mein*, {SSG Headquarters, 2003}.pp,12-36.

⁵ Mitha *Unlikely Beginnings*, pp,200-226

fuses, air operations, ambush, and psychological warfare were other key ingredients of the training. Clandestine operation consumed 160 hours of the training, escape and evasion took 16 hours and fieldcraft another 30 hours.⁶ The officers after completing their training were posted to the companies composed of newly selected men and were made responsible for their training. Platoons were trained by the officers for three months, after which the platoons were given tasks, like raid and ambush. Companies also trained in similar fashion, a company would be sent on leave collectively after undergoing the training cycle.⁷

At the 'H' Company office Captain Manto, Guides Cavalry, 6th PMA Course, from the first parade to the game parade I was to move at the double when going from one place to another, that every morning there would be PT except on Saturday, that on Wednesday there would be five mile run with the '80' pack, on Saturday there would be a fifteen miles routes march with full' field service marching order' and every evening, except Saturday there would be games, Captain Manto then me in his jeep a little distance on a track leading out of Cherat and indicated an area about three hundred feet below the road level and told me that it was my training area.

Next I was introduced to the platoon that I was to train and in the process, get my own training. The men were volunteers and had been selected from all over the army, the incentive were the monetary allowance, certain deviations from the time honored army routines and methods such as no roll calls. The men did not march in bodies to their place of duty and the most appreciated privilege was of being allowed to proceed on weekend leave by signing out and signing in on return. There were about forty men in the platoon, for some reason there was no Junior Commissioned Officer or a havildar, the senior most NCO was Naik, I appointed him as the platoon havildar and my second in command, and appointed other NCOs, according to their seniority, in charge of sections.

The training started with basic fieldcraft training and night training stalking, this followed by patrolling, then selection and occupation or hideouts. Night training would start about eight o'clock at night, continue till about three o'clock in the morning and the next morning would be off till eleven.

The Cherat hills were very steep, covered with wild olive bushes and were full of snakes, vipers around Cherat and Kraits in the foot hills. In one stalking exercise at night I was going down-hill, holding bushes and feeling for foot holds, and while I was hanging from a bushes snake went over my chest touching my neck and I could feel it passing over me.

⁶ SSG Archives, Tarbela.

⁷ For more about early training, see Brigadier Zaheer Khan's *The Way It Was* { Army Book Club, 2000}, Chapter III.

In the selection and occupation of hideous, I was told to move my platoon to within a given area and hide there for three days, cooking our own food and the ‘Demonstration Company’ who acted as the enemy in exercises, would search for us. If an officer got caught by the enemy he had to pay a fine to the ‘Demo Company’ men a chit was signed and handed over to whoever was the commander and the amount was charged in the mess bill, besides this the ‘ Demo Company’ men would dance a bhangra around the officer. We moved out of Cherat in the evening with all the things that we thought would be necessary, early in the morning we stopped in an considered safe, when the sun camp up we found that the area was open and we could be seen from miles around and decided to have our morning meal and move out, Captain Jaffer Shah, Corps of Engineers, later lieutenant Colonel, was my umpire, we were sitting side by side when a small little krait snake came and started striking at Jaffer shah’s boot toe. I noticed it first and was watching it repeatedly striking the toe of Jaffer Shah’s boot when Jaffer Shah noticed me starting at his boot, he looked down, saw the snake about to strike him and made the most spectacular jump backward from a setting position. On this exercise the Demo Company found our hide-out but they did not find me. I hid a nullah bed when the attack alarm went. In the next exercise of this kind that we went out, we shed a lot of things that we had taken on the first outing, each individual worked out what his necessities were on an exercise and made his own arrangements. Weapons, communication equipment etc had to be carried according to the assigned mission.

As the training progressed, the number of men decreased every week, most of them quitting because they found that they did not have the physical endurance required. When I started the training, I did not own a pair of army boots because in the Armoured Corps we mostly wore rubber-soled shoes. I had not been on a route march after leaving the PMA, on the first route march I wore a pair of half Wellingtons and my feet blistered, I then brought a pair of army boots. Broke them in and got used to wearing army boots again.

When they had completed three months training, all platoons were given a test exercise, Captain Zaheer was given the demolition of a bridge located on the Grand Trunk Road near the Kamra airfield. He was called from the game parade in the evening and given the mission, the only information given was that the bridge over the Indus was guarded. *I assembled my platoon, briefed them and we moved out after having the evening meal, after marching all night we stopped about five miles from the Attock road cum rail bridge. I sent scouts to check how the bridge was guarded and to explore the availability of boots. My scouts returned and reported that all trucks were being stopped and searched and that the river was in high floods with no boats available. Sine no vehicular traffic was permitted floods with no over the Attock bridge, my only alternative was the railway. We moved to the Khairabad railways station and waited for a train to stop, late at night a goods train stopped, I went to the locomotive and talked the driver into stopping at the Attock station across the bridge, this way we the Indus. ‘E’ Company located at Attock Fort, was to act as our enemy and Captain Mirza Aslam Beg, later general and Chief of Army Staff, was to act our umpire, After the umpire Joined us and we had given map reference of our out a reconnaissance of the bridge, and we attacked. The attack was deemed successful*

and I was ordered by Lieutenant Colonel Mitha to report back at Cherat. We were not stopped to move during the day but calculating summed I marched the platoon towards Cherat hoping to reach the foothills on Cherat in daylight. On the way my platoon was ambushed, after we scattered the enemy started shouting and asking us to stop running. Cautiously we contacted the men who had ambushed us and found it was a platoon of '11' Company, also on a test exercise like us, and had ambushed us as joke, Captain Hamayun Malik , 6 Lancers, later brigadier, was the platoon commander and he remained me innumerable time about this ambush. After the ambush both the platoons marched together, all night we could see the red light over the PAF radio antenna in Cherat, all night it seemed around the next bend but we only reached it when dawn was breaking.



Companies were trained to operate in the mountains during summer and winter with special equipment. The area they normally went to for training was in Swat beyond Kalam, the road to which was very bad in those days and where nobody else went. The only accommodation was a two-roomed rest house. In winter and summer the company including the officers lived in the special two-man tents. Major General Mitha later wrote, *Mountain warfare was nothing new to us, but winter combined with snow warfare was, and had to train ourselves, which we did.*

One company was sent to East Pakistan to train, be able to operate in the monsoon and in the dry weather. Another company was trained in desert warfare, and another company was trained for fighting in towns. These companies were not trained for regular warfare in these areas, but in how to organize and carry out guerrilla warfare.

Once the two months of initial training was completed. The officers and men were posted to companies. After the first two intake had been, all other companies were trained by the company commanders and Lieutenant Colonel Mitha I tested them when they had finished their initial training. Every man was trained in basic demolition, to drive a vehicle in case of emergency, in advanced map reading and navigation, to operate a wireless set in an emergency, Morse Code, rock climbing, swimming, first aid, and unarmed combat. After this phase of training was

finished, the men had to specialize in two of the trades, thus every group had a specialist in each of the trades. The officers were given advanced training in target analysis. *A very important subject as without this it was impossible to do any job with small groups, which was the whole aim of a unit like the SSG. As I have said, great emphasis continued to be given to night training and physical fitness.* Wrote Lieutenant Colonel Mitha almost forty years after he conducted the training

Every companies in Cherat had to jog downhill two miles to Chapri check-post and back every week, and each man had to carry 40 lb, in his pack. The companies in Attock did not do this because there were no suitable hills nearby, but they had their turn when they came to Cherat in the normal process of rotation of the companies between Cherat and Attock. Every four months each company had to do a thirty-six mile test which had to be completed in nine hours. Every man had to carry his weapon and pouch ammunition and 40 lb. in his pack.

When all twelve companies had been raised, the group did a hundred miles on an individual basis. The men carried no weapons or packs and water points were installed at frequent intervals. Langars were also set up at various places.

100 Miles March- (1960)

SSG set the physical standards in Pakistan Army, a 100 miles marching competition among the SSG companies was conducted on 2nd April 1960 . It comprised of non stop marching, over 20 miles of track, 40 miles on cross country, 25 miles over a metallic road and in the end the 15 miles walk to reach the Cherat ; which invariably involves a climb from 1500 feet to 4300 feet. All in all 57 officers and men were able to do it within 29 hours. The best average time was returned by the G Company having 31 hours and 4 minutes and was declared the champion. Best timing was achieved by Naik{No 3031362} Ghulam Miran who completed the distance in 21 hours and 58 mins; he was 38 years old. Captain Syed Ahmad completed the distance in 25 hours and 14 mins and thus achieved the best time amongst the officers. Jemadar {PJO 31613} Inayat Ullah of G Company was overall second, his timings were 26 hours and 39 minutes; he was 39 years old.



This march was a sensation at that time, it highlighted the physical prowess of SSG to the entire army and nation; Naik Ghulam Miran was awarded Tamgha –I- Imtiaz for his feat, which was considered a world record at that time.

Tirch Mir and SSG -1961

Pakistan is blessed with the three highest mountain ranges in the world namely Karakorum, Himalaya and Hindukush, five peaks over 8000 meters are among these ranges. In the early sixties, SSG took over the mantle of setting the physical and adventure training spirit among the army and country. Tirch Mir {25000 feet} is the highest peak in Hindukush located at the western most extremities of Chitral; overlooking the Afghanistan. In August 1961, a eight member SSG mountaineering expedition team led by Major{PA 4058} Nishat Ahmed attempted to scale it, it fell short of the peak yet the very fact that it was the highest altitude which was reached by any Pakistani army unit then, made the headlines. Team was commended for its efforts and all members were awarded with C-in-C commendation cards. This romance with mountains continued in coming years.

Bajaur- Dir Operation

The very first operational employment of the SSG took place in September 1960, Pakistan's relationship with Afghanistan had reached their lowest ebb, Afghans started instigating frontier fiefdoms on rebellion. Area north of Peshawar was an amalgamation of princely state of Swat and Chitral whereas the Dir was sandwiched between these two ; Bajaur on the other hand was an extension of tribal chieftainship. Both Bajaur and Dir were playing the role of puppets in the hands of Afghanistan , thus it was pertinent to influence a change of rulers. Since the reports from various agencies were not only sketchy but at times confusing as well, so the Special Service Group (SSG) was tasked to send a team in disguise, to assess the real ground situation. On 18th September 1960, Lieutenant Colonel Mitha , briefed Captain Abdur Rauf on the overall situation . For the purpose Captain Rauf along with Havildar Sikander {A Company} proceeded to the region in the guise of local inhabitants. From Chakdara onward they were to cover the area on foot while carrying the required stores and communication equipment on donkeys to look like the ordinary folks of the area. However, after some time the communication was totally lost which created some panic in the concerned quarters. An urgent message was sent from SSG to despatch aircraft next morning to Peshawar for search mission. For the purpose Captain Mushtaq Madni and Captain A R Kallue (both retired as Lieutenant Colonels) were nominated. Captain Kallue was selected for the mission as he was a good friend of Captain Rauf and could recognize him from some distance. From Peshawar, the pilots flew to Malakand and via Chakdara followed the only road leading to Khar area. Couple of miles short of Khar village, the group with two donkeys was spotted. Low passes were made and Captain Rauf was recognized by Captain Kallue without any doubt. Later Captain Rauf reached back Peshawar safely with the desired information.

Dir

Dir State operation took place on the heel of success in Bajaur, on 28th September 1960, Major S.Manto was busy with his company at the firing range when he got the message to immediately report at commanding officer's office. Lieutenant Colonel Mitha briefed Major Manto, 'select 20 men, and be ready to move out of Cherat by 1730 hours...you have to reach Chitral by tomorrow and subsequently to undertake a mission in support of 7 Division for the overthrow of Nawab of Dir...you will be wearing the militia uniform, which you will collect from Balahisar Fort... I will join you at the Peshawar airfield next morning'. Major Manto took Lieutenant Fakher and his men along with required maps and equipment and promptly departed Cherat at given time. Next morning {29th September 1960} the force took off from Peshawar and arrived at Chitral airfield in two Dakotas. Pakistan Air Force had attached an aircrew exclusively for the SSG and it was the same crew which took the force to Chitral.

At that time Chitral Scouts had their headquarters at Drosh Fort which is thirty odd miles east of Chitral city. Lieutenant Colonel Gulsher the commandant of Chitral Scouts further briefed the SSG contingent on the local politics and general layout of the operation. Two battalions of Frontier Corps namely I & II Mahsud Battalions were also part of the force along with Chitral Scouts. The information about the Dir city itself was scant, Military Intelligence had reported about the possession of eight 6 Pounder artillery gun and close to 5000 troops in Nawab's arsenal. The plan given by intelligence which involved burning of the Dir city itself was rejected by the Lieutenant Colonel Mitha, basing upon his own conviction; later a modified plan was agreed upon. SSG in the coming days carried out reconnaissance of the area, furthermore as a guise and cover story, they move to Mirkani Fort, a further ten odd miles east of Drosh Fort, where they trained the Mahsud Battalions. A further reinforcement of SSG, one platoon ex G Company under Major Nishat arrived at Mirkani.

On 8th October 1960, the SSG move out from Mirkani and reached Ziarat, a platoon size post of Chitral Scouts at Lowari Top; Brigadier Shariff the designated force commander also joined the contingent. An hour before the scheduled launching of the operation, the whole operation was put off till the final orders of go ahead from GHQ; they finally got the message late at night thus operation commenced next morning. At first light on 10th October 1960, SSG was in position around the Dir city, pair of Pakistan Airforce aircraft also appeared on horizon, they made low passes over the city, dropped the leaflets asking for surrender of Nawab of Dir. The Nawab himself made a last minute attempt to arouse his people, he was also banking upon armed help from Afghan Lashkar, Nawab's party was ambushed by the SSG and with this his last hope and will was broken. Later he was taken in a helicopter accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel Mitha to Lahore. Nawab's son Khusro was made the new Nawab and situation returned to normalcy, the information about artillery pieces turned out to be an imagination.

High Alerts – April - September 1961.

The very first alert for SSG in relation to its proposed and designated tasks came in April 1961, when GHQ as a precaution, keeping in view the relations with India, put SSG on high alert. Lieutenant Colonel Aslam, MC, called the conference of all company commanders {A,E,J,H} other companies K was performing the administrative duty and G was in Gilgit for survey. The SSG remained on high alert for fifteen days and it was only on the last day of April that they received 'stand down' orders. The major weakness that was observed during this high alert was the lack of a mobility plan and the unsatisfactory state of military transport; over and above the realisation of lacking airborne capability was acutely felt.

Another high alert came on 23rd September same year but this time, it was Afghanistan which caused it. Captain Khursheed Ghias Ahmad was sent to Arandu{Chitral} with command of a platoon{G Company}. The force was attired in militia dress, they arrived at Chitral in Dakota and from Chitral city they drove to Drosh onwards to Arandu. The last ten miles had to be trekked on foot as it was unfit for any vehicular movement. Arandu is a frontier post, a junction of Chitral River and Bashgall Nullah, the boundary line is thirty yards ahead of own post; on opposite side Birkot Fort was under repair. Own SSG collected information about the area mainly from smugglers which invariably were double agents; Afghans used to call this force as Lawanna {mad} as narrated by the smugglers, mainly for the reason that these SSG were seen roaming at day and night over the mountains and in the nullahs. In November, Captain S.A. Durrani replaced Captain Khursheed, in April 1962 the SSG returned to home base.

SSG and Nagas

The tensions on eastern and western borders were mainly due to India's intervention and backing; thus when the opportunity arise in 1962 to pay back her in same currency, it was grabbed. Nagaland is the easternmost territory of India encompassing seventeen different tribes, mainly Christians. Nagas from 1947 had a troubled relationship with India, it was in May 1962 that Mr Phizo the guerrilla leader of insurgency requested Pakistan for military assistance and training; in the background of the India's conduct in recent past, it was agreed to provide Nagas with assistance.


In July 1962, a five member SSG training team led by Major Masood Kamal alongwith Captain Khalid Musharraf, Subedar Zardad and Havildars Allah Ditta and Allah Din arrived in Dacca from Cherat. The team established a training camp, rather it would be more appropriate to call it a hideout near Kumbhi {Sylhet}. Nagas strength was around 150, having a fair number of women as part of them. Training concentrated on map reading, patrolling, hideout, ambush, raid and basic techniques of explosives and demolition. Language was a major barrier in training as these Nagas spoke three different languages thus there were three interpreters, training area itself was small. Nagas were an excellent breed of fighters, simple in nature, religious and physically very tough; men and women carried 80-100 pounds of weight over 25-30 miles of jungle

tracks during training. They all were volunteers, and had trekked over five hundred miles to learn the fine art of fighting in order to repulse the Indian aggression in their area. In September 1962, Captain Kazam Kamal replaced Captain Musharraf as the training officer incharge. In March 1963, the training was concluded and the camp wind down with the SSG team returning back to home base enriched with the art of jungle warfare .

Change of Command (1962)

Lieutenant Colonel Abu Bakar Osman Mitha on promotion was posted out and Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Aslam, MC took-over the command on 25th June 1962. It was a momentous moment in every sense, Mitha had attained a mythical status in the army and within SSG he was loved and feared at the same time. On his posting the digest of service records ‘ The month of June was marked with farewell parties and qawwalis in the honour of outgoing commanding officer’.⁸ Lieutenant Colonel Aslam as his successor was a very wise step, it helped in the continuity of the Scarlet Thread around which the SSG took birth and Aslam had been among the pioneer officer of SSG. Having been the Second in Command with Lieutenant Colonel Abu Bakar Osman Mitha, thus he had no difficulty in maintaining the same tempo and culture of SSG.

Lieutenant Colonel A.O. Mitha was born on 1st June 1923 in Bombay, commissioned in 2/4 Bombay Grenadiers in 1942 , a veteran of Burma campaign, he served in 14/7 Rajputtana Rifles, later he was among the pioneer Muslim officers to undergo Parachute training and he served in 4th Para Battalion. He also served in 1/8 Punjab regiment and commanded 9/8 Punjab Regiment. A graduate from Command and Staff College Quetta and later served as brigade major in 105 Brigade. He was the pioneer officer of SSG and commanded 19th Baluch Regiment for six years. Major General Mitha, later served as Colonel Staff 10 Infantry Division, Commandant of Baluch Regimental Centre at Abbottabad, commanded an independent brigade at Commilla in East Pakistan during 1965 War, Commandant Pakistan Military Academy, General Officer Commanding 1st Armoured Division at Multan and his last posting was Quarter Master General {QMG} in GHQ during the 1971 War; after which he was retired prematurely for ‘no fault of officer’. Major General Mitha took his last breath in Rawalpindi on 4th December 1999; he was given the ceremonial burial by a squad of SSG and officers of the group paid last respect to the



⁸ SSG Archives, Tarbela.

man who laid and nurtured the SSG. Major General Mitha was popularly known as 'Aboo', he was fond of reading, especially the history and philosophy, preferred classic music, remained physically fit throughout his life, an excellent Squash player and a keen sportsman. He had seen many ups and down in his career, for the reason that all his and his wife Indu Mitha's family were in India. Aboo himself and his wife belonged to well to do families in India, but Mitha out of sheer love for the profession of army preferred Pakistan. Major General Mitha wrote two books, namely *Fallacies and Realities* in 1993 and an autobiography *Unlikely Beginnings* which was published posthumously in 2003. As a mark of respect, a company in Special Service Group is named after him 'Mitha Company'. Also the main chowk in Cherat, is named after him.

National Standard Presentation

National Standard is the biggest honour which any battalion, not only in Pakistan but world over strives; to be presented with. It thus becomes the honour of the battalion, in Islamic military traditions the flag or Alm has a very special place. 30th May 1962, is milestone date in the history of SSG, on this day, Commander in Chief of Pakistan Army presented the National Standard to the 19th {Para} Battalion, The Baluch Regiment {Special Services Group} at Cherat.

Exercise 'Joint Train' and 'Tayyyar' 1962-1963.

Exercise 'Joint Train' was conducted from 30th September to 26th October 1962 in area Manshehra Valley. A team of American Special Forces took part in the exercise. The exercise was planned to practice, organized and conduct raids and ambushes in 'enemy' occupied area. During this exercise Special Forces both American and Pakistan were parachuted into the 'enemy' territory. This was the first para jump in Pakistan after partition. The Drop Zone was in area Manshehra. Another exercise Tayyar was conducted in May-June 1963. From early 1961 after SSG had raised and trained 12 companies, it was felt that the present organization of the Special Service Group was becoming unwieldy due to expansion, operations and training commitment not only in West Pakistan but also in East Pakistan. An outline organization was worked out to make independent wings both in West and East Pakistan with headquarter in Cherat to be commanded by a colonel /brigadier. To demonstrate the operational capability of Special Service Group a large scale exercise was designed by General Headquarters. The exercise was named "**Tayyar**". This exercise was attended by the then Chief in Command General Muhammad Musa, Chief of General Staff, principal staff officers, and all the division commanders. Colonel Abu Bakar Osman Mitha who was commanding Baluch Regiment Centre at that time was the director of the exercise. All the pioneer officers of Special Service Group were called for umpiring the sub units during the exercise. The area of exercise expanded from Manshehra to Hyderabad a distance of over 500 miles. This exercise proved very successful in presenting the capabilities and the limitations of the Special Service Group in various operation fields.

Overhead Dwarka

A year before the conflict, two L-19s alongwith two SSG officers carried out first ever cross border aerial reconnaissance.. In February 1962, a flight of 2 Squadron had co-operated with 19 Baloch Regiment in Hyderabad area. The background of these missions was to facilitate the 19 Baloch Regiment SSG in preparing contingency plans involving commando raids on Indian naval installations. Captain Vardag of SSG was commanding PNS Himalaya for over four years and was the brain behind these plans. He had been trained in America for underwater commando operations. He had convinced the higher authorities on the feasibility of destroying certain Indian naval installations by using his elite naval commando force. He had also been practicing jumps from the amphibious aircraft of PAF, Albatross SA-16. This company of SSG was stationed at Bholari Airfield for secrecy. Captain Vardag informed pilots of carrying out aerial photography of the Dwarka radar station located at the edge of Rann of Kutch. Subsequently Captain Subhan Baig of army aviation planned the mission for the next morning.

Preliminary Reconnaissance. On 19th April 1964, aircraft took off from Hyderabad with Captain Vardag and Captain Sadiq on board for preliminary reconnaissance of the target area. They flew to within one mile of the target area maintaining 15 feet of height. They found the general target area clear, without any movement. Both guerrilla captains left for Bholari to brief their company. SSG at that time was tasked to prepare contingency plans for all disputed territories. With the help of Army Aviators these two commando officers wanted to have a close look at the radar and carry out photography. Pilots and commandos discussed all eventualities including reaction of Indian Air Force and ground based weapons, thus an outline plan was conceived for the reconnaissance. The general outline of the plan revolved around SSG infiltrating on the same night (19th April 1964) and placing themselves close to the target. They were to provide physical cover to pilots in case of any emergency. These SSG troops also had the ACT sets.

On 21st April 1964, team got airborne from Hyderabad Strip at 0600 hours. They were in communication with SSG troops who had infiltrated close to the target area apart from Badin and Karachi Air Bases. At 0730 hours aircraft reached Dwarka area maintaining tree top level. Simultaneously both SSG officers started taking photographs. The enemy on ground did not react although army vehicles were visible. Probably Indians were too surprised to react. After three minutes of photography own aircraft rushed back. Same day, they flew to Drigh Road

Karachi , where films were developed and at night Captain Vardag and Captain Sadiq gave the bad news that western side of the target area has not been photographed and it is vital for any successful raid on the target. **Final Run.** On 22 April 1964, they took off from Hyderabad in dark at 0430 hours and planned to reach target area by 0600 hours. Everything went as planned and hit the south-eastern side of the radar station keeping a distance of 800 yards from it. SSG officers took the requisite photographs. On the third run they were fired upon by the ground troops, meanwhile Badin Radar also came on the air and advised them to exit the target. Own SSG and aviation landed safely at Mauripur.

Military setbacks in Rann of Kutch had demoralized the Indians to an extent that the then Indian Premier Shastri ordered “**Operation Ablaze.**” He also moved formations into their battle locations in May and captured three outlying posts in Kargil area on 16th May 1965. Pakistan took preventive measures and deployed its field formations to prevent any Indian misadventure.



Major General Abu Bakr Osman Mitha in Maroon Seater, in 1998 at Cherat as Chief Guest

Chapter III

Special Service Group & Wars of 1965 -1971

1965 is a milestone in Pakistan's history, despite numerically outnumbered by Indian military, own defence forces not only blunted the Indian attack on 6th September, but also captured more territory when the ceasefire was agreed on 27th September 1965. A war is not judged purely on the area and casualties suffered or inflicted rather the impact of war on the morale of the nation is what matters in the end. In 1965, Pakistan military aggressively took Indians head on; the root cause was Kashmir. The year had started in a peaceful manner but the decade old boundary disputes in Rann of Kutch ignited the buried animosity among two rival and opposing ideologies.

Rann of Kutch {April- May 1965} was a limited act of violence in terms of troops and duration, at the end both countries agreed to resolve the issue by appointing an arbitrary commission. SSG did not participated in the action however it is worth mentioning that SSG had a plan to destroy Dwarka; the major Indian Naval base in the area.

Ranger Battalions

In July 1965, the nomenclature of the SSG was change into Rangers Wings. Thus the old 19th Baluch Regiment was reverted back to army and instead the manpower retained was divided into three wings, known as No.1 Ranger Battalion, No. 2 Ranger Battalion and a new unit was raised as No.3 Rangers Battalion. Among these three Rangers battalions, the No.3 Rangers was raised in East Pakistan and placed undercommand of 14 Infantry Division. The SSG was now modelled and organised as an independent group equivalent to an infantry brigade. Thus staff appointments like grade II for training and operations were created and filled. A deputy commander post was also created, for administrative purposes the appointment of quartermasters and staff officers were incorporated in the table of organisation and equipment. No.1 Ranger Battalion was stationed at Cherat and No.2 Rangers Battalion at Attock. This change over was initiated in the first week of July and lasted till the end of August, the complete property and equipment had to be distributed among the two Ranger Battalions; all in all there were 348 files heads which needs to be distributed among these two. This exercise took a heavy toll on the training and planning of the upcoming

operations, as considerable time was spent on this transition. Later in 1966, the nomenclature of Rangers was dropped and instead Commando Battalions was adopted which is lasting till now.

Operation Gibraltar

After the Rann Of Kutch embarrassment, Indians adopted an aggressive posture towards Pakistan, threatening to open a front of their own choice. Pakistan, morally, emotionally, politically had been supporting the freedom movement in Kashmir. Above everything else, Kashmir was and is, the pivot of Pakistan's military strategy. From early sixties {1963}, under the Mr Zulfikar Bhutto then foreign minister, a Kashmir cell was raised to keep the issue alive. Officers and men from SSG were deputed to establish training camps for the freedom fighters in Azad Kashmir. In line with the military thinking of that era, it was conceived and planned to raise a guerrilla force comprising of Kashmir freedom fighters, trained by own SSG, later led into Indian held Kashmir to carryout sabotage activities to an extent that the local population themselves stand up and force the Indians to abide by the united Nations resolution which calls for a plebiscite in valley. A near perfect plan, which by all accounts and rationality was deemed to be a success.

12 Infantry Division under Major General Akhtar Malik was made responsible for the operation, he



presented his plan **Operation Gibraltar** to President Ayub Khan and senior army commanders, on 13th July 1965' plan was approved. The plan envisaged infiltration by small groups into Indian Held Kashmir {IHK}; area of operation was divided into four sectors. Main hypothesis revolved around the local population supporting the guerrillas, enemy committing a sizeable force to counter them thus losing moral ground among the international community. A second hypothesis was also evolved, in which, .after the favourable environments have been created then to launch a second offensive from Bhimber towards Akhnur; it was code name as **Operation Grand Slam**.

Resultantly a 5000-7000 force was raised and trained by SSG within six weeks, the Scarlet Thread of the Operation Gibraltar, revolved around two columns of forces converging from north and west at Srinagar. The force structure comprised of seven forces namely Tariq, Qasim, Khalid, Salahuddin, Ghaznvi, Babur and Nusrat . These seven forces, each had three companies which were commanded by an officer from Azad Kashmir. Major Sindhu and Captain Zaka Afridi of SSG were responsible for the establishing and training of force in signal communication. SSG provided the necessary instructors and manpower for training of this force. Camps were established at Kotli, Mong Bajri, Shinkiari and Rattu. One or two officers, four non-commissioned officers and sixteen soldiers from SSG were employed at each camp for training. The primary focus of training was in handling of weapons and explosives.

Along with the Gibraltar force, SSG planned to carryout deep raids and ambushes on purely military targets inside the Indian Kashmir especially in extreme north in Kargil and Laddakh area

On 1st August 1965, the designated forces infiltrated into Indian Kashmir successfully, they carried out the task assigned to them, everything worked as per the hypothesis, less the appreciation, that local population will carry out a general uprising against the occupied Indian forces.

Hamza Company of SSG was placed undercommand 12 Division for the operations. The company trained the guerrillas, Captain Khalid Mahmood and Captain Muhammad Khan formed two training teams, later both officers and men of Hamza Company operated inside the Indian Kashmir with success Hamza Company was responsible for the conduct of Tariq and Qasim Forces. **Ghazi & Shaheen Companies**. SSG had gone into operations with an aim to recapture the three lost posts on Kafir Pahar in Kargil sector, which were lost in May 1965. Thus much before the launching of Operation Gibraltar, a force was raised exclusively comprising of SSG troops {Shaheen and Ghazi Companies} undercommand Lieutenant Colonel Afridi, it arrived in Skardu in early June 1965. Later in July Shaheen company was recalled to Cherat thus Ghazi company operated at its own. Ghazi Company divided itself into four groups, Captain Nasrallah, Captain Yamin Khokar, Captain Tariq Mahmood and Captain Tariq Rafi were the officers and leaders.

Pashkayum Bridge. Destruction of Pashkayum bridge, located 40 miles east of Kargil on 9th August 1965, was a classic commando operations led successfully by Captain Nasrallah alongwith 14 men . On 4th August , the commando party crossed over into the Indian held Kashmir. The raiding party apart from the ten commandos also had two guides and two men from Karakorum Scouts. Trekking through an arduous and challenging mountain terrain with heavy loads, party was able to take position around the bridge by last light 11th August. A last minute unexpected event almost jeopardised the mission, three Indian trucks with troops stopped at the bridge and for an hour kept sitting in trucks, Captain Nasrallah thought probably the mission has been compromised, but the trucks departed at 2245 hours. The bridge, metal in construction had a strategic implication, its destruction would have crippled the 3rd Indian Division future movement towards the east, if not for weeks at least for days. Raiding commando party had two machine guns, one rocket launcher, one mortar and M-I rifles alongwith explosives.

At precisely 2320 hours, fire was opened upon the Indian post guarding the bridge, simultaneously, explosives were placed under the bridge and blown, within seven minutes, mission was over with no casualty; there was only one soldier who got a bullet wound on his thigh.

The extrication from such a hostile and far flung area is an exercise by itself. Team marched as quickly as possible, discarding all non-essential equipment, knowing fully well that Indians will be coming after them fast. They marched whole night, taking cover in daylight to avoid any detection by locals or Indian posts. At third night, they were fatigued to the limit, there was no food. Close to a population, they slaughtered a zho { native mountainous buffalo } ate the raw meat and gained strength. The one immediate result of eating raw meat was immense state of sleep and drowsiness . ‘I really had to stretch myself to the limit to be able to walk and to make others also walk, otherwise everyone was willing to sleep at the very site, such was our state.’ Remarked Brigadier Nasrallah years later. Later another successful raid was carried on at Shodok, a small outpost fifteen miles ahead of Kargil by Captain Nasrallah with 25 men.

Dras

The successful raid on Dras cantonment by SSG on 15/16th August 1965 was the most demoralising for the Indian Army deployed in the area. Captain Tariq Mahmood and Captain Tariq Rafi with thirty four commandos and six guides conducted the operations. The Dras cantonment had one engineer battalion, brigade headquarters and some supply elements. Cantonment itself is small, with a high barbed wire all around, a small landing strip inside the cantonment completes the scenery.

Brigadier Tariq Rafi recalls the operations ‘ *initial reconnaissance of Dras Cantonment was carried out off the map in early August, later Captain Tariq Mahmood attempted the first raid but , it not only failed , rather the raiding party was chased and fired upon by the Indians. Resultantly, it was decided by Lieutenant Colonel Afridi, to have two teams for the raid on Dras Cantonment. That is how myself and Captain*

Tariq Mahmood got together for the operations, we also decided in principle to employ the guides and porters only until base camp and not to take them along till the firing point. On 15/16th August, we were in position, three miles short of the objective, we spent the night close to a lake, it was cold even in summer. Our guide was a civilian Ghulam Rasul., he was born in Dras and now had some genuine and imaginary grudges against the population, his motive was more of personal revenge than nationalism.. We both {groups } now moved further ahead and took up position a mere 800 meters away from cantonment , it was night 15/16th August. Main reason for our later success was this thorough reconnaissance which we both officers carried out. We finally selected three main targets, the engineer battalion, brigade headquarters and the transport shed. We also pondered over more targets as the whole cantonment was under our observation, we picked the officers mess and the residences also, aim was to kill as many Indian officers as possible. However later, we reached the conclusion that officers are not residing inside the Dras rather they have accommodation in nearby cantonment Muradabad.

We had 39 men in all, armed with six machine guns, three rocket launchers alongwith 36 rockets, one mortar with 18 rounds, each M-I rifle had 192 rounds of ammunition, three anti-tank mines, fifteen anti-personal mines and thirty eight hand grenades. We decided to initiate the raid at 0130 hours and after deciding upon the rendezvous we were hopeful to be back in our base camp by 1000 hours. Major Waheed was at the base camp.

We started our approach, ahead were three scouts which cleared the area, we passed through the nullah, and came into open ground, we had not seen this dead ground before, it was not visible from our position. Myself and Captain Tariq Mahmood had discussion, we both had our own views, I was firm that the target is on our right where as he thought and stressed that target is on left.. In pitch darkness we send two scouts to confirm the target direction but they came back after half an hour without any confirmation, we then ourselves walked out to ascertain the direction but still no conclusive results to confirm the direction of the Dras Cantonment. At dawn, we had to retreat back to our previous location, we decided to spent the day in nullah and make an attempt at night. When the mission with so much of planning fails at the end due to such small human mistake, therefore it is but natural that tempers will also shoot up. Myself and Captain Tariq had a hot discussion, but in the end all troops had gone to sleep. Soon another blunder surfaced, the rocket launcher soldiers, in anticipation of the raid, had already taken out the rockets and threw away the packing material , now thirty six such cartons were lying around. Another unexpected twist was the accidental approach of three civilians who just walked next to us and saw us, we captured them and after some time they revealed that they are Muslims and resident of Khandial Village which is close by. We had no option but to trust them, they pointed out the exact location of 7th Madras Battalion's tents, these tents were not far off from where we halted last night.

At night we walked and guide took us to the near vicinity of the cantonment, but at the final phase, the exact location of target was still not confirm, thus contrary to all teaching, we had to awake a person from the village to show us the tents of the Indian troops. The man walked with us, and after fifty yards , simply pointed to the area ahead , these were Indian soldiers tents.

At 2217 hours, the first round was fired from a rocket launcher at a range of 250 yards, soon every weapon with us was firing on the target, one rocket hit the petroleum dump which lit the whole area. Every rifleman was supposed to save at least sixteen rounds for the return journey. Six minutes after the first round was fire, I gave the signal for withdrawal much to the dismay of Captain Tariq Mahmood.

Our rendezvous was a clump of tree , now the cantonment was alive, and Indian posts located around the cantonment started firing indiscriminately, to our horror, even the fire came from rendezvous; we had committed another mistake, in not clearing the rendezvous beforehand. Indians made a cardinal mistake, they did not fire a vary light round, had they done so , we all would have been seen . Luck favours the brave, thus we were lucky to escape through safely despite these tactical blunders, by first light we reached our next rendezvous at lake. Next day we were in Skardu.

On 1st September 1965, Pakistan Army launched its Operation Grand Slam, which almost achieved the desired results, Akhnur was merely four miles away, India realising the precarious situation, launched an attack in the morning of 6th September 1965 across the international border without any warning.

Para-Drops on Indian Airfields - 1965


In January 1965, Air Chief Marshall Nur Khan brought forward the very idea of destroying the Indian Air Force aircraft on ground; by employing the commandos of SSG; it was a bold, innovate and daring idea. The employment of airborne troops in WWII by the Germans and later by the allies had brought a new revolution in military affairs. The key factor in the stunning success of the German paratroopers was in the fact that they were under the command of Luftwaffe and were part of the air force. In Pakistan the paratrooping was introduced only in 1963 and the para training school was raised in March 1964.

The initial plan and requirement of the PAF involved destruction of the enemy airfields as deep as 250 miles away; later on after deliberation with SSG it was agreed to target only those airfields which are close to border thus Halwara, Pathankot, Ambala, Chandigarh and Adampur airfields were marked as the target. Later Ambala and Chandigarh were taken off the target list. This plan was finalised in May 1965;

In June 1965 the plan was given final touches and Commander SSG Colonel Mehdi gave the briefing to the Air Marshall Nur Khan. The plan revolved around dropping sixty commandos on each of the three airfields, where the commandos would destroy the aircraft, and petroleum tanks and kill aircrew if chance arises. The plan focussed that if execution phase went as per the planning then the PAF aircraft can land on the same airfields and bring back home the commandos; on the other hand, the commandos can extricate themselves in case the own aircraft are unable to land and pick the commandos. This was the most daring plan and highlights the spirits of the nation and the armed forces at that time. Like all military plans, it was accepted in the briefing and planning that the 'Fog of War' will be there, but rationally it offers the best chance to cripple the enemy in the opening hours of the war. Years and decades later the same scarlet thread of destroying the enemy airforce on ground has been implemented with varying success by armies around the world.

The Plan's Scarlet Thread was in the notion that Pakistan will have the advantage of initiating the war, thus the element of surprise will be with the attacker. However the changing face of events in August {Operation Gibraltar} and later Operation Grand Slam,; which almost achieved the desired end resulted in Indians launching the attack across the international border without any warning there by on the morning of 6th September 1965, initiative was with the enemy.

GHQ in a bold move, decided to go ahead with the plan



and orders reached Cherat at 0930 hours to be ready for the execution phase. Ranger battalions at Cherat and Attock received the orders at 1000 hours. The Group Commander Colonel S.G. Mehdi himself was on short emergency leave thus the orders were received and passed by acting commander Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Mateen. *‘ I was called by the company commander at 1045 hours and told to get the men ready and be prepared to move at short notice to Peshawar, I later detailed Company Havildar Major to collect the men, I also detailed naib subedar to collect ammunition and explosives, at 1130 hours I distributed the ammunition and we loaded our equipment and ration in the heavy vehicles, we faced problem and delays in this as the number of heavy vehicles were limited, we left Attock at 1300 hours and reached Para Training School {PTS} in another hour. I gave the ration to PTS for cooking our evening meal and also to prepare our two days pack ration. At 1900 hours I was briefed by the company commander on our task. We thus rigged the equipment, due to shortage, we rigged two packs together, before getting into the C-130 aircraft, our company commander showed us the air photograph of the intended airfield, at 2345 hours we were inside the aircraft which took off at 0100 hours and we jumped out at 0230 hours’.*

There were some inevitable delays, the companies which were initially earmarked for the para drops {Ebrahim and Kamal} were short of manpower due to troops proceeding on leave, this shortage was fulfilled from men of Ayub and Hamza companies. In ordinary circumstances this adjustment of men would have very little bearing on the operation but in this particular operation this was a cardinal factor on the overall outcome of operation. At Peshawar, the delay was due to planning of the air raid by own aircraft over the Indian airfields, the three C-130s had to be provided with an escort and a complete local air supremacy for the safety of the paratroopers.

Pathankot, Halwara and Adampur all are situated in the first cardinal from Lahore. Pathankot is the closest to the border, a mere thirty miles. Followed by Halwara near Hoshiarpur, and then Adampur near Ludhiana; all these airfields are located in Indian Punjab. The three groups were; Pathankot team was led by Major Khalid Gulrez Butt, Captain Bunyad Hussain, Captain Muhammad Azad and 61 Rangers. Adampur airfield team was led by Captain S.A. Durrani, Captain Ghulam Kabir, Captain Muhammad Ashraf along with 55 Rangers. For Halwara Captain Hassan Iftikhar, Captain Ghulam Ahmad, Captain Hazoor Hasnain and 63 Rangers.

Pathankot

Naik Mohammad Sarwar, landed in between the railway line and road, Subedar{ PJO 37939} Fazal Shah of Kamal Company, jumped out from the C-130 at 0227 hours, after two minutes he landed in the middle of canal, *‘ I fell into the water, I swam and came out, wrapped my parachute, punctured and cut at random, to make it unserviceable, hid it under a bush and started searching my team mate. Soon I made contact with two, then four and finally we all were in touch with Major Butt and Captain Bunyad,; all in all we were 26 commandos. We tried to search for other paratroopers but in vain,. Due to paucity of time Major Butt decided to carryout the arid with the available men...we*

crossed a metallic road, and immediately came under fire, we took positions and manoeuvred, cross the canal bridge in the process and were moving in a straight file, when we realised that we are being followed. Havildar Abbas Ali, Lance Naik Muzzaffar and Sepoy Shah Nawaz thus laid an ambush for the enemy{ all three were martyred}, meanwhile rest of the body kept marching in darkness. Now the dawn broke out and we found ourselves in open fields. We threw our all extra luggage and equipment, less ammunition and explosives in the canal, Major Butt now divided the group into two parties and each was left to make its own arrangement, I was in Major Butt's team. We had decided to meet at a rendezvous after dark and to make another attempt to raid the Pathankot airfield.. We marched and established a hideout in the crops, we remained in the crops till evening, at around 1700 hours, our sentry warned us that almost two infantry companies of enemy have encircled us. Major Butt decided to fight till last. Indians were fired upon as soon as we heard the rustle of crop being disturbed, in return a machine gun volley was sprayed through the crops by the Indians along with mortar. We soon ran out of our ammunition, finally after a deadly pause, enemy started searching us in the crop and a hand to hand fight erupted. At the end, our hands were tied and we were taken to Pathankot in trucks'.

Adampur

Havildar Malik SherBaz Khan was performing the duties of Ebrahim Company's company havildar major {CHM}. He wrote ' *I landed north of the Adampur airfield, immediately I tucked my parachute and with the help of north star I started walking ...soon I encountered few paratroopers, thus we were four in total, soon I found Sepoy Ghulam Nabi, he had my rucksack, it took few minutes to change the rucksack, it was deadly error as we both lost track of our men and as such had to walk at our own...we both marched towards the Adampur airfield, short of airfield, we left our rucksack in fields and with only weapons and ammunition started stalking towards the airfield, we both could see the light of the airfield , which was burning due to recent attack by our aircraft on airfield. At 1000 yards short of airfield, all of a sudden the anti aircraft and ground weapons started firing, O assumed as if own commandos have initiated the arid on the airfield. It was now dawn 7th September 1965. We both remained hidden in the crops and waited for the outcome of the raid. I could hear on the village loudspeaker the announcement regarding our arrests and presences. For next whole week, we both marched in and around , hiding ourselves in the crops. On the night of 16/17th September, myself and Sepoy Nabi were on the outskirts of Jullundur City, we crossed a road, and the parallel railway line...an enemy patrol of ten men was walking , we both hid ourselves behind the tree, the enemy patrol was so close to us that we both could hear them talking, unfortunately, Sepoy Nabi coughed at that precise moment. The Indians opened fire on us, we returned the fire and made good of our escape. We stalked and passed through the outer limits of the railway station, a dog barked on us and we had to jump into a nullah to save our life. We finally took cover in a maize field.*

It was 17th September now, the field in which we had taken cover, there was a water pitcher closeby, a Sikh working in the field would occasionally come and take a swig out of it. We change our position and due to tiredness and fatigue soon slept. All of a sudden I woke up , and a cursory reconnaissance confirmed my worst fear, we were encircled by the enemy, I assessed the situation, we had no ammunition left, thus as a last resort we just remained idle , hoping that providence will help us ...we were arrested and blindfolded and taken to the police station’.

Halwara

Subedar Allah Ditta {PJO5980} of Ebrahim Company narrates , ‘After landing , we collected our parachutes and in darkness, got together, First Lance Naik Noor Muhammad met me, then Sepoy Bashir, we walked together, later seven more commandos joined us, we were now ten men. I tried to search for other but in vain. At 0330 hours, we walked towards the airfield , after a mile and half of march, we heard the aircraft noises and the machine gun fire. In this situation, soon the dawn emerged. We spent the day bin the maize field and at evening started walking again towards the target . At 1845 hours we were very close to the airfield, short of it we drank water from a well, our morale was high and we decided , not to go back empty handed. At 1930 hours, the airfield acme under heavy attack from own aircraft, at that time we were 400 yards short of the outer perimeter of the airfield. A bomb exploded very close to us, in this fog of war situation, we decided to retreat back to the crops, thinking that the airfield has been destroyed as per the initial planning. The rendezvous which was originally agreed upon was the canal bridge m thus we waited there for an hour but none acme to join us. We decided to trek back to Pakistan at our own and to link up with the commandos; thus the remaining part of night was spent in the fields adjacent to canal. Next day {8th September 1965} we remained inside the crops waiting for the darkness when at 1500 hours two civilians entered the crops and started reaping , they both dangerously reached close to me. All of a sudden they ran back , I knew that they have spotted us, thus we also change our position, we walk all night and on the morning of 9th September we were spotted by civilians busy in watering their fields. We now were running from field to field but soon we were encircled by the police and army , an announcement was being made on the loud speaker, all Pakistanis hiding in the field to come out without your weapons. We for some time responded back in fire but after ammunition had been expended, we came out of the field’.

The paradrop mission although it did not went as per planning but still it made its impact on the overall outcome of the war. The mere presence of paratroopers created a wave of terror among the Indian population and the army. The aircraft were taken away from the forward bases, an entire army division {14 Mountain} was stopped while proceeding towards the Samba –Sialkot axis, to hunt down the paratroopers; in the end the very division was mauled by the PAF while parked in hunt of paratroopers. A total of 182 paratroopers took part in the operation, 64

for Patahankot, 55 for Adampur and 63 for Halwara airfields, five commandos embraced martyrdom, 13 were injured, 15 became missing in action and 127 were captured, only 22 managed to reach back to Pakistan.

Another operation was planned on 16th September 1965, Ambala airfield was the designated target, and Ghazi Company was the executor. At noon, on same day, a briefing was held at Para Training School at Peshawar, however the mission was cancelled in the hatching period. Indians did not launch any paratroop in Pakistan during 1965 War. But a rumour spread across the country and especially in the army field headquarters regarding the presence of Indian paratroopers in Kharian and Rawalpindi. Few infantry battalions were moved at night, patrolling was conducted around all army and air force bases; in the end these just proved to be rumours, it highlights the kind of terror which the mere rumour of paratroops creates. Own operation against Indian airfields should be seen in the background of mental paralysis which they were able to sow in the minds of Indian military mind set.

SSG Companies in War

The companies which did not take part in the paratroop were employed on various missions, **Ghazi Company** after the mission for Ambala was cancelled, moved to Shakargarh area with Captains Tariq Mahmood, Tariq Rafi and Nasrallah in command. Ghazi Company was trusted with the disruption of Indian military convoys on the road Jammu –Kathua. On the night of 21/22 September, company moved to Chammb Jaurian under command Major Naeem, the mission was to get the information about the enemy disposition in the area. Later in first week of October, Ghazi Company was moved into Zafarwal area.

Ayub Company. The company during Operation Grand Slam was under command 15 Infantry Division, on 3rd September, it came under the operational command of 7 Infantry Division. The task was classical commando missions; create terror among the enemy, which the company did remarkably. Early on the morning of 6th September, company commander Major Sarwar embraced shahadat, while Captain Muhammad Inayat was wounded. On 7th September, while carrying out a commando raid on enemy gun position in Jaurian sector, Captain Muhammad Sadiq and Sepoy Muhammad Riaz not only accomplished the mission, Captain Sadiq later succumbed to the bullet wounds sustained during operation and embraced shahadat. Major Shamim Alam Khan took over the command of the company, it was later placed under command 1 Corps. From the night of 8th September the company was tasked to detect and exterminate the Indian commandos who were rumoured to be

present between Daska- Sialkot area. As the rumours turned out to be mere rumours, the Ayub Company and Ghazi Company were employed together on destruction of Indian troops moving on Kathua-Samba- Jammu road. Few targets were engaged, one medium gun was destroyed on the night of 12/13 September, and in another raid an Indian tank was disabled. An Indian post near Ramgarh was attacked while coming back from a patrol, In the dying hours of the war, an opportunity target in the form of a retreating Indian infantry company was ambushed with great success.

Shaheen Company, at the onset of war was already deployed in Neelum Valley, later the 12 Division employed the company in the defence of an outpost. The post itself came under enemy attack, the post was defended, in the accomplishment of mission two soldiers embraced martyrdom. **Jangju Company** was undercommand 15 Infantry Division, they were task at the very first night of the war 6/7th September to carryout raid and ambushes on the road Kathua – Samba. The ambush was a success, one major reason of the success was the induction of the Punjab Rangers {Sutlej Wing}. An inspector and 25 soldiers of Sutlej Rangers accompanied the commandos. The knowledge of area was and is still critical for the success of any commando raid. SSG had been carrying out regular and periodic reconnaissance of the border areas, still the knowledge which the Punjab Rangers had accumulated by virtue of seven years of stay at one particular place cannot be matched. In the end, two enemy trucks and one jeep was destroyed.

Tipu Company . After the ceasefire, a minor war erupted in the desert between Pakistan and India, in which the Indians tried to recapture the lost posts in the desert. A Desert Force was thus raised with rangers of Desert Rangers. Tipu Company arrived undercommand Major Fazal Akbar in Rahim Yar Khan on 4th November 1965; their two main task were to train the mujahedeen and to carryout raids on enemy lines of communication. Tipu Company was thus grouped into three teams, each led by Major Fazal, Captain Waheed Arshad Gujial and Captain Inayat. The very first mission was to ambush an enemy convoy, thus on the night of 17th November at 2100 hours, a twenty commandos team led by company commander moved out of Kishengarh and establish a position almost twenty miles further east. At 0400 hours the reported convoy came and was successfully ambushed, destroying an enemy truck along with a jeep; two Indian soldiers were taken as prisoners as well. Another successful ambush was carried out by Captain Waheed on the night of 29th November , the target was the command echelon of an 3rd Indian Grenadier {an infantry battalion}. Ambush was carried out in broad daylight as enemy had almost abandoned the travelling after dark due to fear of own commandos. At Achari Toba, local guides were taken , so were a section of Desert Rangers. Ambush site was between the Tanot-Sadewala posts within enemy territory. At 0930 hours the prey entered the killing zone, after few minutes of firing, the three occupant of the jeep, Major Poran Singh, one captain and two soldiers were killed and own commando force extricated safely.

The success of these mission owe much to the local para military organisation notably the Punjab Rangers. SSG had not trained on the camel riding and handling, as it had concentrated more on mountainous warfare thus Desert Rangers expertise in desert came very handy. In East Pakistan, where **Quaid Company** was undercommand 23 Brigade ex 14 Infantry Division. There was not much of action on the Eastern front. On 22nd September 1965, in the lone mission of war, the Quaid Company carried out an ambush on an Indian defensive position with success.

In the 1965 War, SSG lost three officers, one junior commissioned officer and 26 soldiers. It was decorated with ten Sitara-i-Jurat, twelve Tamgha –i- Jurat, one Sitara-i-Basalt , two Tamgha-i-Basalt and 23 Imtiaz Sanads.


East Pakistan

East Pakistan constituted 15% of Pakistan's area but it had 52% of population. Thus under the 1970 general election, the very first elections since 1947, the Awami League won an outright majority in East Pakistan but failed to win a single seat from West Pakistan thus similarly no party from West Pakistan was able to win any seat from the eastern wing; this brought the whole country to a standstill position. Delays in finding the political solution further pushed the alienated Bengalis into an open rebellion which was backed and funded by India; East Bengal Regiments started revolting. SSG had one battalion {3 SSG } in East Pakistan since 1965, the battalion was raised there and for all practical purpose was under the control of 14 Division and later came under the command of newly raised Eastern Command at Dacca. In Late 1970s another battalion 2 Commando Battalion SSG was also sent to East Pakistan.¹

¹ For a detailed account of 3 Commando Battalion , please see Brigadier Zaheer Khan's *The Way it Was*, { Army Book Club, 2000 }

East Pakistan was separated from West Pakistan by a distance of 1600 kilometres of Indian territory, the province itself was surrounded by India from all sides less a small strip in east which joins it with Burma, Bay of Bengal in the south provided the access to the sea. Thick jungles, innumerable ravines and river among which the Meghna and Brahmaputra were the two main river, highly dense population, lack of communication infrastructure in terms of road therefore railways attain greater importance. Dacca was the capital, lying in an open field of 100 kilometres in length having a width of 60 odd kilometres. The military organisation in the eastern province other than the sole 14 Infantry Division comprised mainly the East Bengal Regiment {EBR} a militia outfit having responsibility of looking after the porous border with India, it had six battalions {5000 manpower}. In late 1970, the 14 Division was reinforced with 9 and 16 Infantry Divisions from West Pakistan along with 4 Army Aviation Squadron {having 4 MI-8 utility helicopters and three Alouettes}.

On 25 March 1971, the insurgency started in East Pakistan, General Yahya Khan the Commander in Chief and President of Pakistan imposed martial law in East Pakistan and army crackdown on the Awami League and its militant wing Mukti Bhani started.



Arrest of Sheikh Mujib.

The very first action and task of SSG {2 Commando Battalion } was to arrest the rebel leader Sheikh from his residence in Dacca, a failure to do so would have jeopardised the whole operation, Sheikh was a popular leader thus required a meticulous planning and execution. Mission was accomplished without any casualty, however it highlighted the need to have troops more trained for such kinds of snap actions. Couple of years later Sheikh Mujib was killed in the same house by his own troops in a coup.

SSG Role and Employment in Counter-Insurgency.

This was the first ever employment of SSG in the counter insurgency role; it did not go very well in the end for various reasons and factors. SSG was employed to flush out the rebels in almost every nick and corner of the province. It is often compared with the counter insurgency operation in Malaya but there is very little similarity between the two campaigns. The insurgency and counter insurgency operations lasted from March-November 1971, in which commandos were employed to clear the roads, recapture small towns and cities from the rebel, protect the vital bridges and keep the lines of communication open, hit at the suspected rebel hideouts and training camps. The majority of commandos were taken out from Eastern Front prior to the outbreak of war. During the December 1971 War {3-16 December 1971} few elements of SSG were kept as reserve by the Eastern Command, they were employed between 10-14th December to counter the Indian paratroopers which were dropped near Dacca. In East Pakistan, it was also the first time that commandos and army aviation were employed together and wherever both were employed together the results were positive and morale boosting.

In East Pakistan. ‘ *at sunset if one walked in the streets of a village, from almost every house came the sound of the recitation of the Koran. While walking through a village or Haat {bazar} the feeling was that you were in a foreign country, you could not understand nobody and nobody understood you... while shopping in Commilla city we discovered that we were not liked*’. Remarked Lieutenant Colonel Z.A. Khan the commanding officer of 2 Commando Battalion

A Black Evening

SSG suffered the worst in its short history, when in Chittagong on 28th March 1971, the SSG Battalion was ambushed and resultantly no less than 28 soldiers including the commanding officer Lieutenant Colonel Suleiman were martyred.

Ghazi Company was airlifted from West Pakistan on 27th March and very next day it arrived at Chittagong along with Shaheen Company, a city under siege by the rebels {Mukti Bahni}. SSG immediately on arrival at Chittagong formed into three mobile groups, one group comprised of Ghazi Company and Hamza Company of 3 Commando Battalion, other two groups comprised of men from Ghazi and Shaheen Companies; their mission was to clear the road to Dacca where 24 Frontier Force Regiment had lost contact with the higher headquarters. The two SSG Battalion in East Pakistan namely 2 Commando Battalion was under command Lieutenant Colonel Zaheer Alam Khan and 3 Commando Battalion was being commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Suleiman Khan.

On 28th March 1971, at 1600 hours, the task force left naval base at Chittagong in a eight truck convoy'; in the first four trucks were the troops of 3 Commando and in the other trucks were the men from Shaheen Company. Major Iqbal { Ghazi Company} was in the lead, followed by Captain Sikander { adjutant}, in the third truck were the commanding officer { Lieutenant Colonel Suleiman} and twenty commandos, in the fourth truck were twenty more commandos with Naib Subedar Kabir Khan. A mile after departing from base, astride Karnafuli River, close to the Radio Pakistan building the convoy was ambushed at 1700 hours. The machine gun fire along with grenades hit the trucks and claimed initial casualties, as commandos dismounted from the trucks and tried to charge the radio building the machine gun fire took further toll, commanding officer was hit with a burst of bullets. In the first two minutes the leading three trucks took the brunt of fire. Major Iqbal despite being in the leading truck miraculously survived and tried to counter the situation by taking up position astride the road. All night long the battle between the rebels and commandos continued, it was by 0900 hours next morning that with reinforcement the building was cleared and secured.

The First Heliborne Operation, Bhairab Bazar- 15th April 1971

The SSG operation to raid and capture the strategic vital rail-road bridge at Bhairab Bazar over River Meghna, which was under the control of the rebels, was a highlight and silver lining of SSG operations in East Pakistan during the insurgency period. Bridge was vital for any major army operation towards the east of the Dacca to eliminate the rebels. There were no less than two battalions of rebels holding the bridge and intelligence reports indicated that these rebels have placed the explosives under the bridge, in order to destroy it rather than Eastern Command capturing it intact.

Shaheen and Janjgu Companies were employed for the capture of the bridge intact. Major Tariq Mahmood was leading the Shaheens with him was Captain Afzal Janjua. Captain Arif and Captain Shoukat were leading the Jangu company. Plan envisaged on cashing the initial surprise heliborne landing of Shaheen Company, which will assault the bridge thus taking the guards on bridge off guard,, and in the next wave

the same helicopters would drop the Jangu company. 4 Army Aviation Squadron the sole rotary aviation effort in East Pakistan with its two MI-8 and two Alouettes III helicopters were integrated into the operation. There was no time for any practise, thus it was mainly coordinated verbally. Lieutenant Colonel Shakoor Jan was the overall commander of the operation .

At 0600 hours on 15th April, two MI-8 helicopters landed just a mile away from the main bridge, the reason for this distance away was in the fact that there were electric wires running around the bridge thus the only viable landing spot was utilised. Rebels opened small arms fire , but amidst the fire the two helicopters landed on two opposing spots away from bridge, and Lieutenant Colonel Shakoor Jan and Major Tariq Mahmood along with the commandos jumped and rushed towards the bridge; helicopters in running rotors took off to bring the next wave of commandos to the target area.

Meanwhile, commandos rushed towards the bridge from two opposing direction, rebels opened fire and over fifteen commandos were injured, yet the importance of the bridge and the time factor was so vital that they just charged forward ; Major Tariq Mahmood was able to save the day as the rebel had almost lit the match stick to ignite the explosives for blowing up the bridge but in the end Major Tariq was able to kill the rebel and save the bridge.

This operation raised the morale of the population and the army in East Pakistan. It also set the direction in which it was agreed that the most viable employment of SSG in East Pakistan revolves around having joint operations involving army aviation.

Patauakhali Operation -18th April 1971.

Success at Bhairab Bazaar led to another Heliborne operation, this time it was Patauakhali, a small town where rebels had established a parallel government thereby reducing the writ of the state. Shaheen Company under Major Tariq Mahmood along with Captain Tahir, Captain Zafar Mahmood and twelve commandos were part of a task force which also had an infantry battalion in support {30 Frontier Force} . The Shaheen Company was the first to be landed in two Mi-8 helicopters a mere thousand yards away from the rebel held police lines, in the second wave which landed after fifteen minutes the company of 30 FF was dropped. Shaheen Company in the meanwhile not only secure the helipad but had also rushed towards the kote and ammunition stores, overpowered the rebels without any loss of life to the company . Within an hour the police lines were secured and after a day the writ of state was established in the town.

Training. In East Pakistan, the commando training was modified and made realistic with the environments, frogman element was trained in being dropped from helicopters in river from where they approached their target both in day and night. Battalions of SSG were equipped with long range communication set {GRC-9} which weigh about ninety pounds and was carried by three men, for short range communication, line of sight sets PRC-10 were issued; thus signallers were often sited at the tree tops to increase the range.

Tabal Chari - June 1971

One of the classic commando operation which involved long marches through the jungle terrain and then attacking the rebel camps was carried out in the early hours of 12th June 1971, a mere hundred meters away from the international border with India. The operation was a complete success as more than thirty rebels were killed and the training base was utterly destroyed. Tabal Chari and Khagra were two small border outposts at Chittagong where the rebels were continuously harassing the local tribes and had established their training camps as well. Ghazi Company was given the task to eliminate the training camps of the rebels.

Ghazi Company{ 23 commandos} under Major Iqbal, Captain Arjumand and Captain Qadir along with three guides and thirty odd porters moved from Rangamatti in boats to Panchari Bazar, a journey of over fifteen hours where a firm base was established. Intelligence was gathered about the intended assault camp. One major handicap was the language as none of the officer knew the Bengali, thus through interpreters the information was gathered, not an appropriate method of launching an operation. In the end a wise decision was taken ; to opt for a route which was opposite to the one recommended by the interpreter and guides. Three teams were formed, one under the command of Major Muhammad Iqbal with twelve commandos, second team under Captain Arjumand with seven commandos and captain Qadir had four commandos with him. These teams marched from their firm base and established themselves three miles short of target area on a relatively high ground thus keeping the intended raiding camp under observation. It rained all night and the rice paddies were brim with water so were the half a dozen water channels ; it was a test of endurance. At 0400 hours amidst the early morning fog the teams launched the operation, they attacked the camp with precision and lethality. They destroyed the camp, blew up the bamboo bridge over River Fenni which linked the rebels with Indian border post of Sala Chari.. One of the key factors of success was the meticulous planning and reconnaissance of the target area.

In the 2 Commando Battalion only one officer Major Salman Ahmed of Ebrahim Company had served in East Pakistan, he had served two years with the 3 Commando Battalion almost six months ago. The normal pattern of service in SSG was that whereas 3 Commando Battalion was the permanent battalion responsible for entire Eastern Front, the companies were rotated among the three SSG battalions, on a tenure of two years. There were Bengali soldiers and officers in the SSG{ Lieutenant Haider of Jangju Company, Captain Rehman the medical

officer of 3 Commando are few of the examples}, they were, however taken off the battalion strength before the 25th March 1971 action; unfortunately commanding officer was not taken into confidence before the action.

Sylhet - June 1971

Sylhet had similar narrative , here the rebels had not only taken over the civil administration rather they had also established the Free Bangladesh . Own 117 Brigade {39 Baluch , 30 FF regiments} was given the task to clear the area of rebels. Brigade was given the Shaheen Company undercommand, which in turn was split into two groups, each attached with one infantry battalion. Overall strength of the company was 63 all ranks , undercommand Major Tariq Mahmood with Captains Zafar Mahmood and Shoukat Anwar.

Plan was simple, to block the escape routes of rebels leading to the India and simultaneously attack their camps. It involved a long treacherous trek through the jungle which was controlled by the rebels, the successful penetration of the jungle despite rebels firing is the highlight and highpoint of the operation. On the morning of 17th June 1971, the regular battalions launched their attack on rebels , as the rebels tried to escape towards the India, to their horror they found the commandos blocking the exit. Company suffered its only casualties during the operation when it tried to pursuit the rebels, thus three commandos were injured due to anti personal mines. Shaheen Company after the operation was airlifted to Dacca on 19th June 1971.

December 1971

The undeclared war in East Pakistan which had started in March 1971, became a full fledged war on 3rd December 1971, after Pakistan launched an attack in the west. The military situation in East Pakistan had already reached a point where only bold and calculated strategy could hold the front to a point where a decisive blow delivered in west could salvage the situation. The blow in west never materialised therefore the war in East Pakistan was mainly fought in isolated pockets of resistance by infantry battalions. SSG was kept in reserve for a possible airdrop behind the Indians however before our plans could be finalised the Indians launched and dropped their paratroopers in and around Dacca. Thus SSG in the last week of the war was employed in hunting the Indian paratroopers. The SSG battalions in East Pakistan were pulled back to West Pakistan , a month prior to actual start of war in the west; however they were not employed in any striking role other than minor operations with relative success.

Chapter IV

Special Service Group in Baluchistan & Siachen

SSG was kept busy in the seventies and eighties apart from operational missions, the minor operations against the Farrari in Baluchistan and Dacoits in Sindh. Farrari operations in Baluchistan started in July 1973, 1 Commando and 3 Commando Battalions were employed; at times tandem also, but most of time each commando battalion operated independent of each other.

Baluchistan, is the largest province of Pakistan in terms of area and the smallest in terms of population density. Province is barren, dry, harsh in weather, lack water at everywhere, thus relies solely on the rain and snow. Society is tribal in nature, especially the Baluch tribes of Marri and Bugti, the centre of the Farraris. The tribal 'sirdar' holds the lifeline of the tribe and the tribesmen willingly submits to the will of Sirdar. Farrari is thus the force maintained by the Sirdar, a kind of tribal commandos. Trouble had always been brewing and spilling between the federation and the tribes, since the early days of British raj and later same continued after the creation of Pakistan.

In November 1973 a series of small operations were launched under the name Operation Crossed Swords, between 18-30 November in general Fazal Chal-Kala Buha-Triman and Dill, apart from the Dill which was a two village complex, all other were deserted small habitats. The villages in the Marri tribe area as in other part of Baluchistan, are dependent upon the rain for any cultivation. In the absence of water, sheep breeding is the major source of occupation. Operation Crossed Sword was to clear the area of Alianis {sub tribe of Marri}. There was no communication tracks, less between Fazal Chal-Kohlu. I Commando battalion with engineers and mortar battery in support conducted the operation. 'no resistance was encountered anywhere in this operation, Sirdars of Dill gave up 20 rifles', noted 1 Commando war diary.


In summer 1974, a convoy of troops was ambushed near Duki killing five troops and injuring twelve. In retaliation to the ambush an operation was launched. This operation was conducted by 3 Special Services Group Battalion in area Jandran Range. There was a deviation from

the initial tactics instead of force being inserted by helicopter from the onset, it was decided that troops would march and MI-8 would reinforce the battalion at dawn with rations, ammunition, troops and would also pick the casualties. There was no pre planned landing site designated thus it was decided that flares would be fired for the landing. Two major operations in term of manpower employed were conducted in 1974, code name as 'Red Beret' and 'Red Star', commandos of 1 and III battalions took part; There were occasional ambush of the forces, but no concentrated attack was launched by the rebels or insurgents.

Farrari tactics were more akin to commando tactics, they would in such circumstances take hide out in remote and inaccessible mountainous gorges. Had an excellent intelligence network, no shortage of volunteer to join them, relying upon local own tribesmen for logistics and feeding. Commando battalions as part of overall army strategy were employed to clear the hideouts of the insurgents, forcing them to retreat through the selected exit routes , where blocking positions were already placed' this tactics did not produce desired results . The Farrari being a native knew the area more than anybody else thus the escape routes were known to him. Helicopters were used by the commandos in aerial reconnaissance .

Operation Chamalang, 25 August-2 September 1974

This operation was launched to search and apprehend hostiles from area Chamalang, Kharlakgarh, and Garwadda Garh.. "By this time the hostiles were cordoned off and pushed towards their grazing areas on the border of Baluchistan and Punjab. Chamalang was their main grazing



field for summer...we were unable to penetrate their safety cordon., there was a broken ground leading to the grazing field which our jeeps could not cross and rebels held the far bank... This was the most successful operation of the whole campaign with over 125 hostiles dead, 900 captured with own casualties of 3 dead including one officer from Special Services Group.

The Baluchistan operations were a good teaching grounds, the extreme weather in summer resulted in readjusting the standard payload of a commando, now water became the most important item.

Operation Tail Star -12th June 1976

It was another search operation involving 33 Azad Kashmir, 38 Frontier Force and 1 Commando Battalions supported by one MI-8, one UH-1H, and a L-19 aircraft. It was conducted in area Surf Nullah-Tadri-Khatran River on 12th June. Another operation was conducted on 14th June in area Siah Kach-Waghi by 10 Baloch Regiment .

Donkeys Had Joy-Ride.

In June 1976, while operating around Bhambore, near Lehri area, one MI-8 piloted by Major Ashraf spotted a group of miscreants. The SSG troops on board netted them well and proper. The news flashed to the concerned authorities, who ordered to bring all the captured to the headquarters immediately. There was, however, a slight comical snag. The group also included two donkeys, used as beasts of burden by the rebels. Not to be caught on the wrong foot, in violation of an executive order, headquarters were contacted again and the funny situation explained. To the amazement of all at the receiving end, the previous clear-cut order was repeated with unambiguous emphasis to bring along the four legged animals also. Thus the donkeys were also made to ride in the helicopter along with others.

Epilogue

The insurgency operation came to an end in July 1977 when General Zia Ul Haq took over the reins of the country and declared general amnesty to all the hostile elements. 2 Commando Battalion remained stationed at Quetta till 1982, before it moved to Tarbela..

Anti Dacoits Operation 1988-1990

SSG was employed in interior Sind during the latter half of eighties to curb the menace of dacoits, these dacoits had established a reign of terror through kidnapping for ransom and looting of trucks and other vehicles on main highways. SSG companies and platoons were attached with field formations for hunting of these dacoits. SSG officers would roam in disguise of locals, gathering information and then laying ambushes on dacoits. The operation itself was successfully terminated in 1990.


Siachen

Siachen{ locally means , plenty of wild roses’} the highest battlefield in the world came into limelight from 1983 till do date; Siachen Glacier at an elevation of 18000 feet and above is the highest and the coldest battlefield which man has ever encountered in his entire history. It is living in modern era and fighting a battle under ice age circumstances. The average temperature in summer is below zero, pleasant in day , cold at night but still bearable. During winter which sets in from October onwards and last till April, there are snow storms, chilling winds, temperature falling below 30 Celsius on majority of the season, there is no scale to measure the snow fall, for days it keeps on falling and falling. Siachen Glacier lies to the north east of the Skardu and an hour crow flight from K-2. It is the northern slope of the of the great mountain ranges of Karakorum and Himalayas; in north across the glacier lies the Chinese Civilisation and on south is the Indus Civilisation. K-2, Broad Peak, Hidden Peak , all above eight thousand alongwith the over 100 more peaks above 7000 meters are in Indus Civilisation , in and around Siachen Glacier.

Tradition and local history of Baltistan {Siachen falls under the administrative boundary Baltistan which is now a province of Pakistan} states that in ancient time , people from Baltistan travelled across Siachen in summer period towards the Chinese Kashgir . Under British Raj the snow frontiers of India were never truly demarcated; McCartney Line and McMahon Line were partially agreed upon with China. In 1947, when the British left and Pakistan and India took birth, the area was part of Kashmir & Jammu State. People of Kashmir overwhelming Muslims revolted against the Maharaja’s decision to accede to India rather than Pakistan, resultantly the First Kashmir War 1947-49, took place. When the ceasefire was signed on 27th July 1949 at Karachi, between Pakistan and India, the area north of NJ 9842, a belt of 60 miles, was not demarcated, it was left as it is , ‘due to inaccessible mountains and glaciers’. The two ceasefire agreements after the 1965 and 1971 Wars between Pakistan and India , again overlook the actual demarcation in area north of NJ 9842.¹

¹ Cheema, Pervaiz *Pakistan’s Defence Policy ,1947-58* {MacMillan,London,1990} also see Razvi, Mujtaba *The Frontiers of Pakistan,a study of frontier problems in Pakistan’s foreign policy* {National, Karachi,1971}.

Frontier north and east of Skardu is mountaineers heaven, every year from 1951 onwards foreign mountain expeditions arrived in Pakistan, got the permission to scale peaks around K-2 and this practice is still in vogue. Native Balti being the son of soil are the natural guides and porters, Balti are short in height, very stout, cheerful, hospitable, poor and reserve in nature. It was during one of the expedition in 1980 that local porters brought back few cigarettes empty packs which were made in India. In mountain and snowy area like Skardu, soon these rumours reached local police officials, who investigated the reports and informed the local army brigade about the findings. In 1982, a platoon of Northern Light Infantry{NLI} was tasked to find the veracity of these reports; reports were confirmed. Thus on 10th November 1982, military operation directorate{MO} of Pakistan Army, directed SSG to carryout patrolling in area Goma; patrolling was carried out and also planned for next year with better logistic preparation. In July-August 1983, SSG carried out the reconnaissance & patrolling of the Siachen Glacier. As a matter of fact, a visual contact was established with Indians who were on the other end of Siachen Glacier and probably had come for the same purpose as were the SSG, it was later confirmed in an helicopter reconnaissance carried out on 21st August 1983 with Commander SSG on board. The findings and recommendations of the SSG patrolling were, that passes or La as in local language leading into Pakistan from Siachen must be kept under own control. These passes or La are the only humanly possible way to cross across the Siachen Glacier into Baltistan from Indian side. Important passes include Bilafond La {butterfly pass} Sia La {wild rose pass}.²



² Azam, Cheema, Madni, *History of Pakistan Army Aviation 1947 – 2007* (Army Press, Islamabad, 2007)

Siachen is the largest glacier outside polar region, having length of 72 Kilometers, with width varying 2-5 Kilometres, it is a frozen river with high rugged mountains astride whose peaks remain under snow year around. In summer, the ice starts melting into water rivulets but there is no life other than the few shrubs of wild growth at the mouth of glacier. Black crow a resilient bird, too have a limit, uptill 12000 feet. Skardu is the confluence of two river, one originating from the northwest or from Baltoro glacier, within this sixty odd miles long glacier, many other glaciers join in like Godwin Austin which originates from the K-2 . Thus Shigar river is initially known as K-2 river, and it is only when it flows into Shigar valley it assumes the name of Shigar river. The other river which flows in from northeast frontier and joins the K-2 river at Skardu is Indus; water coming from Siachen glacier joins and flows into Indus river. Siachen and Baltoro glaciers are separated by a mountain saddle , The Conway Saddle at 19000 feet.

Siachen glacier itself lies in a west-east direction, its head is at Conway saddle and tail is Nubra River. On the descending northern frontier of Siachen glacier, there is a pass Indira Koli which allows caravan of porters movement into China. On the southern frontier which concerns the main operations of the army and SSG , there are small glaciers like Kundus, Chumik, Gyong, Bilafond which are wedge into Siachen glacier , these smaller glaciers are further linked to the main civilisation at Skardu through intermittent small valleys. The passes or La that lead into the Siachen glacier from smaller glaciers are Sia La at 18,610 feet, Bilafond La at 18,310 feet, K-2 La at 21,000 feet, Gyong La at 18500 feet and Yarma La at 19000 feet. All combat actions between Pakistan and India have taken place over Siachen , in these eastern glaciers K-2 is the main landmark, it is the head , the small opening at its base provides a descend into China which surprisingly is absolute barren and a desert. Astride K-2 moving eastward is Broadpeak and Hidden peaks dead ends cluster of snowy mountains, a saddle{Conway Saddle 19700 feet} thus provides the only viable crossing over into the Siachen .

1984 –Race for the Passes

SSG had planned to be in place in April 1984, one SSG battalion and two companies were placed undercommand , Force Command Northern Areas {FCNA} with its headquarters at Gilgit, 200 kilometres south west of Skardu. The approaches to Siachen , initiates from Skardu in every sense, the lone town then to have an air strip , which with passage of time have at present heavy commercial jets landing. At that time there was no metallic track leading towards Siachen, the small hamlets at Khaplu delta, from where the two approaches initiate, one towards Sia La through Dansum, Kurmunding, Kundus and Sia La. The other approach through Goma, Ghyari and Bilafond La. SSG troops concentrated at Dansum in March 1984, on 17th April , prior to patrolling of SSG, army headquarters carried out an helicopter reconnaissance in order to update the information, it was found by the pilots that Indians are already in possession of the Sia La and Bila Fond La passes leading into the Siachen

Glacier. SSG was thus immediately moved within three days to prevent any further intrusion of Indians into the subsidiary passes leading into Skardu valley.

SSG thus established posts at Yarma La {19,500 feet}, Gyong La {19000 feet} K-12 La , Liaqat La {later renamed as Yaqub by NLI } and also established post at Conway Saddle. There was one platoon of SSG a section of NLI and a platoon of Mujahids which were for portering purpose at Sia La approach, where as Company strength of SSG alongwith NLI was manning the Bila Fond La.

In 1985, 3 Commando Battalion had one company at Gyong La and 1 Commando had one company at Yarma La where as Sia La and Bilafond La were being manned by NLI and Azad Kashmir Regiment troops. In July 1985 less one company all SSG troops were withdrawn and all SSG posts were handed over to NLI troops; the SSG company was placed at Goma.



Siachen and these glaciated posts offer a new dimension to the military history, it was unprecedented in history of warfare thus the experience gained by troops and especially by SSG is a valuable addition in understanding the snow warfare. First and foremost were the logistics, the equipment required for operating at high altitude was quite short, thus initially it was bought from open market in Gilgit and Skardu later contracts were signed with leading firms and high quality equipment was given to the troops. The snow equipment mainly comprised of snow goggles, they are important as a constant glare of snow can render eyesight blind with acute pain. Gloves and socks were vital, troops learnt that frost bite is more fatal than anything else, and usually the fingers of hand and feet are the first to be affected. High altitude tents and fibre covered shelters were introduced in late 1986. For heating the only viable arrangement was the kerosene burner of varying grade and

quality. The drawback was that the smoke from burner would blackened the white kit thus making an obvious target in white background of snow. This black smoke was highly injurious for lungs as well, cooking was carried over once a day on it, ice had to be melted and heated before drinking. In a classical pattern, this expedition was different from any other mountaineering expeditions, first the occupation of the glacier had to be year around thus living and operating in winter was unprecedented.

Logistics were carried forward from Skardu to Goma, and then on mules to forward posts, from where the soldiers would carry it to the posts and observation posts; army aviation helicopters were also inducted. New helicopters like Lama were purchased exclusively for the Siachen and 5 and 8 Army Aviation Squadrons play a key role in this conflict.

Quaid Observation Post- 1986

In May 1986, Quaid Company of SSG replaced the Ghazi Company, on 17th July 1986, the Quaid Company was tasked to establish a posts on the right shoulder of Bilafond La; company was able to establish the desired posts by 26th July and named it as Quaid Post and Quaid Observation Post. Ghazi Company had already established two major posts on the Bilafond, known as Rahber I and II; now Quaid Post act as the vanguard of the Bilafond glacier. Quaid Post{QP} was in three segments, the base at the foot known as Quaid base, the post itself which was on a ledge involving a rope climb of thirty ropes, and finally the Quaid Observation Post{QOP} which was at summit, 200 yards higher than the post itself. It would take a commando 11 hours to reach the QP from the base and another an hour and half to reach the QOP. This movement from the Ghazi post to the Quaid post and further scaling was in observation and firing range of Indians, thus movement was in low visibility time period. QOP was mounted daily from the post, the commandos would descend down at sunset to post.



During the winter of 1986, in November, the weather became hazardous to an extent that company commander recommended abandonment of the post or proper shelter to be arranged as the number of casualties at post due to weather were increasing day by day. The recommendations of the company commander were not agreed upon, on 23rd November 1986, Lance Naik Muhammad Nawaz died on the post due to sickness, to further compound the situation havildar Iftikhar lost his way between the posts due to blizzard, his dead body was found a day later. Thus on 27th November 1986, Quaid observation and post itself were withdrawn.

Kamal Company moved in end November to relieve the Quaid Company and they took over the charge of Quaid base but observation post was occupied on 6th January 1987; in May the Shaheen Company took over from Kamal Company in the routine changeover. The SSG companies were on a rotation period of six months each.

The first attack on Quaid observation post came on 29th May 1987, in broad daylight, however it was repulsed with enemy leaving behind seven dead bodies; resultantly Indians established a camp 400 yards down the Quaid observation post. On paper it looks very easy to think about a post mere hundred meters away but in Siachen, with over hanging cliffs and ledges covered with snow and having crevasses and moraine, this distance was not a piece of cake. Indian resumed their attempt to capture the Quaid observation post, on 17th June they started shelling the target, own post was manned by one junior commissioned officer and eight soldiers whereas at the Quaid Post there were 11 soldiers under command an officer Captain Zaidi of SSG.

On 22nd June 1987 Indian 4th Jammu & Kashmir Battalion supported by artillery opened fire on the post, Indians had made full use of their MI-17 transporter helicopters who would stack the heavy load near front line from where Cheetah(Lama) helicopters would transport them to the edge of glacier.

As a routine, the replenishment would take place almost every week in winter. Porter parties would start from Ghazi base camp with few packs of edibles, fresh items if they have arrived in any of the helicopter and most importantly the letters for the troops and to deliver the posts from the post. Posts were dumped in summer, yet the letters remained the major source of morale for the troops. On the night of 23/24th June, one soldier had fallen acute sick, doctor advised to lower his altitude thus he was being taken down from the QOP; it was arranged that same men will collect the letters also for the QOP from the post. As the luck would have it, one soldier got his laces broken, his shoe also got free and the soldier slipped down from the ropes into the crevasses. The soldier's life was saved but in the process the wire communication with the observation post and with base was broken and as such now Quaid Post was without any link either with the post or with the base. Enemy shelled the post and OP on the 24th June, which was intensified on 25th as well. At 0800 hours on 25th June, an attack was launched on the

Observation Post which was repulsed , but due to shelling, the wireless set at the OP was destroyed so were the line communication with the post below. At evening , the situation was , that at the main post there were 15 soldiers , one officer and three dead bodies, where as at the OP, Naib Subedar Atta was also wounded , he had four soldiers with him at the OP.

Early in the morning of 26th June, enemy started shelling the OP, at 1000 hours communication was established with the OP by the post, it was conveyed by the OP that they are dangerously short of ammunition. The irony was that the replenishment party which had set from the base was hit with aerial artillery bursts from Indians, it further delayed the replenishment. Meanwhile at the OP, precarious situation had developed in which Subedar Atta was now hit with a shell , he thus lost his arm, ammunition had been finished, two soldiers while repulsing the assault, slipped down and fell into the crevasse . Thus Subedar Atta was the last man holding the OP and in the end he too embraced martyrdom. Observation Post was lost .

An immediate effort was launched to recapture the lost observation post, Ebrahim Company was air lifted on 10th July to reinforce Shaheen company, tactical headquarters of 3 Commando battalion along with Yaqub company were also airlifted from Kamra to Skardu on 24th July.

Operation Qiadat- September 1987

The plan to recapture Quaid Observation Post was modified into capturing of Bilafond La itself by the commander SSG, however it was modified into capturing of the vital posts of Rana and Akbar on the left mouth of the Bilafond La, on 27th August 1987. In the first week of September, 3 Commando made its plan for the capture of Rana Post, this post was initially with own troops however it was captured by Indians in 1986 from NLI troops. Powindah battalion was supported by Ghazi Company{ 2 Commando Battalion} also.

These two posts rana and Akbar located at a height of 19000 feet are not straight in line with each other rather a Saddle joins them. Both had sharp gradients towards own side but gradual slope on the enemy side. The operation to capture these posts was code named ‘Operation Qiadat’.

All available and additional resources in the form of Puma, Allouette-III and Lama helicopters were mustered. From 1st July 1987 onwards Army Aviation started logistic buildup which included shifting of guns, ammunition, fuel, mortars, anti tank rockets and heavy machine guns. Helicopters were tasked exclusively to transport and airlift artillery guns and artillery ammunition to the forward locations. Allouette-III and

Lama helicopters were the main flying assets to shift stores, artillery pieces, ammunition and other equipment ahead of main bases. A 120 mm mortar was slung and transported by Lama to Camp-II area ahead of Ali Brangsa along with its ammunition;. even TOW were helilifted to Rahbar Post at 16,000 feet.

On 17th September, 1987, SSG troops were concentrated, which included Ebrahim Company at Rahbar base camp, Ghazi Company and one combat team of Yaqub Company at Ghazi Post, the battalion tactical headquarters was also established at Ghazi Post. The initial attack , planned to be launched on night 20/21st September had to be postponed. Army aviation helicopter dropped the orders of delay , by wrapping the message around a stone.

22nd September 1987, the operation was launched at 1030 hours in the morning by hitting the enemy bunkers , first TWO hit enemy bunker at La position, second one missed the bunkers at Akbar and third one narrowly missed own forward troops. The planning of any operation, especially recapture of any post is simple in every sense. There are no variable routes or alternate positions available. There is only objective, to reach the top in the first phase, and then assault the main bunkers in the second and final phase. Whereas the first phase to some extent can be planned by higher officer, the actual assault phase is the domain of the assaulting officer and troops for the reason that none had any idea of the layout of the post. This lack of knowledge was not a major factor, as everyone knew that the size of the post is as such that it had no other option but to pitch tents on whatever space is available.

In the evening at 1825 hours assault commenced on Rana by Captain Nazaratt and his team, two hours later heavy snow blocked his advance. The SSG teams , Major |Sana , Captain Shoukat , Captain Imran were between the Rahbar and the post; Captain Rashid Malik was the fire base commander. At night certain changes were incorporated in the plan.

At 0500 hours 23rd September 1987, Captain Nazaratt and Captain Imran along with their men were 150-200 yards short of Rana Top, which in terms of time it can take almost half day . As soon as these SSG men started coming out from the cover and started their ascend, they came under enemy fire and thus whole day the small attacking team was pinned down. More reinforcement moved from base camp , Major Sana and Captain Shoukat troops while climbing Tabish were hit upon. Captain Salik Cheema who had also climbed to evacuate a casualty was ordered to reinforce Captain Imran, which he managed to do so at 1700 hours. Thus at dusk, the entire ridge line from Tabish onwards had SSG troops. Indians brought the artillery air bursts and machine gun fire on the ridge line. SSG responded back, thus a requirement for ammunition replenishment, Captain Iqbal and Captain Afridi carried the ammunition from base camp and became part of the assaulting force. Meanwhile,

Captain Waseem at base camp was tasked to find an alternate route from Rahbar to Tabish, which he did with his men and also fixed the safety ropes.

At last light, Captain Shoukat and Nazaratt again started their climb towards the objective, plan was, Captain Shoukat to establish a fire base with one combat team, while Naib Subedar Rashid to manoeuvre from right so as to suppress the enemy fire from Akbar Post and La Bunker. Captain Rashid Malik to also manoeuvre from right under the cover of fire, where as Captain Iqbal and Captain Afridi to manoeuvre from the left and Captain Salik Cheema to approach the bunker complex frontally, close onto the bunkers. Captain Imran's task was to approach the bunkers from left and reach near the Rana Top. To cater for ammunition expenditure, Captain Najam was task to carry the ammunition with his men, he did so and by 2000 hours he reinforced Major Sana.


On 24th September at first light the operation started. Progress was slow but it was inching upwards, at such heights both defender and attacker have certain advantages, as a defender, the height, observation and the certainty that attacker can only climb upwards from this one direction only, is a great advantage. Attacker although besets by the low altitude, can still close in by making use of the blind and dead spots offered by the boulders. It was the final ascent which was important, it can only be made by using the extreme resources of own body's depleting energy, sheer will power, very high state of morale and a good amount of luck. Captain Salik Cheema imitated the assault and finally reached the top, where he and his three men were hit with enemy fire, they returned the fire but soon took their last breath and embraced martyrdom at the top mere yards short of the objective.

On the other side, Captain Rashid Malik was able establish a fire base at 1900 hours from where he can support the ascend of Captain Iqbal and Captain Afridi. Captain Iqbal was hit with enemy fire at close range but he still managed to knock off a bunker with rocket launcher. By 0200 hours, there was a close proximity fire going on at the top. Space was not enough for both attackers or defenders to manoeuvre, thus fire exchange kept going on. Indians launched a fiery counter attack by bringing fire upon 'own position'. At 0430 hours, Captain Najam was able to link up with Captain Iqbal, however a volley of machine gun fire took the life of Captain Iqbal. All in all there were thirteen dead bodies and twenty five own soldiers were wounded. Thus own troops descended down to 200 yards, Naik Anwar was the last man to descend. At first light the overall situation was almost similar to what was the position three days earlier, however in this time period the 3 Commando Battalion had suffered twenty shaheed and 115 wounded. The further descend was equally dangerous due to enemy fire, thus at last light 26th September 1987, own troops started descending down,


Kargil – 1999

Kargil in the summer of 1999 became a headline world over, Pakistan and India fought a small limited war in June 1999. The Kargil War was in fact a continuation of past, the small mountainous town was first captured by the Pakistan in 1948 and became the extreme extent of the freedom movement which was initiated with the Operation Datta Khel { Gilgit uprising of November 1947}. In 1965 a classic commando raid by SSG at Dras resulted in numerous casualties to Indians. After the stalemate in Siachen in 1988, military planners in Pakistan started pondering over indirect approach, the most logical being, to cut off the logistic tail of Indian forces at the Siachen Glacier itself through interdiction on Srinagar-Kargil- Dras Road.

Almost identical thoughts were being hatched by the freedom fighters of Kashmir, who after the popular uprising in the held Kashmir in 1989, had become more independent in finding the solution through armed resistance. Unlike 1965 uprising in Kashmir which was sponsored by Pakistan, the unrest in Kashmir in nineties was more indigenous and home grown. These mujahedeen in the early summer of 1999, surprised the Indian troops at Kargil, who after the winter, when tried to re-establish the vacated posts; found the Kashmir mujahedeen in place. These three vital posts were now controlling the traffic on the main route, rather the lifeline to Siachen Glacier. Throughout the month of May 1999, Indian army tried its utmost to recapture the lost posts but in vain. On 28th May 1999, a serious setback to Indians occurred when they lost two MIGs aircraft, very next day they lost a MI-17 helicopter as well, all three due to ground fire by mujahedeen. There has been an unwritten convention



between the two countries, not to use the air force in Kashmir and across the Line of Control {LOC}, with this act of India, Pakistan Army was now morally free to fight the war as it suits . SSG troops manned the LOC, Liaqat, Shaheen and Kamal companies took part in the operation. Kamal Company was deployed in Chohar sector, Shaheen Company in Batalik sector and Liaqat company in Gultri sector. The SSG has the credit to carryout successful mission during the conflict, Captain Ammar was decorated with Sitara-i-Jurat posthumously for his act of valour in Kargil.



Chapter V**Special Service Group and War on Militancy**

SSG on the eve of new millennium was in the process of finalising its organisation and structure to meet the new threat. The recently concluded war and skirmishes in Kargil and Kashmir had strengthened the hypothesis that SSG will be performing the same tasks as in previous conflicts. A reorganisation of SSG had been initiated after 1971, in 1974 and also in 1978; but somehow the other it was never finalised due to economic constraints. On 2nd March 1994, the proposals for reorganisation of SSG was finally approved by the GHQ. The existing organisation revolved around having four companies and a headquarter company, all in all a strength of 606 all ranks. Company the basic brick of SSG was having 128 all ranks. In a commando battalion there were 20 officers, 19 junior commissioned officers, 57 havildars and 441 ranks and file; apart from these men there were 19 clerks on the strength of a battalion. The battalion had 64 vehicles also. All in all the SSG was having three battalions with a strength of 1704 all ranks. The fighting unit of SSG is the platoon, and a platoon had three commando teams. Commando team therefore is the basic brick of SSG; it needs bit of elaboration. In each commando team was led by a havildar with a naik as his deputy, four commandos operating light machine gun, two operating the rocket launcher and two riflemen. Surprisingly there was neither the cook nor the sweeper authorised to the commando battalion or the company; a makeshift arrangement was made under the 1966 rules. The only major step taken forward was the establishment of the Special Operations School .

The 9/11 incident came as a jolt and took everybody by surprise. On 7th October 2001, the war in Afghanistan begun with aerial bombing, by first week of December the Taliban government in Afghanistan was over thrown. By the end 2001, Pakistan Army had established the blocking positions on the likely routes of Taliban entering into Pakistan. SSG one company was also part of the force which was keeping an eye on the Tora Bora pass. In the meantime, the situation on the eastern border had necessitated the deployment of SSG with field formations. Commandos of 1 Commando Battalion, for instance spent a month in Gujranwala and surrounding areas practicing heliborne operations and Heli-repelling with army aviation squadrons.

It was in 2002 that the first smoke of the insurgency detected in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas {FATA}, where the very first such mission was undertaken under the code name Operation Tight Noose. SSG and Army Aviation for the first time became an integral force, although both corps had been highlighting the catalytic impact it will have on operations if they act together but , it was never really put into

practise. One reason was the lack or shortage of helicopters. In 2002-2003, American helicopters {Bell 412} were inducted, also a high number of Russian helicopters {Mi-17} were purchased. A new concept of Special operations task Force {SOTF} emerged in which both commandos and aviators practised the battle drills extensively. A battalion size composite force was raised, 3 Commando Battalion was elevated to the status of SOTF, new , modern equipment was given to the battalion. Simultaneously a new commando battalion 4 Commando Battalion was raised as an Air Assault Commando Battalion.

In the year preceding to the first operation, dawn, dusk and night operations were practised , in which a battalion size force was helilifted from Qasim Base and dropped near the Attock and surrounding areas , aim was to integrate the drills. The general officer commanding , of SSG and Army Aviation, Major General Faisal Alvi and Major General Muhammad Azam deserves special mention for preparing the force. Interestingly Major general Muhammad Azam was also the colonel commandant of 19th Baluch Regiment. Another much needed step, was the elevation of commander SSG from one star to two stars rank.

SSG in the first decade {2003-2013} conducted no less than 187 operational missions. The period itself can be classified , in first phase 2003-2009, SSG missions were controlled by military operations directorate{MO Dte}, later SSG carried out operation undercommand Peshawar Corps { 11 Corps}, alongiwth these missions there were certain tasks which SSG carried out as a formation. After 2003, apart from 4 Commando Battalion, four more commando battalions were raised, these battalions were later formed into three Special Service Brigades {SSB}. In terms of area of operation, 75% missions were conducted in the seven tribal agencies {FATA}and remaining in Swat and few operations in Northern Areas of Pakistan. The high point of SSG operations is ‘Operation Peo Char’ in Swat area, for the first time the complete SSG Division was employed in flushing out the terrorists and miscreants. It was a Heliborne operation of unprecedented form, for the first time in sub continent such amass number of troops and helicopters were employed successfully.

Apart from the organisational changes at higher level, certain tactical changes have been incorporated in the operations of SSG. The previous ten member combat team has now been altered to fifteen men since 2014. Training doctrine has been upgraded to cater for new challenges, anti-terrorist training has now become an integral part of all commando courses, sniper training is now given a top priority. The doctrine of training at company level is now replaced by a central training regime under which the individuals are now trained in specific crafts by the SOS {Special Operations School}, presently, in 2016, no less than 187 courses and cadres are being run for training, scale of ammunition for training has ben enhanced.

SSG trained no less than six light commando battalions, which were later affiliated with the SSG Battalions, thus Baloch regiment is associated with 1 Commando, Punjab with 2 Commando, Frontier Force with 3 Commando, 4 Commando is affiliated with Azad Kashmir, Sind Regiment is affiliated with 5 Commando and Northern Light Infantry is affiliated with 6 Commando Battalion.

The long war has taken its toll on SSG, in order to raise the morale of the commandos, many steps have been taken, new accommodation for troops along with family accommodation has been constructed, but more significant step is the construction of two new schools, one at Cherat and other more grand is the Manjanbazam Cadet School and College at Tarbela. SSG provides free accommodation and education to all the children of shaheed. It must be kept in mind that till 2006, all children used to travel no less than 86 Kilometres each day from Cherat and 44 Kilometres from Attock to get education at army run schools in nearby cantonments.

Federally Administered Tribal Area {FATA}

The centre of gravity of all operations, FATA is 600 kilometres long tribal belt with a width not exceeding 130 kilometres, it is along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border which is more commonly referred as the Durand Line, an agreement between the British and Afghanistan dating back to 1893. FATA covers an area of 27,200 square kilometres which is 2.6% of Pakistan's total area, FATA have a population of 5.6 Million people. It is divided into seven tribal agency namely, **Khyber** {1879}, **North Waziristan Agency** {1900} **South Waziristan Agency** {1900}, **Kurram Agency** {1899} were the original political agencies under the British raj. There were few more political agencies in Baluchistan as well. After 1947, **Mohmand** political agency was raised in 1951 followed by **Bajaur** in 1973 and **Orakzai** Political Agency also in 1973.

These political agencies are unique political entity, they are semi-autonomous, where the life and laws are based upon centuries old customs and traditions. The common factor among all the political agencies are language {Pashtu} which is spoken with different dialect in each agency, religion is overwhelmingly Islam, only few of the tribes { Turi, Orakzai and Bangash adhere to Shia faith of Islam, all other follow Sunni doctrine}. Each political agency have a Militia known as Frontier Corps. All these agencies have unique cultural and tribal structure, thus each agency should be treated independently.

Swat on the other hand was a princely state, it acceded to Pakistan in 1947 and later in 1969, all princely privileges were abolished by Pakistan. State was always considered non militant in nature.

Special Services Group were inducted in the war from the onset, company of 3 Commando battalion at Siachen was airlifted from Skardu, after landing at Peshawar, it was taken to Kohat where it stayed for next three months; end of 2001. In these three months, the mission was still not very clear, it was only after American invasion in Afghanistan in December 2001, that the issue of Afghan Taliban entering and staying in Pakistan became the core issue. In 2002, as the bulk of SSG was deployed against the likely Indian incursion on eastern borders thus, only one battalion 3 Commando was spared for keeping an eye on the western borders. Same battalion later became Special operations task force {SOTF} thus the early experiences of war on western frontier is more or less the history of Powindah. After 2005, the other commando battalions were also integrated into the operations.

Three platoons of 3 Commando were airlifted to USA for initial training on the modern way of commando warfare. The training itself got started on wrong foot; it was Ramadan and Captain Tariq 'Tikki' and his men were fasting, the American trainers pointed out this as a violation of SOP, Captain Tariq's point of view was simple, train as hard as you can, as long as I can last, I will keep the fast, where I think, that I cannot cope up with it, than I can break the fast, but from the onset do not make it an issue. In the end, the platoon came back without training; after Ramadan the new platoons were sent to America for training. This incident has certain lessons, the first and foremost, that cultural and religious values are an integral part of human and as such they have to be respected. In mid-2000, the American training team came into Pakistan; for any successful operation in



Afghanistan, a sustained support from Pakistan was vital for the Americans and other western allies. Initial training was conducted by Americans at Kohat and later the training centre was established at Tarbela.

SSG and Army aviation were two most vital component in this war on militancy; thus a joint SSG and Army Aviation base was constructed and inaugurated in 2003-2004. A new company Karrar was also raised, especially for operations in built up areas, later this company was made part of Zarrar Company.

3 Commando, after Kohat moved on to Wanna for likely operations. In the last quarter of 2002, there were rumours and intelligence reports about a certain group of foreigners hiding in close vicinity of Wanna. In the early days of the war, the main aim was to hunt and capture the Osama Bin Laden, the mentor of Al Qaeda, thus all operations invariably were taken with this aim; either for his capture or his allies and close confidants.

In Wanna, the situation and local people were still not hostile, own SSG persons would go to bazaar in civil dress and buy the usual items. The local intelligence network of tribes is quite efficient and they soon pick the routine of military. There were usual movement between the Wanna and Islamabad in connection with American trainers, there were vehicles provided by American with dark glasses that would roam between the two cities. One day Captain Naveed of 3 Commando was approached by a local tribesman , ‘ I was walking in the bazaar, when he approached me and call me by rank, and offering a handsome amount of money, so that his own vehicles can ply with us , he was a smuggler but it highlights the kind of intelligence these people have’. He further highlights that , ‘we were wearing the uniform of Frontier Corps, I somehow had the uniform of a naik rather than that of an officer.’ The first operation conducted against the Taliban was on 2nd October 2002 known as ‘ Operation Tight Noose near Angoor Adda.

Operation Tight Noose 2nd October 2003.

The very first operation of newly raised SOTF was conducted six Kilometres south of Wanna at Bagar Cheena area. The operation was a well coordinated and based upon intelligence reports,, highlighting the presence of over thirty hard-core Taliban; however the exact figure of the Taliban was not confirmed. Karrar Company for the operation constructed a model village in Tarbela , to depict the target and for well over two months extensive training was carried out. ‘ we carried out a deep planning and rehearsed the likely unfolding of events , to an extent that we could predict that at such and such precise moment, the target would be exposing his left shoulder to the sniper’. Reconnaissance of the target had commenced on 20th August, another reconnaissance was carried out very next day. During the reconnaissance phase the commandos were shown the houses nd the compound to be attacked.

On the operational night, the force moved out from Wanna in military trucks, passed through a village and debussed almost two miles short of the compound. An infantry battalion laid the outer cordon along with the 3 Commandos, and Karrar were to pass through this cordon and assault the compound.

Naib Subedar Muhammad Akhtar then a naik narrates ‘ for well over two months we practised the new drills and tactics at Wanna, it included boarding and getting down from helicopter in a tactical manner, laying of cordon and assaulting the mud compounds, daily there were classes in which we were given lessons, by using blackboards and then practising what has been taught...there was a great anticipation among all of us, we were looking forward to see the action. We were organised into assault teams rather than platoons, within our company Sepoy Qaiser was leading the prayers. In the morning we were informed about a likely operation at night. After Isha prayers we all mounted the vehicles. Havildar Liaqat was our assault team leader, it required two vehicles for one team. We reached our designated target area at 0400 hours, it was a moonless night. We walked from our debussing point towards the target, each team would occupy its designated area and then informed through wireless about its position. The target itself, a mud house compound, had a small garden or orchard in front, as soon as we reached the orchard the first fire came upon us from the watch towers. My team took cover behind a broken wall and returned the fire. Karrar team in the meanwhile had reached the walls of the compound, scaled it and were inside the compound.

The compounds and villages in Waziristan are different in design and layout from the standard villages of Punjab, Sind and other parts of frontier. They are made of mud, thus the rocket launchers for all practical purposes lose their lethality. Walls themselves are twenty feet and higher, a compound is in fact a family house in which all members of an extended family live together, having different mudhouses inside the compound, these rooms are interlink, have narrow door and an occasional window. For army or SSG it was not a difficult task to simply raze the mud compound, or bring an artillery round, but it was the concern for the safety of the women and children which prompted such elaborate preparation and caution.

At dawn, the commandos were able to see the whole area of operation, there were trenches in the orchards from which occasional fire was brought upon the commandos. ‘ we shot, one Taliban who was firing on us from the bunker, there was still one man who was causing nuisance for my team. At noon Karrar company carried out the assault, six terrorists were killed in the encounter, at the same time, the encircled terrorist tried to break the cordon by firing and running. Sepoy Qaiser was quite nearby, he was the first one to get the fatal bullet from the terrorist, Qaiser died on the spot. We also killed the running terrorist. The sporadic firefight continued till the evening, after Maghrib prayers, operation was called off and Karrar company was ordered to clear the area, it was during this phase that Sepoy Ishtaiq was hit by a bullet and he

embraced martyrdom. In the end two terrorist were captured alive, one of them hailed from Sheikupura{Punjab}. Later at night we marched back to a predesignated place, an infantry battalion had established the outer cordon, we had meal with them , and slept a little.

In the morning there was a darbar by commander SSG Major General Faisal Alvi who praised all commandos. During the day, Cobra attack helicopters were also employed to attack the compound, a final combing of the area and compound was carried out on 3rd October as well by Hamza , Zikriya and Karrar Companies .

Operation Kalosha was another operation carried out in Wanna {South Waziristan Agency}, It was conducted on 7th January 2004. Primary aim was search of foreign militants in five mud compounds, intelligence reports had highlighted the presence of 40-50 foreign militants. The standard standing procedures now evolved includes an outer cordon by an infantry and inner cordon by commando battalion and finally the search and clearance by the Karrar. After encirclement of the compounds, announcement was made on speakers about the intention, thus all women and children { 25 in number} came out and stayed in open. Artillery and Cobra fire was brought upon the compounds at 0930 hours. At 1100 hours the search and clearance started and was over by 1330 hours. *‘Although the operation met no success but it was a good real time exercise and the unit and sub units were able to practice their drills and procedures in actual environment’.*

Operation Zarkai -23rd February 2004. An operation almost similar to the two previous operations, basing upon the intelligence reports of foreign militants present in the area. It was an exclusive SOTF operation and no infantry battalion was employed for the establishment of cordon. Also it was the very first operation which was Heliborne, all the force was helilifted from Mianwali in three waves. In the first wave, nine MI-17 helicopters airlifted 185 commandos of 3 Commando battalion to establish an outer cordon; by 0700 hours the target village was easily cordoned without any resistance. The second wave of six Mi-17 helicopters landed near the target area, 115 commandos of Zarrar and Karrar companies were in position by 0730 hours. The announcement was made on loudspeakers, this time lady searchers were also part of the raiding force, in order to ensure that no militant escapes under the veil cover. These lady searchers, Frontier militia , infantry company and political agent arrived at the target area in vehicles. Operation terminated at 1430 hours without any major or worthwhile prize, only two local armed men and four Kazakh women were apprehended. Commandos observation were *‘ intelligence agencies are exaggerating the presence of high value targets and miscreants’.*

Operation Shakai-11th June 2004. Operation at Shakai in SWA was a major operation in terms of troops and the helicopters, a wholly SOTF operation, in which 3 Commando and Karrar Company took part, there were 15 MI-17 helicopters, supported by four Cobra gunships and a UH-2 helicopter acting as aerial command post.


As the helicopters came in for landing, they were fired upon, thus one Mi-17 with two combat teams of Karrar had to divert to Wanna from where the combat teams were later dropped at evening. The maximum fire was coming from the northern ridge{ pt9715}, this was unexpected development, teams had to sent to eliminate this menace, which they did successfully. There was one 14.5 mm single barrel gun which was causing all this havoc, after the ridge was overpowered, it was found and deduced that not more than five militants were on the top.

The search and clearance of the compound and the adjoining area revealed nothing as only one vantage rifle .303 was captured alongwith some ammunition. For a more precise destruction of the target area , an air strike was called which came at 1630-1700 hours strafing and bombing the northern ridge line . Troops camped in the near vicinity of the target , during night, illuminating artillery rounds were fired , the militants attempted twice to attack the camp but failed. Next morning {12th June 2004} the day started with own air strike on the compound area and searching and clearing by the Karrar company which they were able to do so by 1500 hours. Meanwhile a link up was established with the 8 Punjab regiment, they now took over the cleared compounds under their control. The SOTF had to spent the night again , on the ridge lines. On 13th June , the ridges were searched again for any miscreant , a single cabin with a 12.7mm gun mounted was located and destroyed. By mid day all 15 compounds were searched and cleared without finding anything worthwhile ; deinduction started at 1430 hours and was successfully completed by 1615 hours. SOTF later realised and stressed that , clearance and search mission should be completed with in a day, irrespective of darkness, rather than spending the night in the target area. Another bitter lesson was that, such operations can last longer than planned, therefore food and other arrangement which includes batteries for the wireless sets should be carried in sufficient numbers.

North Waziristan Agency

After the operation in Angoor Adda, the focus of SOTF shifted towards Miranshah, between 2003-2005, no less than a dosen such operation were carried out in the vicinity of Miranshah. Army took the operational control of the political; agency in July 2005, prior to it, the political agent and the Tochi Scouts were the main strength of the state. American training team and small group of soldiers were also accommodated in the Miranshah, in the vocational training institute. Thus Americans had the high technology setup, from where the intelligence was gathered and later passed on to own troops for action. Actions were deliberate and thoroughly planned.

Tande Obo a small village on the outskirts of Miranshah, approximately 18 Kilometres north east, having a madrassah was the target. Intelligence reports gave the impression of foreigners being trained in the Madrassah. On 23rd August 2004, SOTF troops were Heli landed short of the target area, a company then secured the landing area, after the experience of previous operations, securing the landing zone became a priority. As usual the outer cordon was established by 3 Commando and Karrar Company carried out the search and clearance of the target. The Karrar assault team was hit by the miscreants' fire resultantly Captain Arshad Iqbal was hit and wounded. Such sporadic fire, retard the speed of the assault teams and allowed the miscreants to make an attempt to escape through the cordon. Miscreants hiding and blending with the ground, were good marksmen, thus two more soldiers of SOTF were wounded, Havildar Niaz Ahmed and Naib Subedar Mir Dad had to be evacuated to safety area. All captured arms and ammunition was destroyed by the SOTF and troops were helilifted from target area and were back in Tarbela by 1930 hours.



Lawar Mandi is a small village, 55 Kilometres west of Miranshah, astride the Durand Line. On 14/15th January 2005, a major operation was carried out, no less than 12 MI-17 helicopters having support of four Cobra gunships participated in the operation, 3 Commando Battalion and Karrar Company were heli landed in the snow covered area. The one major lesson that had emerged so far from the operations conducted was the requirement and necessity of having a close coordination among the commandos and aviation element. Thus the whole force had spent the night at Qasim Army aviation base, where last minute details were ironed out. The cordon force took off at 0600 hours on 15th January and they established the outer cordon, which started squeezing and finally by 0800 hours it was in position. Karrar Company landed at 0845 hours and immediately started searching the village. It was one of the very first and perhaps the only mission in which American also participated, albeit in an indirect manner. Five American gunships were hovering inside Afghanistan and own four Cobras were inside Pakistan, thus eliminating any chance of any miscreants making good with escape. Seven compounds were cordoned and people ask through

loudspeakers to vacate the compound, ‘everyone started vacating the house without any retaliating and surrendered peacefully’, leaving the women and children, twenty men were apprehended and taken to Bannu. All compounds were then searched but nothing objectionable was found

NWA post July 2005

On 5th July 2005, army took the operational and political control of the political agency, from this date onwards the operations also took a sharp turn in terms of conduct and more importantly the resistance increased manifolds to the operations. Sometimes one minor incident acts as the ignitor or catalyst. Immediately after taking control, army carried out clearance operations of the city and the surrounding villages. On the night of 17/18th July in an unfortunate incident, few of the local women and children were killed in such encounters, which changed the overall attitude and mind-set of the native population. In the following days, strong speeches and demonstration were held in the city, pressing for the eviction of American troops in Miranshah; in the end the Americans were taken out and replaced by a company of 4 Commando Battalion.

Noor Payo Khan, 1st March 2006.

The operation at NPK, is considered to be the first Direct Snap Action {DSA} conducted by SSG, although a minor operation was carried out on a similar pattern at Dera Ismail Khan a year earlier. For NPK, six Mi-17 helicopters, five Cobra attack gunships and two Bell 412 helicopters were employed. SOTF was divided into two groups, Karrar and Ebrahim Companies each had six combat teams, whereas two companies of 1 Commando battalion were incorporated. Cobras softened up the target with missiles and heavy cannons, starting at 0730 and lifting the fire after ten minutes. In the first wave Karrar and Ebrahim company landed on the north east and south of the target compounds. Operation lasted for two hours.

NPK compound is located Dande Killi, couple of miles north east of Miranshah. It was stressed by the intelligence agencies as the main hub of Taliban training and a centre of insurgency, presence of miscreants was definitely expected and it proved true. The initial strafing by attack helicopters took the Taliban by surprise and quite a number were killed inside the compound. The miscreants who were outside the compound offered stiff resistance to the landing troops, two soldiers of Karrar Company suffered bullet injuries seconds after landing. Karrar true to its name fought through the fire, reached the compound, breached its gate and entered the compound. They searched the half a dozen rooms but found nothing extraordinary other than usual cache of arms and ammunition.

Ebrahim company also landed simultaneously , but on the southern edge, they were also under heavy miscreants fire, regardless of the fire, they provided fire support and cover to the assaulting Karrar teams .it was a daylight operation, thus by 0945v hours the companies wee helilifted from pick up zone. The major catastrophe was avoided at the pick up zone, two rockets hit the landing Mi-17 Helicopter, pilots despite the fire and the fire within the cockpit, managed to take off and land safely alongwith troops at Miranshah. 3 Commando battalion suffered one shaheed and 15 other as wounded.

Minor operation in and around Miranshah

Apart from the helilanded operations, a string of minor operations wee carried out in the surrounding areas of Miranshah. The city itself had a periphery of posts located on high ground, like Sarbandkai, Banda, Amin to name few. SSG officers were detailed and task to lay ambushes and raids on the Taliban vehicles, convoys and commanders. Captain Qamar Aijaz carried out one successful ambush near Chashmai Bridge in July 2007. SSG now with passage of time, opted to detach one company on duration, to be attached with each of the infantry divisions operating in North and South Waziristan. A major pause in conflict also arrived with the signing of peace pact with the Taliban in North Waziristan Agency; furthermore the drone attacks were achieving the similar results which were expected from a raid or ambush by SOTF.

A Sepoy's Narrative

Sepoy Shams hails from Mirpur Khas in Sind, his parent arm is artillery, in search of adventure he joined SSG and passed out in 2006. *'After my wing ceremony, I was posted to 1 Commando battalion, I reported at Attock fort, along with five other commandos who have recently passed out. Two days after our joining the battalion, we moved to Miranshah by road. First we reported at Bannu, from where a convoy was operating on every Sunday between Bannu and Miranshah. For next one month I was in Miranshah, Americans were still present and one of my main duty was to act as the sentry in the compound. After a month, one fine morning we were told that we are leaving for Parachinar. We boarded the helicopters and soon we were landed at Doabba, short of Thall fort. Now there was a change in mission, we had to move to Jandola in South Waziristan Agency.*

We were a combination of two companies Liaqat and Kamal, Major Jawed Bhutta was the company commander, our mission was to spearhead the advance of the infantry division, leading to the home village of Bait ullah Mahsud. As I was the new comer thus I had to carry the maximum weight which included the light machine gun and its ammunition. Sepoy Waheed , myself and naik Shahbaz who was our team commander as well were leading the advance of our commando company. The company itself was divided into two groups, with each group having twenty odd commandos, we were visual to each other. The going was tough, as we reached a ridge, the very first fire came upon us, this

was the very first enemy fire of my life, I have no hesitation that for a moment it unnerved me, I took cover behind a boulder. The heavy luggage was a hindrance in swift movement, we passed the information to the company which was at the base of the ridge; the fire was effectively coming over them also. Sepoy Waheed had also joined recently, in a rush of blood, he moved forward to assess the situation, immediately he was shot; he now thus was lying wounded almost fifteen meters away from the cover, his weapon had fallen away. I called him and told him to crawl backwards so we can help him out, but he was more worried about his weapon and refused to crawl back without the weapon. Naik Shahbaz then dashed forward and drag him into safety. But Sepoy Shahbaz had taken his last breath. We now, cleared the ridge, it was a pair of snipers who had halted our advance. We split the weight of the shaheed and in turn carried his body. I once rolled down the ridge with the body, my uniform was now torn and wet with the sweat and blood. We finally managed to reach our designated high ground without any further incident. We could see the village down below. Next day, we had to travel good distance of over fifteen Kilometres so we can hand over our shaheed body to the waiting ambulance which had arrived under armed escort. After three days at the ridge we came back through the same track, there were two donkeys which we found at the ridge, we decided to use them for own transportation of luggage. Surprisingly, the donkey refused to carry any load more than ten Kilogram, we knew the weight specification of each of our pack, since I was the donkey handler, thus the moment I will add any weight over ten kilograms, donkey will simply sit down and no matter how you kick him would not walk unless the extra weight is taken off him. Reason which our senior subedar gave was that this donkey is a water carrier and as such used to carry only ten kilograms of weight and as such is reluctant to carry any extra load. stayed with the division for three more months rather than the three days as planned earlier.

From South Waziristan Agency, we were taken to Orakzai Agency. In the Orakzai Agency, the militants had burnt the house of Sikhs at Samana ridge thus for the protection of Sikhs we had to move. Captain Hamza Bin Tariq was our platoon commander, we searched the house but found nothing in them, we stayed for over a month at Samna ridge. We were taken back to Doab, from where we move to Bannu and stayed for fifteen days before moving back to Para training School at Peshawar. At PTS we were told to practise an ambush, most likely we will be laying n ambush on vehicles of Muslim Khan, Sufi Mohammad and Fazlullah’.

Pash Ziarat, 16th September 2007.

The operation was conducted in the Pash Ziarat area, which is north of Razmak, it is a ridge line which covered the track movement going from Razmak to Manna. During British ear three posts were constructed on the ridge line known as Alexandria, Duncan and the Pash Ziarat Post. Unfortunately the post itself was lost to Taliban by the army and frontier corps. Now the mission assigned was the capture of the post itself and destruction of the training centres of Taliban .The main ridge known as Rocky ridge have a length of 800-900 meters running in west-east direction, it was heavily fortified by Taliban in anticipation of the intended attack; it was situated 400-500 meters north of lost post.

The Pash Ziarat Post was located on the north of Razmak-Mana track where as the Khassadar Post was situated on the south of Pash Ziarat Post along the Razmak-Manan track. A compound of Taliban was reported to be in the base of Jamiat Ridge which was dominating both the Pash Ziarat and the Khassadar Posts. Own forces comprised of 122 soldiers, three junior commissioned officers, five officers, two artillery observers, one medical orderly and four sappers, all in all 138 all ranks.


On 10th September, 2007, the force was gathered at Miranshah and move to Razmak, the initial plan was offset by the weather and as such delayed for a day. Twenty men each were dropped from helicopters at the ridge three Kilometres short of the objective{ Pash Ziarat } before the last light. As soon as the landing was accomplished, the Razmak airfield acme under intense attack from the Taliban from the surrounding and dominating hills , this thus overruled further insertion of troops in the target area. The dropped force occupied a hideout and spent the night.

On 13th September, at 0900 hours, two more forces were dropped at the ridge, the two forces later joined together at what was known as triangular feature. Whole day the firing duel with miscreants continued, with own troops trying to establish a foothold. Next day, a further force of 60 soldiers was dropped close to Mana, they after landing establish contact with the already dropped troops. Meanwhile, the miscreants close the circle around the first two parties; night was spent fighting with the Taliban; it was now decided to break the cordon of Taliban and establish contact with the own troops at first light. The contact with own troops was established at the first light, at this stage after assessing the situation, it was decided to capture the Pash Ziarat Post. Firm base was established and reconnaissance of the target was carried out, but they were taken by surprise when at 1830 hours the force found itself being surrounded by Taliban . Now it was a battle for survival, thus the force was divided into four groups , each fighting its own battle and trying to break the cordon of the miscreants

On 16th September, 2007 at 0500 hours the physical assault was carried out by the Taliban, a hand pitched battle ensued, miscreants were pushed back to thirty odd meters from where behind the cover the fire fight continued. Now it was decided to disengage from the battle and find a way out; after seven hours of intense and sporadic fight, own troops started disengaging from the confined area, they were able to extricate themselves and by evening the battle was over. SSG suffered the highest casualties in the current war at Pash Ziarat, fifteen soldiers embraced martyrdom and twelve more were wounded. Two soldiers of 3 Commando Battalion were able to re-join the battalion after few days. They were wounded and had to escape using their wits through the Taliban territory.

Swat , Operation Rah-e-Haq -2007-08

Operations in Swat in earnest started from the mid October 2007 and continued intermittently till 2009. 3 Commando battalion was in position at Kanju fort since 22nd October 2007. The Taliban offensive which was launched on 24th October targeting the police and para military organisation did achieved its aim, by 7th November 2007, Taliban were in control of Madyn , Kabal and Khawaza Khela tehsils and towns. In the second week of November, Taliban tried to wrest the Shangla District, which is on east of Swat. This advance was checked by own army and Taliban were pushed back into Swat; by end November , Taliban went underground. Close battles were fought between the infantry and the Taliban, finally in February 2009, a peace accord was signed between the Taliban and the government. Soon this peace pact was broken by the Taliban when they abducted four commandos who were under cover, they later killed all of them. As a result a final push was launched in Swat which ultimately cleared the Swat state from the menace of militancy. It was in the last phase that SSG launched its two major operations to capture Peo Char valley.



During the winter 2007 phase, Powindah were employed to restore the morale of own troops, in one action, Captain Arif was able to recapture the Kabal police station from the Taliban , impromptu targets were also neutralised by the quick reaction force {QRF } of 3 Commando Battalion. Capture of Najia and Usmani tops , two dominating features overlooking the route to Dir were captured by a combined force led by 3 Commando alongwith 6 Azad Kashmir , 28 Sind and 15 FF regiments

Lieutenant Colonel Zafar Niazi, a ‘golden dagger’ commando, commanded 1 Commando Battalion{2014-2016}, narrates.

In 2007, I was commanding the Ayub Company {1 Commando} undercommand Lieutenant Colonel Mumtaz, my company was placed at Mingora, battalion headquarters were at Kabal; Captain Hussnain and Captain Hussain were the other two officers with me at Mingora. My company was located at the circuit rest house, few miles outside the city. The 17 Division was about to launch the Operation Rah-e-Haq, as such we were task to clear the approaches of advance and clear the city of miscreants.

There were sixteen such targets, these were men identified by military intelligence as 'black' and having sympathy with Taliban. First task was to identify the house of these miscreants, the situation in city was as such that no army personal could move with security, it was practically under the control of Taliban. For target reconnaissance myself and a captain from military intelligence, would disguised ourselves as poor beggars, wearing dirty kameez shalwar, which I really had to make dirty by playing volleyball in them, with bathroom sleepers as the footwear. My major disadvantage was that I could not speak Pashtu, although I could understand. After three such runs, in the last run a day prior to the actual raid on these houses, myself and the intelligence captain alongwith a company commander of 18 Frontier force{FF} went on reconnaissance. It was bit frustrating as the company commander was also a Punjabi and even when he spoke Urdu, the Punjabi accent was too visible and obvious. I confirmed the sixteen house to the intelligence officer and made final plan for an early morning raid.

At night , the company was briefed, teams were earmarked, we were operating on ten men team at that time, I made six combat teams. Early on the morning before Fajr prayers, my company was in position, they had the light ladders with them, the procedure was that one team would take cover and provide the fire in case it si required, the other team would assault the designated house. I went into two such houses, I knew the opening sentences in Pashtu, when the door was opened, I would inquire about the person required, by and large all of them gave themselves up without any resistance. In one of the house, the son of the wanted man , a young boy, who seems to be very attached to his father cried bitterly, I consoled him that , I will make sure your father comes back alive, I also gave money to the boy , to buy books for his studies. Meanwhile 18 FF had established the outer cordon, they had an exchange of fire with militants in which two militants were killed. My own commanding officer and that of 18 FF were also present .

Later the brigade gave orders to demolish the house of all miscreants, there was no issue, but the last house belonging to Akhunzada Sher Durrani , was adjacent to the mosque, and there were chances that mosque may also get damage; thus in the last, the house was left intact. I called the elders of the area, Mashr, for a Jirga. Main aim was to have a human shield in case of suicide bombing, I noticed many people among the gathering wearing the Servis company's Cheetah sports ankle high shoes, a trademark of Taliban.

It was now, 0900 hours, brigade gave us the intelligence warning that Taliban has planned an ambush on our convoy. There were only two routes out from the area towards our own camp. One passing through the city, same route on which we have come, other was the bypass

road of city. I opted for the main route, although it is against the teaching to have same route for entry and exit, but intelligence report had highlighted that ambush is on both routes. Advantage of main route was that the road was good and wide enough to allow us to sped our way back home.

Our convoy now consisted of the two commanding officers and my company, as we sped our way, we had reach the midway in the city when fire came upon us from the side streets and from top of houses. My troops returned the fire with such ferocity and accuracy, that Taliban were forced to fire without any aim, fifteen bullets hit my vehicle, thirteen hit the vehicle following behind, almost every vehicle received bullets. There were only two fatal casualties, Havildar Ramzan was hit in the head, a bullet pierced through his safety helmet, other bullet hit the Akhunzada Durrani, whom we gave medical treatment but he died.

Major Rizwan , presently the second in command of 4 Commando Battalion, further highlights the operations in Swat area. The 4 Commando battalion was inducted after the deinduction of 1 Commando. ‘ My battalion{Yalgaar} was at the Mingora, city had gone back under the control of Taliban, 37 Division had replaced 17 Division, and a final push was underway. My company was earmark for clearing the approach route. The companies and battalions of the division were under siege at their respective locations, so much that even helicopters were unable to land in the area. We were running short on ammunition and food, there was no way to evacuate the casualties to safety. As a first step we cleared the nearby mountain ridge to enable helicopter landing. Later we were to occupy and hold the Banda Dheri plateau. It was a dominating feature in the approach.

We marched at night and linked up with a company of Baluch regiment at Kanju, few hundred meters away and on a higher ground. After a day spent in reconnaissance, we decided to occupy the feature before first light, thus combat teams were finalised and at first light we were in possession of the feature. The Taliban counter attack came at 1000 hours, they opened fire with long range weapon and in the cover of fire tried to reach the feature, but we foiled their attempts. They resorted to mortar bombing, there were trenches and overhead foxholes present at the feature made by the Taliban. However we remained in open , for the reason, in case we took cover than they would have assaulted the feature. Captain Zahid was the first one to be hit with the mortar splinters, he became unconscious due to excessive bleeding. I alongwith my men now occupied the same position, and soon myself and six men were hit with the mortar splinters, another officer came for our rescue but he was also hit with splinters. Despite all these adverse environments we still held the feature and by evening, as the division advanced the Taliban also retreated and we were able to have some respite. Later under darkness we marched back to the Kanju , from where we got few charpoys, put our wounded commandos on it and then marched sixteen Kilometres to field dressing station . As far as my own injury is concerned, the fact

that when it hit me, I felt no pain neither I realised that I have been hit, it was after four or five minutes that I felt acute pain and saw my blood dripping . The best part is that operation was a success and I alongwith my men and comrades kept the battalion izzat intact.

Operation Peo Char , 24th May 2009.

The final solution of unrest in Swat was in carrying military operation, flushing out the Taliban and their supporters , to destroy the training centres and hub of militancy; above all to take a moral ascendancy in the campaign by hitting at the very villages of the so called leaders of militancy. 1 Commando Battalion alongwith company each from 3,5 and 6 Commando battalions were employed in the first phase. A series of operations were carried out, to clear the valleys of the menace, Pio Char -2 was launched on 26th may, followed by operation to clear Dob Banda Valley on 29th May{ an exclusive 6 Commando Battalion operation}, minor operations to clear adjoining valleys in the first week of July known as Tilligram, Sir Killi and Badr Colony, finally the ‘Last Nail Operation’ in which 2,4,5,6 Commando battalions and two companies each from 1 and 3 Commando battalions participated, making it the largest SSG Operation in the history of the group and that of Pakistan Army. A through planning and good leadership resulted in having only five fatal casualties and thirteen injured soldiers in the entire month long campaign .

Pio Char was planned in a meticulous manner, a Darbar was held at Attock fort in which the General Officer Commanding SSG Major General Haroon Aslam addressed the commandos, raised the morale and wish them a success in the operation.

Lance Naik Shams narrates ‘ *Before the darbar, all mobile phones were deposited, at night we move in trucks from Attock to Ghazi air base, where at first light we took off, I was part of the tactical headquarters as an intelligence operator, my job was to keep the maps updated. We had to jump from the helicopters at the target area,, some commandos would jump with the load , other would first throw the pack and then jump. It was a long ridge, immediately after landing we rolled and took cover behind the trees. The designated companies and troops than moved down the valley, soon second wave of own troops landed in similar pattern. There was sporadic fire coming from the miscreant, but it was accurate. By evening our own sniper detected the Taliban sniper and neutralised him, he was on a tree. I myself alongwith the khateeb of the battalion had taken cover behind the tree, when we moved forward, a bullet hit the trunk of the next tree, thus we both jumped into a water tank. At the top there was a hut alongwith the water tank, we made our tactical headquarters in the same hut. Myself and khateeb thus remained inn cold water for well over an hour and then we decided to get out , other wise we will freeze to death . We just bolted out in two different direction without any fire coming on us. We were being provided with fresh food, which we had to pick from the road head. Thus we in the headquarters would march down, collect the haversack, and then at a predesignated point we will distribute it among the representatives of deployed companies. Presence of the Major General Haroon on the same ridge was a morale boosting factor.*

Operation Zarb-e-Azb, 2014-2016

On 8th June 2014, ten militants attacked Jinnah International Airport at Karachi, 28 people were killed; that was the starting point of Operation Zarb-e-Azb. In the first phase extensive aerial bombing was carried out on suspected hideouts of militants in North Waziristan Agency, at least 140 militants were killed. Subsequently ground operation was carried out in the NWA which was regarded very correctly as the hub of all militancy in frontier region. Initial plan which was presented by SSG revolved around helidrops of SSG {11 Special Service Brigade} on the southern heights of Panekzai, Humzoni and Boya Degan area, later it was decided to concentrate all efforts in clearing the Miranshah city

4 Commando Battalion undercommand Lieutenant Colonel Adnan Bashir , was given the mission of clearing the city, 5 Commando battalion was tasked to clear the adjoining areas of Tapi Tol Khel and Dande Darpa. Over 400 compounds were searched and cleared by 11 SSB, major explosive factories were detected and destroyed. Most important was the moral ascendancy which own troops gained over the miscreants. For long , since 2005, Miranshah had been a no go area for own forces and own troops were practically besieged within the mud walls of the Tochi Scouts fort. No vehicle could proceed to Bannu other than on Sunday, none could even move freely within the perimeter of the fort , however this operation took the initiative away from miscreants.

4 Commando Battalion, in the first phase employed their snipers with great effects, these snipers would take down anything moving in the streets of the ghost town. Captain Abrar who carried out the physical search of the town, later highlighted the fact that the layout of washrooms and toilets are different in each political agency. The search and clearance of the town was a nerve wrecking experience, a town famous for manufacturing of IEDs had to be neutralised and it was carried out without any major loss. 5 Commando Battalion on the other hand, secured the adjoining heights , these heights in the past have been the sites from where rocket attacks were launched into the fort.

Boya –Degan {7- 25 July 2014}

After clearing the Miranshah, the SSG troops advanced towards the west, next objective was the securing of road Miranshah- Panekzai- Humzoni-Ahmad Khel-Boya.-Degan uptill Khar Kamar Two commando battalions, 5 and 7 were given the mission to clear the area, these areas , especially area ahead of Boya was the stronghold of Gul Bahadur a militant commander, also the Wazir tribe territory starts truly ahead of Boya. 7 commando cleared Ahmed Khel where as 5 Commando Battalion cleared Ghazlami. 7 infantry Division was the overall formation in

charge of NWA, it had apart from 27 and 88 Infantry Brigades, the 11 SSB also under its command, thus at times commando battalions were placed undercommand infantry brigades but majority of the operation they were undercommand 11 SSB.

7 Commando Battalion during the operation was ambushed at Ali Khel but it managed to get out of the block, in the action, two commandos Lance Naik Tariq and Sepoy Siddique embraced shahadat. Finally on 8th July Usman and Haider Companies were able to link up with a NLI regiment at Boya .

In the next phase, two commando battalions {5&7} cleared the road from Boya to Degan. The area as such was divided into six sectors and clearance operation was carried out meticulously , villages like Sani Khel, Land, Mohammed Khel, Fazal din Kot and finally the Degan itself was cleared. In Degan, over 160 compounds were searched by Khalid, Harris and Mujtaba Companies. There were no own casualties in this operation.

5 Commando later move further westward, sanitizing Khar Kamar, Ghazlamai and Kani Rogha, mission was accomplished by 16th July and area was handed over to 46 Frontier force Regiment.

Retrieval of 30 Sind regiment Shuhada

A section strength of 30 Sind Regiment had suffered casualties in a firefight with militants in Ahmed Khel on 15th July 2014. Commanding officer of the Sind Battalion made the request for SSG reinforcement for retrieval of his dead bodies. A company of 4 Commando and two companies of 7 Commando battalions took part in the operation, four Cobra gunship helicopters and two Bell 412 also took part in the operation. The dead bodies of Shuhada were lying in the bed of Tochi River. In the initial phase of this operation, Havildar Muhammad Mustafa embraced shahadat while Naik Shahadat got injured. Operation after a brief pause was again initiated after last light. Commandos of 4 Yalgaar volunteered and retrieved the dead bodies from the mid stream. ‘ my men were deployed facing the river, and providing cover to the retrieving party, all of a sudden , a single shot took the life of Captain Akash Rabbani, he was hit by a sniper shot...later we searched the area and found the militant sniper, our sniper then shot him...the major threat were these hiding snipers, who were well conversed with the terrain and as such inflicted casualties on own troops.’ recalls commanding officer of Yalgaar. Apart from havildar Mustafa , captain Rabbani, Sepoy Waqar of Yalgaar also embraced martyrdom.

By 14th August 2014, the area around Boya was sanitised , troops and SSG battalions in a gesture to win hearts and minds of locals also distributed food and sweets among the children, Commander Brigadier Bhutta {11SSB} also met the local maliks and local population.

Intelligence Based Operations {IBO}

Between 23 August-4 September 2014, few successful IBOs were carried out by 5 and 7 Commando Battalions in the Saidgi Valley, the valley itself is in north east of Miranshah. 5 Commando Battalion remained on the east of the main water channel whereas 7 Commando battalion was on the west of stream; both battalions carried out sanitization simultaneously. Local population was warned before hand to evacuate the area, a Jirga was also held with local maliks to minimize the casualties.

Khyber Agency

After the cleansing of the North and South Waziristan, the militants took refuge in the highlands of Khyber Agency most notably in Tirah Valley. In October 2014, the preliminary operations started in Khyber Agency in which 2 and 4 Commando Battalions were deployed. 4 Commando was the main punch in Bara Valley where as 2 Commando Battalion was operating in Kohat, Bannu and Peshawar areas mostly carrying out intelligence based operations. 4 Commando operated under and with Mahsud Scouts {1st October-25th October 2014}, with 115 Brigade {26th October-18th November 2014} and with 124 Brigade {19th November – 4th December 2014}. Most remarkable was the ambush carried out by Quaid Company on 8/9th November near Peshawar, to apprehend the high value targets who were escaping from the area after strikes by PAF jets.

Khyber II- Post Army Public School Operations

The prime target was Umer Narai of Lashkar Islam was operating from Tirah valley, thus Operation Khyber II was aimed at his capture and destruction of the entire training and command system of miscreants. 11 Special Service Brigade { 2 and 5 commando battalions} operated under 21 Artillery division {19th March- 7th April 2015}. 4 Commando battalion undercommand lieutenant Colonel Jawad Bhutta was given the task of clearing the inaccessible parts of Tirah Valley. The plan mainly revolved around clearing the Tirah/Dwa Toi axis and Bara Valley simultaneously employing three infantry and 11 SSB. In a broad term, 11 SSB to lead on Dwa Toi axis with 26 Brigade on heels, it was called as the western axis. On eastern Axis the 53 Brigade operated along Kidney Ridge, 124 Brigade operating north of Bara River with 4 commando battalion along the Durand Line, passing through Musatil Pass and Pinda China Village.

11 Special Service Brigade after accomplishing the mission, was further task to sanitize in Shaikan, Tarkho Kas, Nagharo, Javed Killi and Tor Dara, these operations started on 18th May and terminated on 10th June 2015. 4 and 6 Commando battalions participated in these operations, combat helicopters were also on call. The sanitization went as per planning, however the arms recovered were not impressive, one 12.7 mm, only five rifles were found which included one 12 Bore as well; on the other hand ammunition were captured in high quantity.

Shallow Cut- July 2015

In the summer of 2015, the battle again came back to North Waziristan, miscreants after loosing all the safe heavens were reported to be concentrated in Shawal valley, south of Miranshah. The Shawal Valley is bounded by Datta Khel in north, Road Razmal-Kanigram on east, Shakai Valley in south and Durand Line on west, there are series of mountains ranging from 7000-11000 feet, dotted with thick vegetation, undulating ground and seasonal nullahs. The tops were all held by miscreants namely Makki Garh, Darra Narai and Point 2965 and Point 3243. Builtup area comprised of mud huts, prominent were Lawara Narai, Punga Killi, Rwe Ware, Palgal and Zawar Killi. Intelligence reports highlighted presence of 150-200 miscreants in the area of operations, the main strength of the miscreants was in the ability to muster reinforcement from their strongholds of Gurbaz, Manna and Punge.

22 Special Service Brigade under Brigadier Mumtaz having 4 and 6 Commando Battalions { these battalions move into the area after successful operations in Khyber Valley} was given the mission of clearing these areas. The initial reconnaissance was carried out by Lieutenant Colonel Shahid Aziz and his second in command Major Adnan, Brigadier Mumtaz and Lieutenant Colonel Jawad Bhutta. Two infantry brigades namely 106 and 107 were also in support of the commandos. By evening of 4th August all reconnaissance was completed including that of Pash Ziarat. Later the SSB was placed under command 9 Infantry Division. While the reconnaissance was in progress the respective companies and tactical headquarters of the battalions also move into Shawal Valley, camping in Razmak Cadet college. The task of SSB was to infiltrate deep into the hostile territory and occupy the tops; it was known as the Northern prong, while two infantry brigades were employed, one each on central and southern prong. SSB had to link up with the central prong by the last light on third day after the start of operations. As a deception, a company {Saad} was move towards the Angoor Adda. On 19th August 2015, operation started at 1700 hours when the battalions reached their jump off point. First objective was the Point 2973 and Point 2885. Move was in darkness, navigation in mountainous terrain is a difficult task in daylight and becomes hazardous in hours of darkness; same was experienced during this move, companies did get strayed but soon regained their original bearings. Lieutenant Colonel Shahid took a timely tactical decision by separating two combat teams and straight heading for the designated target; large body of troops was hindering the swift march. It proved correct as by morning the battalion had reached and captured the first objective Makki garh. Taliban reacted swiftly by launching a counter attack to recapture the lost ground but it was repulsed by the battalions, another arid was repulsed on 22nd August. For another week, the battalion held the position defying all attacks of Taliban, meanwhile 4 Commando Battalion also reached its objective Wucha Darra without encountering any worthwhile opposition. During the later half of operations, the IEDs took their toll, Captain Basharat Fareed, Havildar Nabi, Havildar Mushtaq, Sepoy Aftab and Sepoy Aatim Masih all were injured due to blasts, Naik Nazakat of Essa Company {4 Commando} embraced shahadat on 29th August 2015 due to an IED blast.

Campaign Plan- 2016

In 2016, 11 Corps planned to evict all miscreants from the uncleared areas of North and South Waziristan Agencies. Operation was code name as Campaign plan, it was launched in the month of March. It had two prongs, one Prong I, 22 SSB {6 and 3 Commando Battalions} lead the advance with the mission to clear area from Kundi Ghar till Zoe top; while on second prong 1 Commando Battalion was earmarked for advance to clear area from Sir Garh till Taimora Village. Both prongs thus had to join at Taimora in first phase; the link up had to be in position by 16th March 2016. Subsequently both prongs had to advance forward till they join each other at Baiza Feature, at the latest by 15th April 2016, finally in the end the commandos had to advance till the Meman Punga by 30th April. After clearing of these areas the 22 SSB in the final assault was task to occupy the Shaga Sharkai by 30th May 2016. The major villages and pocket of resistance was expected at Dabbar Miami, Dabari, Mana and Gurbuz. The area of operation itself is bounded by Mira Din in north, Road Wanna- Angoor Adda in south, Villages of Dabbri Miami and Aasman Punga in the east and Durand Line in the west. There were two infantry divisions, one on each prong, the SSB was undercommand 9 Infantry Division, whereas 1 Commando Battalion was undercommand 7 Infantry Division.

The advance was not an easy task as no less than 300-350 foreigner fighters were reportedly present in the area. The important passes of Maghrotai and Zoe –Narai were vital as they allowed the miscreants to get reinforcement across the Durand Line. Operation unfolded as per planning and troops achieved the desired results, reconnaissance started from early February when commanding officers of 3 and 6 Commando battalions along with their officers undertook the reconnaissance. They did come under miscreants attack and fire on 21st February 2016, however own snipers quickly neutralised them. On 26th February, 3 Commando undercommand Lieutenant Colonel Sajid Malik moved from Wanna, the plan was that Hamza Company will lead the battalion as assaulting company followed by Yaqub, Ebrahim and Zikriya companies; they were able to capture the objective by 0200 hours 27th February through deception, chivalry and by surprise.

6 Commando took over the operations from 27th February onwards and immediately they came under intense miscreants fire attack, it was a long night of hard fighting. In the morning the Taliban launched fresh attacks on the 6 Commando battalion, Havildar Zia embraced martyrdom and later the post was named after him; Captain Zafar, Sepoy Khalid and Sepoy Habib also suffered injuries in the battle. Lieutenant Colonel Shahid Aziz was hit by miscreants bullets in abdomen while carrying out reconnaissance of the area and was evacuated. However the main objective of capturing the high ground and keeping it under own control was achieved.

Linkup between the 7 and 9 infantry divisions was finally achieved

Chapter VII

Special Operations School

The Commando course of SSG is the most difficult course in the Pakistan Army for the reason that the ratio of passing the course vis a vis intake is the lowest as compare to other army courses; this ratio is almost identical with the passing out ratio of fighter pilots in PAF. The myths, legends and stories associated with the commando course by itself can fill up volumes. Over period of time it has undergone few changes but by and large the core has remained the same as when the very first course was initiated in September 1957. Major General Faisal Alvi in 1999 as the commander of SSG while giving the opening and welcome address to the new intake started his address with the remarks ‘gentlemen remember Geneva Convention ends at Chapri’. The other very common statement given is ‘you have to snatch this wing from us, we will try our best to deprive you of this’. The end statement is that SSG training staff try their utmost to break an officer and only then the best among the best are able to put on this wing on their chest

The very first advance commando course was run between September 1957-February 1958 at Cherat ; it was mainly organised and instructed by the American team headed by Colonel Bunte. Sixteen officers were able to pass through the gruelling course including Captain Aslam Beg {he became Pakistan Army chief in 1988-1991}. The pattern of officers induction at that time was that initially the volunteer officers would spend three months with the SSG during which they underwent training and at the end were put through a final test before formal induction in SSG. The officers of First Advance Commando Course followed this pattern too, however , at the end of three month course they were further put through this six month course.

In January 1958, while the first course was under progress it was decided to induct more officers and other ranks, trained them together and after successful completion of the course, additional companies {G, H, J, K, L} will be raised around this nucleus. This was a classic pattern , as the officers and men were trained together and later served together as well.

The induction system of soldiers and other ranks varied with time. In 1959, it was experimented to have recruits selected from centres into SSG and trained them at Cherat. The main advantage lied in having the right mind set from onset; it was and still is the mind set of soldier and officer in SSG which really differentiate them from conventional and traditional mind-set and attitude of regular troops. These fresh recruits were palced as F Company and after completion of training were posted to other companies as well; it was discontinued in 1964.

On 4th March 1968, Serial No.10 Officers Advance Commando Course started with an intake of 21 officers including four officers from Pakistan Air Force, it commenced on 3rd August, with only 15 officers qualifying {including two from PAF}; six officers were dropped from the course. In the next course out of 22 officers {including 4 from PAF} only 16 managed to qualify. In the Serial No.12 Course, which started on 9th March 1970, there were 39 officers including seven officers from PAF, no less than 14 officers were dropped and for the first time a precedence was set where three officers despite qualifying the course were dropped hours before the graduation parade on grounds of discipline. This sent a very strong signal and message among all the aspirants of joining the SSG that, it is a highly disciplined organisation where no slackness on discipline is tolerable.

Till 1965, all volunteers {less officers} had certain age and service limit, a junior commissioned officer had maximum age limit of 38 years, a havildar not more than 33 years, similarly naik to be under 30 years and a sepoy should not be more than 27 years of age. In addition, all must have initiative, emotionally stable and their service record be clear of any red ink entry; at least for last two years. Educational standards were not very high at that time in the country and in army, yet these volunteers for SSG were required to be able to read and write, only a JCO was required to be able to read English. The intake for Other Ranks varied, in 1968 it was in excess of 400 out of which only 182 qualified {273 soldiers were dropped out of an intake of 455}. Almost identical pattern of having 50% soldiers being able to qualify the commando course has remained in vogue even at present. For soldiers during the course, separate companies were raised {Haider, Sadiq, Nazir, Abbass, Javed, Mehdi and Riaz} these companies were only meant for the duration of the course.

In 1967-68, the oath ceremony or Pledge of Commando was made mandatory for all passing out commandos {both officers and other ranks}

Officers Commando Course.

SSG is the first arm and corps which captures the imagination of gentlemen cadets in Pakistan Military Academy, the insignia of SSG is drawn on almost every satchel of every cadet and cadets do dream of joining it after passing out. The adventure parachute training and subsequent familiarisation visits of cadets to different corps and formations further add fuel to the burning desires of these would-be officers of army. Naturally every cadet does not get the regiment of his choice but there is always a way out for them, join the SSG and fulfil your dreams. Within army, regiments are by and large not willing to depart from their young officers thus many officers have to resort to 'direct method' for being at least given a chance to appear for the SSG tests. The 'Direct Method' remained in vogue till 2000, under this any officer could write a demi official to the commander SSG requesting him to send a signal to his unit where by authorising the intended officer to be spared for the

tests. Captain Salik Nawaz Cheema , SJ , Shaheed , is one such example, he was a brilliant officer and his regiment { 127 MAA } was reluctant in allowing him to appear for the tests, Captain Salik wrote a letter to Brigadier Tariq Mahmood and a week later he got the signal to appear in the tests at Attock.

It was Muhararm, there was no transport from Sargodha, I thus travelled on roof of the public bus from Sargodha to Attock at night and got down at Attock Fort. From gate till mess , I walked singing and joking. At Mess there were small tents pitched for us, there were around thirty odd junior officers who had come for the test, all in all over three hundred applies for SSG. The initial tests were tough, running and a long route march which was dubbed as after dinner walk but lasted till wee hours of morning. The repelling and the most notorious; the test around the pool or the Tunnel Test. It is this test which breaks the will of majority of officers who have lasted till here. The test is , that you are given a task to steal something from the end of tunnel and you are caught by enemy and then how you reacts and survives because enemy tortures you. Thus the feeling of darkness in a tunnel of five hundred years old fort, and all o fa sudden an unexpected kick or a punch and then you are captured and interrogated which naturally includes torture in form of beating; very few officers can bear this. An officer at any time can simply say 'non volunteer' and torture ends instantly, thus it is a test of mental endurance. Finally an interview with the Brigadier Tariq Mahmood{TM} and other officers to have a final assessment of you. The question in board are not regular kind of questions but rather 'what was the most embarrassing moment of your life ' types and in the end you are told about the result;. One of the commando Sepoy Zulfiqar in Attock was from my regiment, I was not knowing it but he send me grapes as a gift.

Captain Salik Nawaz Cheema not only became a commando , but he was decorated with Sitara-i-Jurat in Siachen ; posthumously.

Lieutenant Attaullah joined SSG in 2006, *' I was commissioned in Ordnance Corps, I had a desire to join SSG, however in 2005 under revised organisation of Ordnance, the officers were not allowed to join SSG. One day , in the evening, I was so dishearten while sitting in the lawn of the armoured division mess at Kharian that one field officer out of curiosity inquired, 'young man what makes you look so gloomy'. I*



narrated my ordeal that , I have explored all avenues but still I am not finding a way to join SSG. The major himself a SSG officer smiled and narrated that how he too had faced similar situation and approached the President General Zia during his visit to the armoured formation and requested him to be given a chance; General Zia accepted his requests. I got a clue and same evening I made a call to the Army House in Rawalpindi; operator attended the call, for next week I made at least a dozen call everyday to the Army House telling them the purpose of my calls. Finally the Army Chief and President General Pervaiz Musharraf returned my call, but unfortunately I was out of office, thus my commanding officer attended the call, however the operator highlighted that President wants to talk to Lieutenant Attaullah only. When I came back to the office, everybody was giving me strange looks, my commanding officer inquired as why the call came from army house, I explained the reason and my commanding officer just stared at me in disbelief. Later I rang the army house and I was told to write a demi official letter, after a day I received a signal , directing me to report at Special Operations school at Cherat for the course'. Lieutenant Attaullah not only successfully passed the course but later on performed exceptionally well in Baluchistan operations, he was wounded in the operations. He received a demi official letter from the General Musharraf after he successfully completed the course; General Musharraf was keeping a track of Lieutenant Attaullah.

President General Pervez Musharraf himself had joined SSG in 1966, and he wrote. *'The training was physically exacting, there was very tough physical exercise for an hour every day, starting with a warm up run of two miles, we ran four miles with weapon once a week, twelve miles with weapons in two hours; thirty six miles with weapon and thirty-pound pack in ten hours. In addition there tactical exercises involving hundreds of miles of route marches. Then there was watermanship in lakes and fast flowing canals, as well as parachute training in which one had to qualify in six jumps. Eating delicacies like snakes, frogs' legs and local lizards is not infrequent. I learned that one can eat anything except plants with white sap. One test was to hold a self made grenade of plastic explosives with holes made at three-second intervals in the time fuse. A new SSG volunteer was expected to throw the bomb when the spark of the ignited time fuse came out of the last hole just three seconds before exploding. Another test was to run on a yard wide iron beam 300 feet high, spanning the top of the side structure of a metal bridge about 150 yards in length. The distance had to be covered in forty seconds. Another improvised test was to lie flat on one's stomach in a railway culvert, looking toward a train hurling at full speed that would pass one or two feet away; closing the eyes was not allowed'.*¹

Cherat

The course reports at Cherat, they are taken by a truck from Pabbi, any officer reporting late has to make his own arrangements to reach Cherat. Presently Cherat has undergone a major transition since 2000 with new mess building, spacious and modern rooms, stable supply of

¹ Pervez Musharraf *In The Line of Fire A Memoir* {Simon & Schuster, NewYork,2006},pp-48-50

electricity and above all reasonable availability of water. Between 1958-1998, it seems as if time had stopped at Cherat. Pabbi is the first check post, almost five miles short of main check post, for all commando officers, it holds a very special place, as during the commando course, it is the most common form of punishment 'go touch the Pabbi'. Thus an officer had to march down from Mess to Pabbi at night through the trek, sign the register at Pabbi and march back; it takes almost two hours for a return journey.

In the first four weeks, the officers are physical toned up with intensive running with military boots all around the hills. A morning physical training period, then time for breakfast, classes at Range, another class on demolition, a period on tactics; they are designed in a manner that students have to run from one end of the ridge to the other. Walking is not allowed only running, officers are paired 'buddy', this is the strongest bond which an officer develops with another, if one officer is given a Chappri, then other officer irrespective of the fact that he was not guilty of any breach has to march with his buddy to Chappri. The course usually starts with an intake of thirty odd students and slowly but gradually the officers start dropping out, some on losing heart, few on medical grounds thus in the end only a handful {approximately 48%} are able to proudly put on the SSG Wing. From Cherat the course moves to Mangla for watermanship training, they practically remain in water for days; it is a nightmare for non swimmers but at the end of four weeks all are good swimmers who can remain in water for hours, can swim two kilometres in running water. Late Lieutenant Colonel Mohabbat Khan Afridi was a non swimmer and it was only during the SSG course that he learnt, he was given so much tough time at Mangla Dam that he later remarked 'I now cannot even withstand a sight of a glass of water'.

The next phase of the course involves Desert Warfare, for which the students are taken to Desert Warfare School at Chorr. The area is full of snakes of all kind majority of whom are venomous. I had a snake phobia before I joined SSG, I could not even think of walking through the same track on which a snake had been sited a year ago, but during the course I slept in bushes where snakes were killed just now, such is the confidence which this course gave me. Lieutenant Colonel Niazi {Golden Dagger honour list} developed an interest in the snakes during the course to an extent that he later had a cobra kept as a pet, Niazi is taken as an expert on the snakes. At Chorr, the snake charmers have their own colony, SSG students are taken there and the snake charmers are also invited as guest speakers and to give demonstration. There is no truth in 'singhi' a herb which traditionally is taken as an antidote for snake bite, confirms Lt Colonel Niazi; he recalls how at one time at Chorr during the demonstration the snake charmer was bitten by the snake and the snake charmer pleaded to be taken to the military hospital 'saein take me to the hospital, I do not believe on these singhis'. Students are given a simple deal by their instructors, 'catch a snake and your evening march will be reduced to half', thus students are eager to catch a snake.

Mountain and snow warfare art are taught at Rattu, Kalam and adjoining mountainous areas, aim is to harden the art of fighting in such hilly terrain. At Peshawar or in Rawalpindi the choice is with the in charge training team, a training in intelligence fieldcraft is given, officers are given lectures than they have to practically demonstrate the art. They are often guise as low, medium and high agents, task with, to steal files and documents from regular army regiments. Major Jawwad narrates ‘ In 2006, during training we were given the task of operating in guise in Peshawar city, I was to pretend as a ‘maltia or masseur’ in the Saddar; I would walk with bottles of oil in my hand, and giving massage to public on payment, at times I had to pretend as a poor man seeking temporary jobs as waiter in small hotels, as rickshaw drivers. In one of the exercise at Attock, I was task to get a file from artillery centre, I went to a mobile phone outlet and bought couple of sims, brochures and by luring the sales representative that my entire

family is interested in getting the package, I got his visiting card. I later in a computer shop, did photo work on the card and pasted my picture. I was not ask to prove my national identity card at the artillery centre reception, I acted as a ‘mummy daddy boy’. I managed to reach adjutant office, It was quite funny to act as a absolute stupid in front of the adjutant....later I managed to sit in the head clerk’s office where I ask more innocent looking questions, after a brief time, I ask for glass of water and while drinking, I deliberately spill the water on files, as the clerical staff rushed to find the cloth to wipe. I slipped two odd files, thanked the clerks and walked out, took the rickshaw and managed to come out of artillery centre with desired files.’

The survival exercise is off three days duration in the course in which the officers are tied and blindfolded and then just thrown away on grass in summer, later in the night they are put into a room full of mosquitoes and beaten too. Captain Hussnain narrated how he seriously thought of filtering the urine, in order to drink it, he narrated how his NCB once walked close by after washing clothes in the river and Hussnain just suck his NCBs wet trouser in order to squeeze few drops of water. *In the course were two Africans, one from Azerbaijan, two from Sri*



Lanka and two Palestinians as well. Each nationality have different characteristics. Sri Lankan would remain quiet during beating so were the Africans and Palestinians, on the other hand during water torture the Pakistanis were comfortable but all other were shrieking. Water torture is one in which a towel is wrapped closely around a mouth of person, one of the training staff would sit on the chest and other staff would hurl the water to the tortured person, this water thus goes straight to the mouth during breathing and thus causes immense pain. At the end of this ordeal the dried blood of goat and raw blood of pigeon is given to the tortured officers.

There are two main marches in the course, the 200 kilometres endurance march which usually starts from Mangla and terminates at Abbottabad, time allowed is five days, it is carried out with full marching load, and dry ration is given which the officer has to cook himself. Lieutenant Colonel 'Daato' narrates 'on the very first day, I had a nail in my boots, for next five days I limped and limped, I was the last one to complete the march'. The other is 80 Kilometres march with a time limit of 12 hours. The weight carried is approximately 12 pounds.


At the last leg of the course, the student officers and the training soldiers are trained together for a week and then they are formed into small tactical groups and a final test exercise is conducted which involves a complete battle life cycle.

Soldiers course is known as the Soldiers Basic Commando Course, intake is over 500 in each batch, with only one-fifth passing out successfully. Sepoy Yasir {No.2421109} was recruited in 15 Punjab Regiment, he was serving at Leepa when the SSG enrolment team visited the regiment. 'I volunteered for the SSG alongwith one more soldier of my unit, we filled few forms and after a week got the letter to report at Pabbi. We were also instructed to bring three pair of uniforms, track suit and bedding. It was evening of 9th September 2010 when we both reported at Pabbi, full of enthusiasm and zeal. We were taken in army trucks to the Jallozai Camp, it was raining, all in all there were 800 soldiers who were part of the course. Soldiers kept coming in batches, however on very first evening, we fill the forms and it was midnight before we had a chance to put our kit in the bivouacs. Next morning, we were 'Fall In' at five in morning and for next four weeks it was just pure physical exertion. My unit sepoy and many other had raised their hands in first twenty four hours, showing their inability to cope up with rigorous training, however for another week they were given even more tough routine before they were allowed to return back to unit. We were organised into three platoons, there was only one company which was known as Najam Shaheed Company. Captain Furqan was our training officer, alongwith Naib Subedar Gulzar, Havildar Saeed, Havildar Naeem, Naik Asad, Naik Zafar and Lance Naik Faizullah were our training staff. By the end of first two weeks our strength was half and after four weeks we were quarter of original strength. At Jallozai apart from physical exertion we were taught combat medical and signal procedures. Every night there was punishment of a route march with weight. We then move to Dakhnair to have two weeks training in navigation. In this leg, we were taught map reading, navigating on compass, we would be given a grid reference and had to reach the objective on map and compass bearing at night. Next segment was learning the small arms, light

machine gun, mortar and rocket launcher firing at Attock. In my regiment we had the Rifle G-3, but here I learnt Chinese sub machine gun stripping and assembling and firing. I had never fired a rocket launcher before, now I was taught and made to fire three rockets, I missed the first one but next two I hit it on target. Same was the case with mortar learning and firing, despite the physical exertion not only myself but all the soldiers were enjoying the course and the freedom of action which the SSG was inculcating in ourselves. Our bearing and confidence grew with each day, we would laugh, we would joke, sing song, poetry and narrates tales . Next we were taken to Mangla for swimming and waterman ship training. I was a non swimmer , so was half the course, in these three weeks , we were not only taught swimming but we had to pass one mile swimming in costume, 500 meters swimming in uniform with army boots and 25 meters of swimming in lake with our weapon. It speaks volumes for the training itself that they made dead swimmers like me a proficient swimmer. During swimming we also had to jump from forty feet into water , it was to check our height phobia.

From Mangla, we had to march with our military kit to Abbottabad, covering a distance of 250 Kilometres in a five days, our route was Mangla-Gujar Khan-Kahutta- New Murree-Nathiagali-Abbottabad. March was carried out during hours of darkness, we were issued with flour, ghee, sugar, milk powder, pulses, salt and pepper. We were issued with utensils also and we had to cook the food ourselves, I had never cooked before in my life but I learnt cooking in these five days. It was winter, cold and it rained almost daily. My shoes were wet and later they become stiff, I had three pairs of socks as well but invariably we all had blisters on very first day. It was a tough march, at the end we all had cramps and stiff legs, we were given one week midterm break. The one unforgettable lesson which I and everyone else learnt was the importance of a good shoe , proper fitting and adjustment of the web equipment.

After midterm we reported back to Cherat, where we spent two weeks learning explosives and demolition techniques. We were issued with PE-3A explosives for training , Apart from explosives, we carried out repelling for a week at Cherat, assault course was also conducted



daily; passing marks were six minutes for completing the assault course. A week was spent in the survival techniques, not many among us had seen a snake so close in our life, now we had to catch them from the bushes and search them in the graveyard. As the course was progressing, we became physical fit, now we were enjoying the course. We also underwent physical tests at Cherat, although we were running every day and running four miles on every Wednesday yet the tests had to be passed before we proceed to our next leg of airborne training. In the tests, we were required to do forty push-ups in one minute, 40 sit-ups in one minute, minimum of eight chin-ups, squat thrust repetition of forty in two minutes, four mile under thirty minutes with thirty pounds of weight and finally twelve miles with weapon, weight and water bottle in two hours.

At Peshawar, in next leg, we spent four weeks to learn parachute jumping. In first three weeks we did airborne physical training and ground work, in last week we carried out five jumps from C-130 aircraft. I think among the hundred odd students, only ten have been inside the aircraft before and now we had to jump. The feeling of fear, the sensation, thrill, joy of airborne is beyond words to explain. After our last jump, we had to march back to Cherat, covering a distance of 80 Kilometres in under twelve hours.

Last two weeks, we were now grouped into tactical teams, given a scenario, a grid reference and we had to plan and conduct ambush and raid, seize and hold the area, make hideouts, infiltrate and extricate from the given situation. We all soldiers were given appointments, making us platoon commanders, commanders of raid and ambush parties, I learnt how to plan and give orders, how to ensure the tactical discipline of force, the considerations in such actions, the safety of my undercommand. Above all now we fully understood the importance of officers, the



pressure they had to undergo in making and carrying out such operations, how vital is discipline for any force to succeed in any operation. Last week we spent , rehearsing for our passing out, now staff was also bit cordial and share jokes with us but training officer was still as fearsome as on day one. When the SSG Wing was put on my chest, it was the happiest and most satisfying moment of my entire life; I could not believe that I have survived such gruelling months. I cannot forget the dedication with which our training team trained us, for me and for entire course they are the most reverend men’.

Types and Variety of Courses

In 1999, Special Operations Training School was raised at Cherat. It was a major step in bringing the training in light with the modern environment. Previously, a taring team was established for each course but now it has become institutionalised. Some of the traditional screening regimes like tests at Attock have been replaced with more modern methods like having a psychologist on the panel of selection board. The criteria of selection has also been upgraded, now any officer with a red ink entry or having low or average grades in military courses may consider himself extremely lucky to be given a chance in SSG. For a short period it was experimented in having officers directly posted or be given a chance to appear for tests straight from Pakistan Military Academy, also at times the restriction of having served in the regiment and undergone the basic courses have been waived but by and large , the induction and selection system at present is more scientific in nature.

SSG Advance Commando Course is the ultimate test of an officer and a soldier’s mental and physical endurance, it makes a warrior out a gentleman, it bings those hidden qualities within an officer or a soldier , about which even the individual is not fully aware. Extensive firing and physical regimes thus inculcates basic killing instincts in the commando.

Under the present training regime, the courses have been classified as Induction, foundation, leadership, specialist and advance . In the induction courses, there are only two courses, one for officers which is known as Officers Advance Commando course having a duration of 33 weeks, at present three such courses are conducted every year. The soldiers induction course is a 28 weeks long and it is also conducted thrice a year. The prerequisites are having service not less than one year and not more than five years. A soldier must have a clean conduct sheet as well, must have passed the army standards of physical and range efficiency tests. For an officer criteria is almost identical with only one exception , he must have two years of service in regiment of his commission.

In the foundation phase which starts after the soldiers and officers have successfully completed the induction phase and are posted in the commando battalions.

There are eight courses which falls under the Foundation category, the first and foremost is the mixed martial arts course, it is twelve weeks long and the both soldiers and officers undergo together. Students are taught the unarmed combat skills; it is conducted indoor and outdoor. Small arms course, automatic weapons course, rocket launcher, mortar specialist, sniper, advance explosives and demolition, security and unarmed combat and advance navigation courses all falls under the foundation stage; all these courses have duration of four weeks. These courses are mandatory and a soldier cannot be promoted to next rank unless he has undergone these courses. For the sniper course, the prerequisites are naturally to have a six-by-six eye sight, a natural instinct as a firer and a good and sound tactical knowledge.

Leadership courses are by and large more oriented for the soldiers, they are groomed, trained and taught to handle duties as platoon , team, and combat leaders. There are five courses under this category, duration varies from six weeks for primary junior leadership to twelve weeks for advance leadership and management course. These are again a prerequisite for soldier's especially non-commissioned officers for further promotion.

SSG Specialist Courses, all have a duration of twelve weeks with an exception of basic specialist operation communication course which have a duration of sixteen weeks, on the other hand the geographic information system and navigation course which is a six weeks duration course. In the specialisation course, the individual commando {soldiers and officers} are trained to be a specialist in any one field. Combat diving leads to the water and underwater arena, demolition and explosives is another field, so is advance sniper course. The snipers are a modern reality and SSG pays extra attention to train its commandos in becoming excellent snipers, thus this advance sniper course of twelve weeks is an extension of basic sniper course which is six weeks duration. Combat Driving Course is the lengthiest in terms of



duration, it is twenty two weeks long course in which commandos are trained as the name suggests in driving under combat environments. Specialist courses are also a mandatory phase for all commandos, but they are supposed to undertake only one course only.

The Advance Courses are more oriented towards the protection of high and important officials, there are three courses which includes close protection, special driving and communication course, duration vary from six to twelve weeks.

Apart from the abovementioned courses which are exclusively meant and designed for those soldiers and officers who are to be inducted or already inducted in SSG, there are three other courses which are conducted for all arms; they include officers, soldiers basic commando course and a counter terrorism course.

Parachute Training School

Para Training School {PTS} was inaugurated on 24th March 1964 at Peshawar, the very first para jumps in Pakistan were performed on 30th September 1962 as part of Exercise Joint Train. Captain Humayun Malik, Captain Mohsin Khan and Captain Khalid Latif Ansari had the honour of making the first ever para jumps in Pakistan.

The establishment of Parachute School itself has a history. In 1962 after the exercise it was principally decided to establish a school in Pakistan, Americans agreed to provide the equipment to raise three Para Companies. Peshawar was a natural choice mainly as the PAF had its headquarters at Peshawar, thus land was purchased from Military dairy farm. Construction of 43 feet high para tower was an issue but it was resolved accidentally when Major Iqbal {G-2 Training} while roaming in Chaklala found the towers and wires imported for construction of a hanging bridge in Northern Areas. The Water and Power Authority {WAPDA} was very helpful in the initial gathering of towers and other material. An eleven member American team came to Pakistan; they initially ran a course meant to refresh the officers and soldiers who were trained in America and later to award instructor rating to selected SSG personals to impart further training in Pakistan. Rigger training was to be conducted simultaneously; Rigger is the one who packs the parachute.

At the inauguration ceremony, Major Khalid Latif Ansari a qualified rigger was appointed as the first Commandant Parachute Training School. The very first package of parachute arrived in school on 15th January 1964 and first night tactical jumps were carried out on 28th May 1964. School celebrated its silver jubilee of conducting 25000 jumps during 26th Basic AirBorne course on 12th April 1969; Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Hayat made the silver jubilee jump. Another mile stone was blind jumps and at company level which were performed on 6th June 1969 and the first Free fall was made by major Tariq Mahmood on 27th August 1970 from a height of 6300 feet, Captain Akram, subedar Mohammad sheriff, Naib Subedar Yousef Hussain , havildar Mohammad Hussain and havildar Shoukat Islam were the other jumpers .

It was due to these successful para jumps that SSG was authorised to wear the Maroon Beret and keep a dagger; it was authorised in 1964.

The very first casualty was havildar Noor Islam who died while jumping in May 1964 and than the next accident took place on 1st December 1983 when Captain Tariq Mahmood lost his life followed by Captain Sarfraz Khan in June 1985. Commander SSG Brigadier Tariq Mahmood himself died while jumping on 29th May 1989, Captain Sher Rehman lost his life on 8th April 1992, two soldiers died on 5th May 1992, Sepoy Yousaf Khan and Sepoy Javed Iqbal. Havildar Liaqat Ali had an emergency on 16th November 1995 which proved fatal. Flight Lieutenant Shahzad Awan's parachute failed to deploy on 16th November 1995 and last casualty was sepoy Muhammad Saleem on 12th October 1997.

Para Training School had completed 24,7,378 jumps by year 2004 and till to date has completed 32,9,543 jumps.

The parachute training for Pakistan military academy cadets was initiated in 1968, Brigadier A.O.Mitha was the commandant in military academy and it was his initiative which proved very useful in all these years. It was in 1968 that the Para jumps were first demonstrated at Defence of Pakistan day in Rawalpindi and since than it is the most looked forward act in the parade; traditionally it is always the commander SSG who performs the free fall jump with his team.

There is a difference between the Para Jumps conducted by the officers and soldiers as part of adventure training and SSG men as part of training. Although the standard of physical training is the same which is known as Air borne PT, however the in adventure training only three jumps are carried out where as in SSG training six jumps are mandatory. Among these six jumps, first two are simple, next two are performed with weapon and equipment and last two are at night with weapon and equipment.

Sepoy Awais of 7 Commando Battalion underwent basic commando course in 2012 successfully, he narrates ‘ *I enjoyed my first jump as I was unaware of what is going to happen , I jumped out from 1500 feet and after four seconds my parachute was deployed and I had a wonderful feeling of flying and floating, there is not much of control in the parachute , on landing I just made the fall with the direction of the wind. It took me a minute to land after the deployment of the parachute. Main thing to remember is to land with both feet, in case if a parajumper lands with one foot then he is most likely to get a twisted ankle or a fracture. In next jumps I was more conscious of what will happen on landing. During the jumps with tactical load, weapon is fastened around the body lest it falls away, the pack {rucksack} is tied with legs and is released fifty feet from ground. Immediately after landing the first thing to do is to release the parachute pack, then to assemble and collect it, more often it gets dirty and many bushes are attached with it. Night jump is more on experience, as I was inexperienced thus I had a nasty fall, you cannot judge the height it is more of feeling. During one of the jump, my buddy had already deployed the parachute and I was overhead, but I just walk over the deployed parachute and was over in the air.*’

In May 2000, Major Haroon {later lieutenant colonel, shaheed , Hilal Shujaat} and Captain Adnan Bashir had a nasty mid-air collision, in which their parachutes became entangled, canopies became partially collapse which increased the rate of descend, both despite all efforts failed to free themselves from each other. Both had a very hard landing, suffering from multiple rib and thigh fractures. Both remained hospitalised for well over two months; credit goes to army doctors and to the Army Medical Corps that not only both were back on active duty but later served the country and SSG.

In SSG as in other organisations which deals with flying, any accident results in extensive parachuting, aim is to highlight that it was an accident and nothing more than that ; commandant Para Training school is always the first one to jump after any such accident. On the other hand all accidents are probed deeply to find the cause and remedial actions are taken.

Musa ‘M’ Company ‘Amphibious’

In 1945 the British Army had raised a River Reconnaissance Unit, the unit came as part of Pakistan Army share in independence and as such was stationed in East Pakistan. The terrain and geography of the East Pakistan was most suitable for its deployment and operations. In 1958 the M company was raised and Captain Mahmood Kamal ‘Kumbho’ was made its first officer commanding. Mahmood was a qualified diver having attended the Frogman Course from America, moreover he belongs to East Pakistan, with him was Subedar Mannan who was also a Bengali. Captain Mahmood and later Captain Hakim Arshad Qureshi commanded the M Company. One detachment of the M was stationed at Karachi and other at Chittagong. M Company was changed into Musa Company in 1965, in the same year as Pakistan Navy had obtained its first submarine Ghazi from USA thus Musa Company was attached with the

Pakistan Navy . The company was given the operational task of blowing few bridges in 1965 War but war itself ended before Musa Company could received its operational orders. In 1967, Musa Company was shifted from Karachi to Mangla and in 1982 to Tarbela for a short period before reverting back to its present location.

On 22nd March 1969, the first ever parajumps into the Mangla Lake was carried out by Musa Company, eleven para troopers took part in that jump. Musa Company has also served in Sierra Leone in July 2001.

Training Allied Countries

The very first foreign country to be trained was Bangladesh in 1976, five officers and soldiers were able to pass the gruelling course, so far 43 Bangladeshis officers and soldiers have been trained. All in all so far 3605 officers and soldiers have been trained by SSG from 31 different countries including Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Brunei, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan Lebanon, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, Niger, Palestine, Qatar, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Turkey, United States of America, and Oman. The courses and art in which these countries have been trained ranges from personal protection, protection of installation to full-fledged commando course. Language is definitely an issue but it is overcome through an interpreter and above all after few weeks both the instructor and students do understand each other.



Lieutenant Colonel Zafar Niazi was the training officer in the SSG and back in 2003 conducted the commando course for the Saudi Arabian students. *‘There were over fifty students, two majors and remaining all soldiers, initially as usual the allied students try to take advantage of language barrier but soon after two weeks, we were having only forty students. Pattern and standards were as high as our own commando course. For them we made one change, instead of conducting the course in mountains we took them to desert after initial breaking period at Cherat. Some of them were good in running, and rest we made sure come up to our standards. I still remember that one student Abdul Saleh was a good runner, and during 12 miles test was leading the pack with*

long steps, I did cautioned him twice to keep in mind the distance and thus shorten his steps but he paid no heed, later he developed cramps and although he passed his test but he was fourteenth in number. He after the test came to see me with his officer, he was weeping and feeling sorry for not listening to the advice of 'Muallam'. During the survival exercise which was conducted in Rahim Yar Khan desert, I took the course, blindfolded them and after five hours of driving in the desert took them to the deserted fort of Bhagla, not very far from the town itself. They were given only a bottle of water each and had to survive for a week on it. One staff was with them all the time but he was on rotation. After three days, I visited them, they were expecting that may be I have brought water with me but they were disappointed. There was a water cooler in the jeep, I in front of them threw the water in sand; they all cried in unison, 'major its kufr'. One of them took the distilled water bottle from the jeep and shared it with his comrades. Students whether they are local or foreigners have same mind set and habits, all are good actors. Thus this particular student now acted as if he is dying and all his fellow students were appealing to me in the name of humanity to take him and few others to nearest hospital; I paid no heed and told them to simply march to next hideout. The actor student after few steps simply fell on the ground and became motionless. We marched and after few minutes the almost dead student joined us, he came running. At the end of course they all were fighting fit, trimmed, proud, happy and very grateful. I feel proud, as two among them later qualified from USA as SEAL as well.

SSG not only trains the foreign students but carryout mutual commandos exercise with few of the countries, most notable being China, USA, UK and Turkey. In September 2016, first ever joint training with Russian Special Forces was carried out. These mutual exercises are beneficial to both participants, as after decade long war on terror, SSG is regarded as the foremost expert in counter terrorism.

Training other Arms, Services and Departments

SSG have been the main contributor in establishing the special branches in Pakistan Navy and Pakistan Air Force. Sailors and airmen have been getting training at Cherat since the very inception of the SSG. In almost every course there are vacancies for them, also SSG instructors are attached with these two services on regular basis. Similarly SSG have established elite police units in every province, instructors are attached with these police units. Punjab Rangers and SSG have special bond, three of Punjab Rangers director generals namely, Brigadier Humayun Malik, Major General Arshad Hakim Arshad and Major General Haroon Aslam all were former SSG officers, with latter two also remained commander of SSG. In 2005-2007 SSG established, trained and organised the 'Commando Wing' of Punjab Rangers, with Major Abdullah {colonel now} as the very first instructor; SSG also trained the Sind Rangers elite units on similar lines. As highlighted earlier Frontier Corps platoons were regularly attached with SSG in the sixties for training, at present although they are not attached but they are being trained by SSG.

Chapter VIII Special Service ‘Group Way of Life’

Cherat ‘Eagles Nest’ 1855-2016

Cherat is synonym with Special Service Group, while driving towards the Peshawar from Rawalpindi, after crossing the River Indus, thirty miles short of Peshawar, on the left, at Pabbi, a road leads into the mountains and amidst these hills, on a ridge at an elevation of 4500 feet is Cherat which is more popularly known as Eagles Nest. Cherat was first used as a sanitarium for troops in 1861 and was constructed as cantonment in 1881. It was first noticed by Major Loke while exploring the Mir Kalan route to Kohat. Proposals for its occupation were made, but these fell through for the reason that political entanglements with the Afridi tribes were expected. However, the annual experiment of an autumn camp succeeded so well that it soon becomes a cantonment. In the beginning tents were mainly used for accommodation, brought up by elephants, every summer from the plains. An elephant camp was established at the foot-hills



near Chapri which in a hamlets of the village Dag Ismail Khel. Troops used to march by night camping enroute as Jallozai, which is half way between Pabbi and Cherat, avoiding the heat of the of the day by resting. Ladies and children travelled in bullock tongas which in vogue then. When proper construction of buildings began, stones were brought up from Nowshehra by elephants. The first building was constructed in 1855. In due course a hospital, a club and three churches were built. The church of Scotland is built on the highest points in Cherat. The British regiments occupied Cherat in succession. The first to come was the 2nd Battalion, the North Staffordshire Regiment in 1861 and the last one 2nd Battalion, the Black Watch who visited in 1947. Each regiment has left a monument in from of a crest carved on a rock. Some regiments revisited Cherat in course of history. On second or subsequent visited they have added the date of their revisits to their crest. The crests are beautiful and most artistically done up.

Cherat first came into limelight with a small piece of literature *Venus In India*¹, published in 1870s. From Nowshehra one has to take either tonga or ride on horses, changing them at Pabbi{also written as Publi}.

‘from that place{Pabbi} I must make the best of my way to Cherat, for there was no road along which dak gharries could be driven, the said interval between Publi and Cherat was dangerous for travelers, there being many lawless robbers, distance was a good fifteen miles...At last I reached Publi, a small village situated where the road to Cherat turns off. It was full of liveliness, native shops, in which comestibles and sweet meats were exposed for sale, were still open. more or less brilliantly lighted up with—oil lamps, consisting of an earthenware cup and a wick dripping in oil. Men, women and children were moving about, as if the idea of sleep never entered their minds, and the monotonous beat of the favorite tom-tom, rose fitfully on the air. Bullocks, elephants, camels, horses and dogs lined each side of the road, and added their various noises and smells to the general collection.... The scenery I passed through was wild and savage to a degree. We mounted almost perpendicular walls of rock, over which my strong and clever pony climbed in the most cat-like manner, or descended into deep and sandy bottomed ravines, the beds of which at times were irresistible torrents. We skirted precipices, along paths dangerously narrow and often very broken, until we at last reached the foot of the principal hill, up which we had to climb. I let my pony pick his own steps... At last! At last! My pony staggering with immense fatigue and the fearful strain the terrible climb had cost him to reach the top of the spur of the hill, which jutted out from the main mountain range, and formed the buttress by which for the last two hours we had been ascending! Oh! The exquisite, cool, almost cold and bracing breath of real mountain air which swept across my face and filled my lungs with its exhilarating strength! My pony seemed to enjoy it as much as I. For a minute or so he stood and drank in the delicious breath of nature,... ,... I continued my walk along the charming and easy path along the mountainside, delighted with the magnificent expanse of scenery which my lofty position afforded me. Below me were the craggy,

¹ https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Venus_in_India/Volume_1

rugged serpes, diversified with deep ravines and far jutting spurs, all bearing unmistakable evidence of the fury of the rains which swept their rocky sides. All over these slopes grew innumerable dwarf trees, and shrubs of various kinds but the wild olive seemed to predominate. Far in the distance, rapidly becoming obscured by the thick dusty haze added to the intense heat which was burning up the plain and the valley, I saw two rivers, one was apparently the Indus, which I had crossed at Attock, for I could trace its course to where it emerged from far off mountains and the other was the Cabul river of which I had heard at Nowshera and which flowed only a few hundred yards behind the bungalow ... What made up for a great deal of the discomfort at Cherat was the delicious, cool and bracing air. I felt invigorated and strengthened by it. I enjoyed to the fullest inhaling it; and the savage grandeur of the scenery added enjoyment to breathing the pure mountain breezes which played upon it.... There was at this time in Cherat several officers of other corps or regiments in charge of "Details" who had been sent up from Peshawar to recruit their health in our cool and salubrious air... There were no general barracks at Cherat, except on Sunday morning after divine service, at which the Colonel read prayers. Officers commanding companies paraded them on weekdays at such hours as were convenient, and inspected the men and their arms. The regiment had seen such harassing service in Afghanistan, and had so many sick and feeble in the ranks, that it had been sent, almost at once, to Cherat, with positive orders that there was to be as little work as possible,... The soldiers were, on arrival at Cherat, warned that if they ever went shooting on the mountain sides, they must never be in parties of less strength than five or six, or more than that in number. If fewer, they might be attacked, if greater, it might alarm the natives who might fear attack

Post 1947.After independence the Boys Wing of the Pakistan Armoured Corps was located at Cherat². It was the 4th February 1956 that a part of the 17th Battalion, the Baloch Regiments was shifted to Cherat.

SSG and Cherat

When the SSG which infact was 19th Baluch Regiment moved into Cherat, not much had changed from what was written almost seventy years ago. As the American training team headed by Colonel Don Bunte was going to be stationed at Cherat thus an uplift was carried out. Road was made, bungalows were renovated and repaired. The Americans stayed at Cheat till 1960, their number alongwith their families was between 25-30 . Cherat thus had a colorful life pattern, a club was also established, so were the tennis courts .

² Zaheer Khan *The Way it Was*, {Army Book Club, 2000},p-37

Water was the main issue, as Cherat is short of any water source, the main source is the Chappri spring. Americans as they were using washing machines, therefore water was rationed to 200 gallons per day per family; later another spring and water source was established at Dag Ismail. Under a contract which was signed during the British era, all construction work had to be given to the local contractors, so was the case with water. The water supply is an interesting phenomena. There is no natural spring here to feed the population, British developed an interesting method, close the end of the knoll on north, they plastered the walls and built two water tanks, thus, all the rain water would just trickle down to these tanks from where through pipes the water was brought to the main mess and bazar. The pipes have broken down other than this the water is still getting in the tanks but none to use it. Presently water is coming up from the Marabba or the Ziarat town, there are three staging stations in between. Cherat was a family station, troops and officers were allotted limited number of huts, bungalows and rooms, there was no lady doctor and as such the very first lady doctor was posted in 1957, a small school was also opened for the children but it remained a main source of concern till 2007, when the present day army Public School was inaugurated close to Chappri. There were no shops, thus mess havildar had to make purchases from Peshawar every second day. For electricity a generator was installed with limited time of operation. Apart from these lack of modern amenities, the other inconvenience at Cherat was the snakes, which were and still are quite in number, 'Cherat hills were very steep, covered with wild olives, bushes and were full of snakes, vipers around Cherat and Kraits in the foothills'. Other notable animal is the panther, one panther was killed in 1952, and other was killed in 1979.

In 1968, the present SSG crest was engraved on the main 'Crest Mountain', a mosque was also constructed in the same year at Cherat. Mess life is thus the main source of relaxation at Cherat.

Cherat underwent major transition in post 1965, when the SSG was reorganized, buildings, offices and residential accommodation was readjusted among the battalions. Before the headquarters and school was shifted from Cherat, the life pattern was almost same it was in early days of SSG. Officers and men undergoing the course, always running in pair, mostly limping in the abinitio stages. All around an air of awe and to some extent an aura of terror for newcomer. Commandos carrying out repelling, assault course, judo and host of other activities, at night firing echoing through the valley. There was only one public bus leaving Cherat at 0900 hours for Pabbi and coming back in evening. School bus leaving with children at 0600 hours and at 1540 arriving back. At retreat the gates of the cantonment would be closed, opened only at commander's orders.

In early days, commander would visit the mess twice a week to have interaction with officers undergoing training and with those who were staying in bachelors' accommodation. There used to be a guest night every fortnightly. As Major General A.O.Mitha stated 'no discussion or argument on the parade ground, just obey the orders, but in mess I would emphasis to the officers to have discussion and come up with their own ideas on anything and everything under the sun'.

Officers were invited for tea and ice cream at commandant's house once a month

Present

The road from Pabbi to Cherat has changed quite a lot, Road quality is good but there are speed breakers of irrational size and design at irregular intervals, in 2002, SSG officers Major Abdullah and Captain Jawwad were both ambushed here by the dacoits and were robbed, these speed breakers are infact constructed mostly by those notorious gangs , as car speed invariably comes to a grinding halt before crossing them. There are quite a number of construction alongside the road, the famous Jallozai Afghan refugees camp was also located here which has now been constructed with fiber glass material, there are four such huge structures, then the campus of Peshawar University of Technology another grand structure spread over acres. The scenery from midway becomes classic in nature, silence, greenery all around and a gentle climb, Short of Chapri check post, I had to apply harsh brakes as a Chikoor family was crossing the road, the mother had crossed over and the little baby was following; a rare sight but it seems that it is quite common on this track and path. A new post has been constructed short of Chapri, in front of the army school and college, which is also new . The layout and design alongwith the scenery resembles the Lawrence College of Murree, basketball courts, solar panel, double storied building and fence all around the school, a beautiful school indeed. In the past the children from Cherat used to travel almost thirty odd miles one way to attend the school at Nowshehra and this solves the age old issue. The area all around is now reserve park, with strict instructions not to do any shooting.

The procedure at Chapri is same as in past, you have to get registered and it means that someone from the Cherat has to inform the check post, the road from Chapri to the Cherat cantonment is one way, the gate at the top informs the Chapri on landline about the vehicles coming down and till the time these vehicles do not reach Chapri, no vehicle from Chapri is allowed to go up. After an hour , I set course, in the meanwhile I had little chit chat with the soldiers at the Chapri. The present SSG mess was renovated and inaugurated by Major General Abid Rafique only last year. Mess from inside is comfortable and modern.

While we were exploring the Cherat, we three {myself , Captain Amir and Havildar Qaiser,} went to a house which was reportedly occupied by Major Tariq Mahmood in his youth. The house is on an elevation on the northern ridge, we had to climb the stairs, whole area is green but deserted as most of the buildings have been declared dangerous. House is big and deserted, now, a welding plant is operating from here, the structure is not dangerous in true sense but military way of assessing dangerous especially to a building has very low threshold. Scenery from the corner of the house is breath-taking, as we walked towards the edge, suddenly a wild boar just rushed out and ran away. These pigs are generally un-harmful however if a pregnant pig with recently born babies are approached by anyone, then the pigs react by rushing towards the intruder, other than that a balance is maintained here, now Captain Amir would just clap his hands before approaching any bush and pigs would get alert , either to run or stay at the place.

At present there is electricity, cable network, mobile network, few food shops, souvenir shop, water is still scarce but by and large in abundance. Mess is new and fully furnished, few guestrooms which have been renovated and converted from old structure. At Mitha Chowk in evening there is quite a

life, students {including foreigners} buying food items, there is a canteen stores department shop as well. Mess have its own private Suzuki van which can hired by anyone on payment. In the playground is a new gymnasium building, basketball, miniature football where children play every evening alongwith young officers.

Cherat has been the host of all SSG gatherings, which are held once a decade in which all old SSG officers are cordially invited. On 13th October 2000, the grandest of all gathering was held at Cherat Mess in which the Chief Executive General Pervaiz Musharraf was the chief guest, he was the first SSG officer to become the president of Pakistan

Attock Fort , from Mughal Era to SSG

Attock Fort on the home bank of River Indus is in fact a fort on the confluence of River Kabul and River Indus; a confluence of civilisation. One of the most strategic fort of its time as it kept the eye and guard on the Indus Civilisation against the intruders from the Central Asia. Indus which flows down from Himalayas and Karakorum and River Kabul which takes its origin from Tirth Mir and passes through Chitral , joins by River Yarkun and later by a small tributary from Kabul near Jalalabad ; both these river joins a mortar shell distance away from present day Attock Fort. Foundation stone of the fort was laid by Great Akbar in August 1581 A.D; completed in a record time of two years. Shams ud Din Khawfi was the architect and engineer; Akbar last visited the fort in 1585. Later with Nadir Shah Durrani invasion 1739 and Ahmad Shah Abdalli in 1761 the fort remained under the control of Kabul till 1818 when Sikhs overthrew the Afghans and entrenched themselves in fort till 1849 when British Annexed the Punjab and fort came under their control.

In 1940 during Second World War, 7 Infantry Division was stationed here. In 1947 after the birth of Pakistan the fort naturally came under our control. Attock Fort become for a while a prisoner of war camp, housing the Indians captured during the Kashmir War 1947-48. Later the Close Quarter Battle School was located there and when it was closed 312 Garrison Company of the Frontier force Regiment was raised and stationed here. On 14th February 1956 , 19th Baluch Regiment {SSG} first entered the fort and since then it is home of Special Service Group. In early days of SSG, four companies were stationed here, later in July 1965, under reorganisation, No.2 Rangers Battalion occupied it which naturally in 1966 became 2 Commando Battalion. All SSG battalions have served at Attock under the rotation system; thus this fort and its mess is an integral part of SSG folklore.

The fortifications are over a four miles in circumference and are strengthened with eighteen bastions; all of circular shape except one which is rectangular. *They are built mostly of a local slate and granite rock set in thick lime . The arches, vaultings and domes are in small*

‘Lahori’ brick. The original gateways are in sand stone resembling the one found in Tarki hills near Jhelum. The present main entrance facing the grand trunk road ‘Mori’ gate properly dates back from the Sikh period but its shorn work and ramp are British. The Kabuli gate on the west is the only old entrance now open to view. It has double gates and is flanked by round towers. The only major fortification added by the British is the “Clyde Battery Embattlements”. These are near the river gate overlooking the river. The gun fort holes are directed towards Afghanistan. A well was also sunk but that remains now as the base foundation of the engine. The present day supply of water is however, independent of this well as it is pumped direct from the river into two sedimentation tanks.³

The Grand Trunk Road used to pass in front of the main fort gate ‘Mori’, leading to the lone railway and road bridge over the River Indus, two miles south of the fort. The crossing of River Indus itself has a history connected with the Attock Fort. Indus is at its narrowest on the foot of fort. In the 1840s and even before that a boat bridge was placed for crossing of Indus; however in monsoon and in summer it was always risky to cross the Indus. In 1856 the idea of constructing a railway tunnel was contemplated and it was partially constructed in 1862, later a overhead railway and road bridge was completed in 1883. It was in 1970 that present bridge on north of Attock Fort was completed and a three decades later a second bridge



³ From a paper written by Major General retired Hayauddin in 1965, SSG Archives Tarbela.

was inaugurated making the traffic one way.

After the SSG had camped in the fort, the renovation and repair took place, the present day swimming pool was constructed in 1960, the mosque in 1968 and few other changes have also taken place , but by and large fort retains its original layout. The Fort have three main gates, known as Mori {on the east} Delhi on the north and the Kabul gate on the west. Inside the fort, the layout is not even rather it is slopping from east-west with a steep gradient, separating the fort into two distinct halves. The western lower portion was for the troops and the followers where as the royal accommodation was on the eastern and upper half, the gate separating them is known as Lahori gate. The senior SSG officer in the Attock fort also acted as the station commander, till seventies, the lone railway road bridge used to be closed for all public crossing and transport thus , SSG officer used to give the crossing permit after sunset.

The Mess and few buildings were constructed outside the fort perimeter during early half of last century. Mess itself underwent major renovation in 2000, when the false ceilings and tiles were incorporated in the bachelor's accommodation and in the main mess as well. It is a difficult task to convert old structure into a new and modern style. Thus present rooms lack the windows, have bathrooms almost equal to the main bedroom. Presently another major work is underway in which a green lawn in front of mess is being levelled and efforts are underway to make it green. Attock does not have shortage of water, there is a well inside the main fort compound and moreover water is pumped from the river as well.

Fort walls are thick and have double layers, thus having width enough in the walls for the sentries and troops to live and fight independently. There is space enough for the troops to have a green football ground, cemented basketball and squash courts as well. Around the outer walls are wild growth with plenty of pigs , jackals and snakes. Inside the fort the most enigmatic engraving is that of Star of David on the Kabul Gate; none knows when and who engraved it. There are so many bats inside the haunted portions of the fort that it is difficult to walk under the arches due to their stench, the stench of bats is so powerful that for days it becomes part of the nostrils.

Presently the SSG Battalion keeps the fort in working condition, repairing and renovating with own resources, planting trees and flowers all around. Plaques of SSG battalions which have been stationed here adds a history to the already rich heritage. There are many folklores associated with fort and adjoining places, every now and then some ancient coin or tunnel is discovered by commandos. On the northern side is a sarai which is known as Begum ki Sarai , it was commissioned by Emperor Jahangir's wife. The old cemetery is also located close by , now only remnants of one odd graves are left.

Presently, the security is of highest order with multiple check posts between the road and the mess. Students undergoing the commando courses have to spent almost 4-6 weeks here for explosives, small and heavy weapons firing. The ranges are outside the perimeter of the fort. In the morning and in evening the fort is buzzing with the cheerful and morale boosting slogans of student course. Their presence also liven up the mess life. The mess retains its old glamour with modern amenities like electricity, television, table tennis, billiard to name few. As the story goes, decade ago, officers especially the married ones, would gather at the mess to play bridge during weekends. Commanding Officer was not fond of it, thus the field officers on weekends would call up their jeeps with trailer, dressed in the uniform, they would pretend as going to the exercise and all would gather at the mess and have happy time. It was the dog of one field officer which blew up the secret, one of the lady wife noticed the dog sitting outside and after bit of inquiry, the mess waiters came up with the secret and soon all lady wives raided the mess and caught their husbands red handed; historians are quiet on what happened next.

Food is an integral part of SSG Mess culture, with food it means enormous food. In SSG none takes one egg omelet, it is unlike SSG if the omelet is less than of six eggs. Lieutenant colonel Mitha narrates that , one day I was coming back from Rawalpindi and I decided to stay at Attock, Major Afridi was the only officer present in the mess, we had food , he ordered an omelet of a dosen eggs and then had half a dosen mangoes as well. The officer is known as ‘Twelve Eggs Afridi’.

Buddy system in SSG is the strongest bond among the commando group. From the induction stage in both soldiers and officers commando course, on the very first day, each one is asked to pick and choose his buddy. The men who joins the SSG, already have few years of service and as such invariably when officers appear for the initial tests,



they come in pair; an officer influencing the other. Buddies are supposed to be together throughout the course, undergoing all punishments together, at the end of the course it is a policy to post both the buddies together in a commando unit. In case of soldiers, it is much easier as quite a number of them are posted in each commando battalion. During the long war, many have lost their buddies; they do make new buddies during operations but they are always known with reference to the original pairing. A buddy is more than mere friend or fellow officer, he is the one on whom you trust with your life. Colonel Rizwan Lashari and lieutenant colonel Haroon Islam shaheed were buddies, 'we used to share the same underwear and vests...our money was lying together in the drawer...we would proceed on leave combined...in short we were just twins, knowing each other, families, values, it helped a lot in operations'. President General Musharraf changed the name first son Shahryar to Bilal, in the honour of his buddy Major Bilal who embraced martyrdom in 1971 War.

Company. In SSG the basic brick is the company in each battalion, an officer and soldier after the induction course are posted to battalions, where the commanding officer at his will posts them to the four odd companies in the battalion. After posting in the company, like Liaqat, Shaheen, Hamza, Zikriya, Ayub to name few, the officer adopts it as his new home and family ; a bond that will last till the last. Thus in SSG officers and soldiers prefer to be referred more with their company name than the battalion, Captain {lieutenant colonel} Adnan Bashir Dhariwal, when blessed with his first son, named him after his parent company Hamza. The companies have their own culture, they are semi autonomous in nature, have their own cook houses and recreation halls.

Commando Rivalry. In army, rivalry among battalions, corps and regiments is taken as a healthy and positive sign. In SSG the rivalry between the *Yaldram* and *Powindah* is now almost legendary and a folk lore, whether it is training, sports, administration or the operations, each battalion tries its utmost best to outclass the other. These battalions have no problem if they are beaten by any other commando unit in sports but to lose to the rival is almost a regimental mourning day. In operations , whenever these battalions have been combined, each one tries to acquire a target which is more difficult, higher and further than the other. During Operation Zarb Azab, in North Waziristan Agency, both battalions were together, one with each infantry division. Commanding officer of Yaldram had to plead with the general officer commanding Major general Nadeem, to be allotted the highest mountain for capture , he highlighted that Powindah in other division is tasked a much higher target and this is not good for his battalion. As the tale goes, the GOC declined to alter the plan, later at night and next day the Yaldarm captured not only the task given to them but also reached the target of Powindahs.

SSG culture is restricted and closely guarded, it is introvert in a manner that non SSG officers and soldiers are kept at a distance. It is only in recent past that SSG have established headquarters and other institutions at Tarbela, which is comparatively more accessible than the Attock and Cherat cantonments. In all these cantonments, entry of military officers is also restricted unless and until they have been invited by

the SSG officers, none can enter these cantonments, same holds true for other ranks. A SSG officer prefers to have company of fellow SSG officer rather than anyone else. When these commando units do operate with other formations, the efforts are to keep the SSG as a separate entity both in operations and in administrative matters. It is a male oriented culture thus ladies are seldom seen or talked about; children and pets are an exception as commandos can spend hours and hours talking about children and pets. In SSG majority of officers do have pets, ranging from cobra to wolf. However dogs are the most common, among the other ranks the trend is not that much and at the most they do have a bird in cage.

In SSG, games are mandatory so is morning PT, anyone missing from morning PT is fined with a chicken. In the evening the games are only football, basketball and rugby. All these are played with improvised rules, in which nothing is foul as long as the player is not seriously hurt. By their own traditions SSG does not take part in sports competitions held by other formations. This tradition was setup in early days, as in the eyes of Lieutenant Colonel Mitha it was wastage of time. SSG also does not have Quarterguard as in vogue in rest of the army. They believe in keeping the barracks neat and clean but any commando battalion which indulges in whitewash especially before any visit is always looked down by other battalions.

SSG Uniform and Insignias

On 2nd December 1969, Special Service Group as a separate corps came into being and thus were authorised to wear the distinctive cap badge, shoulder titles and badges of rank. It was thus now an independent brigade with Brigadier {Pakistan Army No1158} Sherullah beg as the first commander, and subedar Major Latif Shah as the first SM of the group.

Special Service Group have a distinctive uniform of green camouflage and insignia which highlights the professional competence and achievement. From 1955-1965, there was nothing unusual or distinctive about the SSG uniform, they being part of Baluch regiment were wearing the same dress as by other Baluch Regiments, green berets and khaki uniform. After the establishment of Parachute Training School at school and with conduct of airborne training, the case to change the beret colour into Maroon was taken up and also to wear the para insignia.



Para efficiency wing was introduced in 1968 , it was awarded after completion of 100 jumps, Frogman insignia was also introduced in same year.⁴Rigger, written on SSG Brevet highlights the efficiency and the fact that commando is capable of packing and rigging the parachutes. SSG for the first time took part in National Day Parade in 1968 with its own distinct style of marching. This marching in which the SSG contingent marches with rifles holding in right hand, knees touching chest, in a running style and above all the recitation of *Haq Haq* and *Allah Ho* has made SSG march past an event which the spectators look forward.

In 1970-1971 the uniform underwent transition, the famous Green and camouflage smog jacket was introduced in whole army, SSG made a modification, that tucked in the khaki trouser and since then SSG had always worn a uniform with trouser tucked in. In mid-seventies the Pakistan day parade attained a greater value , with live television coverage. The Parade was held at Rawalpindi Parade Ground, the Parachute Jump was made part of it and for next decade and half, it was Brigadier Tariq Mahmood who used to lead it. All SSG commanders since then always perform this free fall alongwith the team.

Commando knife was an integral part of the SSG uniform from 1965 onwards, it was put on the web belt. The web belt itself, green in colour and made of canvas was an unique item by itself; it had one runner only, other pushed to the rear.

The scarf is another item of uniform, it has always been white on parade, but in late eighties the parachute cloth scarf was very in. The SSG uniforms are not governed by the army dress regulations in the strict sense. Officers and men do wear the dress items either by choice or by necessity. For instance, in early eighties the winter dress code of regular army specified Great coat as the official winter dress item for officers {Great Coat has always been the officers winter dress item since WWI} but SSG preferred to wear the green American field jackets.

SSG when even wearing the standard dress of Khaki had a way to blend a dash of its own. Brigadier Tariq Mahmood being its longest commander is attributed with setting many examples and trends. Keeping the top button of uniform shirt open, rolling of sleeves with one twist became a hallmark of SSG officers and men; especially of commanders at all levels. This has landed many officers of SSG in warm waters with field formations.



⁴ Summary of important Items/Measures introduced/implemented/recommended since February 1968, File No.35, SSG Archives Tarbela.

Beard is another distinction of SSG, although at present the trend is not as much as it was in the past especially during General Zia's tenure. SSG keeps beards for many reasons, religion is one, ease, comfort and style is another factor. Moustaches and especially long moustaches are a trend in the regular army, where regiments have such soldiers employed on Quarterguard and regimental police duties; in SSG seldom any one has kept long moustaches.

In 2007, the army made drastic changes in dress code and uniform; the belt was removed from the uniform and camouflage of brown colour was introduced. SSG although it retained its green colour camouflage but the belt was no more part of it. In the same era, the green smog jacket, white scarf and khaki trousers were also bid farewell. The insignias under the new changes were made smaller in size, instead of metallic ranks the smaller collar dog and web ranks in front of uniform were introduced which are still in practice. Shoes are now of polished less suede, khaki in colour with green socks. Zarrar Anti terrorist battalion wears black dress with maroon beret, Para Training school also wears black coveralls. SSG headquarters at its own had initiated manufacturing and purchase of camouflage green jersey, which it issues to soldiers on payment, also camouflage parka has been introduced by Headquarters SSG.

SSG does not have any mess kit, neither they have any staff duties dress, the officers when required wear the standard winter mess kit as in the regular army. For sports and fatigue duties SSG introduced its own tracksuits in 2011-12. Yalgaar Battalion was the first commando battalion to do so, Mr Amir Hussain was the manufacturer and soon almost all commando battalions had the track suits; later headquarters SSG introduced a standard tracksuit for all battalions. The track suit is in maroon colour. Also a maroon woollen cap was introduced not only for sports but it is very useful during night guards in winter and in operations.

For Mess dress, SSG officers are more open, seldom is the restriction of lounge suit imposed in any mess gathering but officers are encouraged to wear so; SSG does have a regimental tie and scarf. In 2002, trousers and shirt were made mandatory for troops to wear at least one day in week. A mess night is observed every week in soldiers' mess in same dress, main philosophy behind was to encourage the commandos to feel the trousers and shirt, as they have to perform duties with foreign delegations also quite frequently.

SSG insignia shows a commando knife as if shooting from a lightning strike and exploded with a star of eternal glory⁵



⁵ SSG History File No.35, SSG Archives Tarbela.

SPECIAL SERVICE GROUP MILITARY AWARDS / CIVILLIAN AWARDS

Ser	Army No	Rank & Name	Unit	Date of Award	Remarks
<u>HILAL-I-JURRAT</u>					
1.	PA-20756	Capt Muhammad Iqbal Khan	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	23 Mar 1988	
<u>SITARA-I-JURRAT</u>					
1.	PA-5045	Capt Nisar Ahmed, Engr	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	21 Sep 1965	Shaheed
2.	PA-5654	Capt Muhammad Sadiq, Arty	HQ SSG	21 Sep 1965	Shaheed
3.	PA-5274	Maj Shamim Alam Khan, AC	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	Dec 1965	
4.	PA-5567	Maj Bilal Amin Babar, Engr	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	Dec 1965	
5.	PA-5521	Maj Tariq Rafi, Sig	HQ SSG	Dec 1965	
6.	PA-6311	Capt Tariq Mehmood, BR	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	1965 & 1971	Shaheed, 1989
7.	PA-4941	Maj K G Butt, Engrs	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	22 Mar 1966	
8.	PA-5953	Maj Syede Hazur Hasnain, BR	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	22 Mar 1966	
9.	PJO-5981	Sub Allah Ditta, Engrs	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	22 Mar 1966	
10.	PA-5683	Capt Nasrullah Khan, FF	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1966	
11.	PA-7280	Maj Muhammad Afzal Janjua, PR	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	7 Dec 1971	
12.	PSS-9028	Capt Akhtar Qadir, AC	2 Cdo BN (SSG)	7 Dec 1971	
13.	PJO-171665	N/Sub Ghulam Hussain, BR	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	7 Dec 1971	
14.	PA-7868	Capt Arjumand Malik, BR	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	18 Feb 1972	
15.	PA-6917	Maj Bilal Ahmed, FF	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	6 Dec 1971	
16.	PA-5342	Lt Col Pir Dad Khan, BR	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	27 Dec 1971	
17.	PA-3930	Lt Col Muhammad Hanif Malik, BR	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	27 Dec 1971	
18.	PA-6745	Maj Abdul Qadir, Sig	Gp Sig Coy (SSG)	27 Dec 1971	
19.	PA-19051	Capt Rasheed Ahmed Malik, PR	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	23 Mar 1988	
20.	PA-21584	Capt Salik Nawaz Cheema, Arty	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	23 Mar 1988	Shaheed
21.	PJO-31408	N/Sub Atta Muhammad, ASC	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	23 Mar 1988	Shaheed
22.	2969024	Nk Muhammad Yaqub, Arty	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1989	
23.	PA-16250	Maj Abdul Rehman Bilal, PR	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1990	
24.	PA-33654	Capt Muhammad Ammar Hussain, FF	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1999	Shaheed

Ser	Army No	Rank & Name	Unit	Date of Award	Remarks
<u>TAMGHA-I-JURRAT</u>					
1.	3234473	Hav Lal Khan, BR	19 Baloch	1959	
2.	3434620	Hav Shahzada Khan, FF	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	21 Sep 1965	
3.	6263292	Lnk Abdul Ali, Sig	Gp Sig Coy (SSG)	21 Sep 1965	
4.	3040925	Hav Abbas Ali, BR	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1966	
5.	3539119	Hav Pir Badshah, FF	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1966	
6.	3246841	Lnk Muzaffar Khan, BR	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1966	
7.	2339825	Lnk Mukhtar Ahmed, PR	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1966	
8.	1248586	Sep Sher Ali, Arty	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1966	
9.	1013546	Sep Muhammad Haleem, AC	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1966	Shaheed
10.	2439635	Sep Shah Nawaz Khan, BR	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1966	
11.	PJO-30403	Sub Manzoor Hussai, ASC	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1966	
12.	4130882	Hav Nazir Muhammad Khan, BR	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1966	
13.	2339234	Nk Mir Akbar Khan, PR	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1966	
14.	2243601	Sep Ghulam Hussain, PR	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	7 Dec 1971	
15.	6272256	Sep Abdul Hamid, Sig	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	7 Dec 1971	
16.	1319596	Sep Asghar Ali, Engr	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	7 Dec 1971	
17.	2221972	Nk Sabir Hussain, PR	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	16 Dec 1971	
18.	2444495	Lnk Faqir Muhammad, BR	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	16 Dec 1971	
19.	2469303	Sep Jehangir Khan, BR	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	16 Dec 1971	
20.	6267737	Lnk Aslam Khan, BR	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	16 Dec 1971	
21.	2429256	Hav Bostan Khan, BR	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	3 Dec 1971	
22.	1250938	Nk Abdul Ghani, Arty	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	3 Dec 1971	
23.	2221913	Nk Fazal Hussain	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	4 Dec 1971	
24.	1320351	Sep Nasrullah Khan, Engr	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	4 Dec 1971	
25.	2661650	Sep Mehboob Khan, FF	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	14 Apr 1972	
26.	PA-116607	Capt Aftab Ahmed, AMC	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	14 Apr 1984	
27.	1037329	Hav Muhammad Sharif, AC	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	23 Mar 1984	
28.	2296486	Nk Muhammad Anwar, PR	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	23 Mar 1988	
29.	2518792	Nk Muhammad Saleem, BR	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	23 Mar 1988	
30.	2519252	Nk Tazarib Hussain, BR	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	23 Mar 1988	
31.	2520950	Nk Jehan Zeb, BR	1 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 1988	
32.	2790837	Lnk Muhammad Rafi, AK	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	23 Mar 1988	

Ser	Army No	Rank & Name	Unit	Date of Award	Remarks
33.	2976	Lnk Muhammad Younis, Arty	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	23 Mar 1988	
34.	2559935	Sep Muhammad Afzal, BR	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	23 Mar 1988	
35.	2316491	Lnk Jamil Ahmed, PR	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	23 Mar 1988	
36.	2767537	Sep Bashir Ahmed, FF	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	23 Mar 1988	
37.	2836774	Sep Shakoor Ali, BR	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	23 Mar 1988	
38.	2837638	Sep Hazir Shah, BR	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	23 Mar 1988	
39.	2987728	Sep Muhammad Nawaz, Arty	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	23 Mar 1988	
40.	3021676	Sep Abdul Razzaq, Arty	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	23 Mar 1988	
41.	3307999	Sep Hazrat Yousaf, FF	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	23 Mar 1988	
42.	3061862	Nk Muhammad Shabbir Hussain, Arty	1 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 1988	Shaheed
43.	3458957	Sep Abbas Ali, Sind	1 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 1988	
44.	3648494	Lnk Irshad Hussain, Sig	Gp Sig Coy (SSG)	23 Mar 2000	
SITARA-I-BASALAT					
1.	PA-6706	Capt Javaid Aziz	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1969	Shaheed
2.	PA-3923	Lt col Muhammad Suleman Khan	2 Cdo Bn	28 Mar 1971	Shaheed
3.	PJO-178537	Sub Muhammad Akbar	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	16 Oct 1965	
4.	PA-6792	Capt Mehdi Hassan	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1970	Shaheed
5.	PSS-9029	Capt Muhammad Alam Khan	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1976	
6.	PSS-13978	Capt Shaukat Nazir Hamdani	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	23 Mar 1981	
7.	PA-6311	Col Tariq Mehmood	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	23 Mar 1985	
8.	PA-19902	Capt Sarfraz Ali Khan	1 Cdo Bn (SOU)	23 Mar 1986	
9.	PA-17907	Capt Muhammad Tariq Mehmood	2 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 1985	
10.	PJO-160946	N/Sub Abdul Ham	2 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 1986	
11.	6287926	Hav Liaqat Hussain	Gp Sig Coy (SSG)	23 Mar 1988	
12.	2357802	Sep Muhammad Rafique	3 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1989	
13.	3442538	Sep Muhammad Hussain	3 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1989	
14.	PSS-23613	Capt Tariq Mehmood Khan	Zarrar ATU	23 Mar 1994	
15.	PSS-24498	Capt Arshad Adnan	Zarrar ATU	23 Mar 1994	
16.	PA-9025	Brig Muhammad Nazir	HQ SSG	14 Aug 1994	
17.	PSS-26192	Maj Muhammad Sohail Arif	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	14 Aug 1999	
18.	PA-37885	Lt Arshad Iqbal	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	23 Mar 2005	
19.	PA-37354	Capt Asad Zaman Kayani	2 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2005	
20.	PA-15079	Maj Gen Tahir Mahmood	HQ SSG	14 Aug 2007	
21.	PA-26179	Lt Col Aamir Hameed)	2 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2007	(Shaheed)

Ser	Army No	Rank & Name	Unit	Date of Award	Remarks
22.	PA-29228	Lt Col Muhammad Rizwan Lashari	Zarrar ATU	14 Aug 2007	
23.	PA-30136	Maj Pervez Saddique	2 Cdo Bn/Ghazaband Scouts	14 Aug 2007	
24.	PA-32038	Maj Wajahat Ali Khan	Zarrar ATU	14 Aug 2007	
25.	PA-32040	Maj Khalid Aziz	2 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2007	(Shaheed)
26.	PA-35321	Maj Tahir Mehmood	2 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2007	
27.	PA-36441	Capt Zameer Abbas	2 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2007	(Shaheed)
28.	PA-36319	Maj Tauqir Anwar Khan	5 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2007	
29.	PA-37407	Maj Adil Obaid	Karrar Coy	14 Aug 2007	
30.	PA-38545	Capt Salman Farooq Lodhi	Karrar Coy	14 Aug 2007	(Shaheed), T Bt
31.	PA-39407	Capt Tanvir Ahmed Basra	Zarrar ATU	14 Aug 2007	
32.	1726533	Lnk Sikandar Hayat	SOU	14 Aug 2007	
33.	P9777	Capt Hafeez Ur Rehman	SOS	14 Aug 2008	
34.	PA-40550	Capt Muhammad Raheel Matloob	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	14 Aug 2008	
35.	PA-33265	Maj Asif Javed	HQ SSG	14 Aug 2009	
36.	PA-37220	Maj Zahid Hussain Shah	4 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2009	(Shaheed)
37.	PA-40561	Capt Bilal Zafar	3 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2009	(Shaheed)
38.	No-7353732	Hav Allah Ditta	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2011	(Shaheed)
39.	3355399	Lnk Abdul Qadeer	2 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2012	(Shaheed)
40.	PA-45371	Capt Tariq Jamal	6 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2013	
41.	3136776	Sep Waqar Hussain,	4 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	(Shaheed)
42.	PA-50135	Capt Akash Aftab Rabbani,	4 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	(Shaheed)
43.	PA-45670	Capt Hafeez Ahmed	ZATU	23 Mar 15	
44.	PJO-1723164	N/Sub Mufti	2 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 15	
45.	2400079	Hav Muhammad Shahid	2 Cdo	14 Aug 15	(Shaheed)
46.	3465142	Nk FidaUllah	2 Cdo	14 Aug 15	(Shaheed)
47.	4320956	Hav Muhammad Zia	6 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 16	
<u>TAMGHA-I-BASALAT AND BAR</u>					
1.	PA-24254	Col Sajid Naveed	SOS	14 Aug 2009	
2.	3350170	Nk Ihsan Ud Din	7 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2014	
<u>TAMGHA-I-BASALAT</u>					
1.	PA-3215	Maj E.H Dar, PR	HQ SSG	23 Mar 1965	
2.	PA-5122	Maj Abdul Rauf, BR	HQ SSG	23 Mar 1965	
3.	1237540	Lnk Muhammad Ayub, Arty	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1968	
4.	PA-5807	Maj Hadayat Ullah Jan, BR	HQ SSG	17 Dec 1971	

Ser	Army No	Rank & Name	Unit	Date of Award	Remarks
5.	2225483	Nk Amir Afzal, PR	3 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1976	
6.	2402570	Nk Muhammad Muzaffar, BR	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1976	
7.	7032003	Lnk Sadiq Akbar, EME	3 Cdo Bn (SSG)	15 Jul 1972	
8.	1267502	Nk Mushtaq Ahmed, Arty	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1977	
9.	PA-13350	Capt Mansur Manzur, Arty	3 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1977	
10.	2301718	Up/Lnk Javaid Khan, PR	3 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1977	
11.	1038643	Up/Lnk Umar Khan, AC	3 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1977	
12.	2966860	Sep Rehsam Khan, Arty	3 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1977	
13.	PA-13978	Capt Shaukat Nazir Hamdani, BR	3 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1979	
14.	PA-13145	Maj Akhtar Sultan, FF	PTS (SSG)	23 Mar 1981	
15.	1259520	Hav Abdul Rashid, Arty	3 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1981	
16.	2463823	Nk Inayat Shah, BR	3 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1981	
17.	PA-9044	Lt Col Ghulam Akbar Baloch, PR	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1984	
18.	PA-18510	Capt Zahoor Ahmed, BR	1 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 1984	
19.	6824733	Sep Liaqat Ali, AMC	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1984	
20.	PJO-173940	N/Sub Ghulam Hussain,	3 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1985	
21.	2694270	Nk Muhammad Arshad, FF	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1985	
22.	2727257	Sep Inayat Ullah, AK	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1985	
23.	1387188	Sep Nazar Hussain, Engr	3 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1985	
24.	PSS-14332	Maj Gul Muhammad Khan, BR	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1985	
25.	2691665	Nk Muhammad Shahbaz, FF	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1985	
26.	6282546	Hav Mushtaq Ahmed, Sig	3 Cdo Bn (SSG) / SSG Sig Wing	14 Aug 1985	
27.	1281924	L/Hav Mazhar Hussain, Arty	3 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1985	
28.	2960563	Lnk Muhammad Saeed, Arty	3 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1985	
29.	1059172	Sep Riasat Ali, AC	3 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1985	
30.	PA-18978	Capt Syed Akhtar Ali Naqvi, BR	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1986	
31.	3024193	Sep Altaf Hussain, Arty	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1986	
32.	PA-20020	Capt Abid Ali ShahR	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Aug 1987	
33.	PSS-116716	Capt Abdul Jabbar Bhatti, AMC	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Aug 1987	
34.	PA-21106	Capt Muhammad Akmal Khan, ASC	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Aug 1987	
35.	1395427	Sep Abdul Rahim, Engr	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Aug 1987	
36.	3005299	Sep Fazal Khan, Arty	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Aug 1987	
37.	6287776	L/Hav Nazir Ahmed, Sig	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1987	
38.	2694352	Hav Iftikhar Hussain, FF	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1987	
39.	4150054	Lnk Muhammad Nawaz, Engr	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1987	

Ser	Army No	Rank & Name	Unit	Date of Award	Remarks
40.	2974264	Lnk Muhammad Fiaz, Arty	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1987	
41.	3240819	Sep Muhammad Javed, ASC	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1987	
42.	3014044	Sep Muhammad Saleem, Arty	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1987	
43.	1366148	Nk Muhammad Mumtaz, Engrs	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1988	
44.	2523007	Lnk Muhammad Yousaf, BR	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1988	
45.	1382981	Sep Manzoor Hussain, Engrs	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1988	
46.	1388707	Sep Nasrullah Kan, Engrs	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1988	
47.	2325944	Sep Muhammad Shamshad, PR	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1988	
48.	2321195	Sep Allah Yar Khan, Arty	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1988	
49.	7095890	Sep Sher Ali, EME	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1988	
50.	6322828	Lnk Barkat Shah, Sig	Gp Sig Coy (SSG)	23 Mar 1988	
51.	PJO-174752	N/Sub Abdul Rashid Khan, BR	3 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1988	
52.	PA-13180	Maj Manzoor Iqbal, Sind	Zarrar Coy (SSG)	14 Aug 1989	
53.	3636409	Sep Manzoor Hussain, Sig	Gp Sig Coy (SSG)	23 Mar 1993	
54.	PA-17998	Maj Liaqat Ali, PR	3 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1994	
55.	PJO-175979	N/Sub Muhammad Akhtar, BR	Zarrar Coy (SSG)/ 3 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 1994	
56.	PJO-186528	N/Sub Muhammad Yaqub, Sig	Zarrar Coy (SSG)	23 Mar 1993	
57.	1045743	Hav Wajid Hussain, AC	Zarrar Coy (SSG)	23 Mar 1993	
58.	PSS-26275	Capt Fazal Mabood, AK	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1995	
59.	1399314	Lnk Shamshad Ahmed, Engrs	3 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1996	
60.	PA-24842	Maj Ghulam Rabbani, BR	HQ SSG/5 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 1997	
61.	PA-31561	Capt Karrar Hussain, PR	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1997	
62.	3042152	Lnk Muhammad Nazir, Arty	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1997	
63.	3045455	Lnk Muhammad Latif, Arty	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1997	
64.	3044407	Lnk Muhammad Ahmed, Arty	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1997	
65.	1391207	Nk Muhammad Hafiz, Engrs	Zarrar Coy (SSG)	14 Aug 1999	
66.	32311256	Hav Walayat Khan, ASC	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 2000	
67.	3326477	Lnk Mamnun Ur Rehman	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 2000	
68.	3328590-	Lnk Aman Ullah Khan	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 2000	
69.	1076174	Sep Muhammad Ishtiaq, AC	Karrar Coy (SSG)	13 Aug 2004	Shaheed
70.	3092858	Lnk Qaiser Khan, Arty	3 Cdo Bn (SSG)	13 Aug 2004	Shaheed
71.	PA-38545	Capt Salman Farooq Lodhi	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	14 Aug 2004	(Shaheed), T Bt

Ser	Army No	Rank & Name	Unit	Date of Award	Remarks
72.	3092858	Sep Qaiser Khan	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	14 Aug 2004	(Shaheed)
73.	PJO-224523	N/Sub Mir Dad Khan	Karrar Coy	23 Mar 2005	
74.	7360013	Sep Muhammad Ashique	Karrar Coy	23 Mar 2005	
75.	3069746	Lhav Ghulam Jilani	2 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2005	
76.	PA-26713	Lt Col Muhammad Ikram Ul Haq	4 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2007	
77.	PA-21229	Col (Now Brig) Raja Tariq Mehmood	Comd SOTF	23 Mar 2007	
78.	PA-28338	Lt Col Irfan Zafar	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	23 Mar 2007	
79.	31190011	Sep Winder Ali	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	23 Mar 2007	
80.	PA-35382	Maj Tariq Saleem	Zarrar ATU	14 Aug 2007	
81.	PA-37441	Capt Muhammad Afzal	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)/SOS	14 Aug 2007	
82.	PA-38283	Capt Ihteram Ahmed	Zarrar ATU	14 Aug 2007	
83.	PA-38534	Capt Bilal	2 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2007	
84.	PA-40138	Lt Atta Ullah Khan	2 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2007	
85.	PJO-120425	Sub Khalid Mansoor	Zarrar ATU/3 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2007	
86.	PJO-158204	Sub Muhammad Inayat	Karrar Coy	14 Aug 2007	Shaheed
87.	PJO-197612	N/Sub Saleem Shah	Zarrar ATU	14 Aug 2007	
88.	2375534	Hav Muhammad Khan	Zarrar ATU	14 Aug 2007	Shaheed
89.	3256700	Hav Muhammad Asif	Zarrar ATU	14 Aug 2007	Shaheed
90.	3256849	Hav Mohib Ullah Khan	Z ATU	14 Aug 07	
91.	3630797	Hav Abdul Waheed	Z ATU	14 Aug 07	
92.	2383308	Nk Rahim Nawaz Khan	Z ATU	14 Aug 07	
93.	2383823	Nk Saeed Ahmed	Karrar Coy	14 Aug 07	
94.	2391903	Nk Muhammad Saddique	Z ATU	14 Aug 07	Shaheed
95.	3453498	Nk Ghulam Abbas	Z ATU	14 Aug 07	
96.	1080750	Lnk Sheraz Ali	Z ATU	14 Aug 07	Shaheed
97.	1080818	Lnk Nasrumain Ullah	Karrar Coy	14 Aug 07	
98.	1717027	Lnk Fiaz Ahmed	Karrar Coy	14 Aug 07	
99.	2401610	Lnk Shoukat Ali	Z ATU	14 Aug 07	
100.	3085719	Lnk Muhammad Ismail	Z ATU	14 Aug 07	
101.	3339335	Lnk Muhammad Johar Nasim	Z ATU	14 Aug 07	(Shaheed)

Ser	Army No	Rank & Name	Unit	Date of Award	Remarks
102.	3341005	Lnk Afsar Sayyab	Z ATU	14 Aug 07	(Shaheed)
103.	1728213	Sep Muhammad Khalid Khokhar	Karrar Coy	14 Aug 07	(Shaheed)
104.	1737367	Sep Muhammad Naseer	Karrar Coy	14 Aug 07	(Shaheed)
105.	2408025	Sep Muhammad Wahid Afzal	Karrar Coy	14 Aug 07	(Shaheed)
106.	PJO-121765	N/Sub Sabir	2 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2008	(Shaheed)
107.	PJO-197613	N/Sub Abdul Wali	1 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2008	
108.	3076130	Nk Muhammad Aslam	2 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2008	(Shaheed)
109.	3661230	Nk Nadeem Ahmed	SSG Sig Wing	23 Mar 2008	(Shaheed)
110.	3734620	UP/Nk Zafar Ali Shah	2 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2008	
111.	PA-34759	Maj Julian Muazzam James	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	14 Aug 2008	
112.	PA-38898	Capt Muhammad Qamar ejaz	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	14 Aug 2008	
113.	3097355	Hav Farman Ali	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	14 Aug 2008	
114.	BR-910677	Sep Shafqat Abbas	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	14 Aug 2008	
115.	1732110	Sep Waheed Ali	1 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2008	(Shaheed)
116.	2406419	Sep Ajab Khan	3 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2008	
117.	3358788	UP/Nk Shahbaz hussain	1 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2008	(Shaheed)
118.	4318063	Sep Abdul Hameed	3 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2008	
119.	3652497	Nk Inam Ellahi	SSG Sig Wing	23 Mar 2009	(Shaheed)
120.	3112027	Lnk Imdad Ali	3 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2009	(Shaheed)
121.	3348282	Lnk Yasir Khan	3 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2009	(Shaheed)
122.	1084120	Sep Aqeel Khan	3 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2009	(Shaheed)
123.	1088210	Sep Abdul Qadir	3 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2009	(Shaheed)
124.	2408409	Sep Rizwan Ashraf	3 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2009	(Shaheed)
125.	3125968	Sep Muhammad Zahid	3 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2009	(Shaheed)
126.	3846830	Sep Rajab Ali	3 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2009	
127.	PA-21210	Brig Muhammad Saleem Soekarno	HQ 11 SSB	14 Aug 2009	
128.	PA-29522	Lt Col Mumtaz Hussain	1 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2009	
129.	PA-36189	Maj Zafar Ullah Khan Niazi	1 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2009	
130.	PA-37446	Maj Muhammad Umair Khan Bangash	1 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2009	
131.	PA-37990	Maj Sardar Ali Khan Siddiqi	3 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2009	
132.	PA-40763	Capt Najam Riaz Raja	6 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2009	(Shaheed)
133.	PA-41656	Capt Junaaid Khan	6 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2009	(Shaheed)
134.	PJO-164540	N/Sub Abdul Ghafoor	1 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2009	
135.	1074911	Nk Shahid Rasool	6 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2009	(Shaheed)

Ser	Army No	Rank & Name	Unit	Date of Award	Remarks
136.	913149	Lnk Shakeel Ahmed	6 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2009	
137.	1083858	Sep Muhammad Asif Nawaz	1 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2009	(Shaheed)
138.	1091521	Sep Khan Faraz	1 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2009	(Shaheed)
139.	3756825	Sep Muhammad Rashad	1 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2009	(Shaheed)
140.	3758886	Sep Shahzad Mehmood	1 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2009	(Shaheed)
141.	7768541	Sep Shahid Khan	1 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2009	(Shaheed)
142.	3732677	Hav Maqsood Ahmed	7 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2010	(Shaheed)
143.	3465327	Lnk Rustam Ali	3 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2010	(Shaheed)
144.	1086668	Swr Abdul Rehman	7 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2010	(Shaheed)
145.	1086695	Sep Khalid Mehmood	3 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2010	(Shaheed)
146.	2419920	Sep Waseem Tahir	7 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2010	(Shaheed)
147.	3118227	Sep Muhammad Rizwan	3 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2010	(Shaheed)
148.	3139682	Sep Mushtaq Hussain	7 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2010	(Shaheed)
149.	3751998	Sep Hussain Ahmed	3 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2010	(Shaheed)
150.	4312217	Hav Roshan Ali	7 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2011	(Shaheed)
151.	3067724	L/Hav Muhammad Aslam	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2011	(Shaheed)
152.	3342693	Hav Mazhar Iqbal	2 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2012	(Shaheed)
153.	3836525	Hav Gulzar Ahmed	2 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2012	(Shaheed)
154.	2400229	Nk Abideen	2 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2012	(Shaheed)
155.	2409731	Lnk Tariq Mehmood	2 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2012	(Shaheed)
156.	4313100	Lnk Abdul Aziz	2 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2012	(Shaheed)
157.	2857898	Sep Naeem Abbas	2 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2012	(Shaheed)
158.	3374390	Sep Nasir Ihsan	2 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2012	(Shaheed)
159.	3759228	Sep Mehboob Ur Rehman	2 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2012	
160.	4332132	Sep Ghulam Abbas	2 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2012	(Shaheed)
161.	PA-43556	Capt Ali Mahmood Khan	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2012	(Shaheed)
162.	PA-44613	Capt Ejaz Mohsin	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2012	
163.	3336976	Hav Hazrat Ali	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2012	(Shaheed)
164.	4316086	Hav Muhammad Naveed	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2012	(Shaheed)
165.	2851459	Nk Afzal Iqbal	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2012	
166.	3745483	Nk Nazakat Ali	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2012	
167.	3743976	Lnk Khatab Noor	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2012	(Shaheed)
168.	1743917	Sep Mohassan Ali	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2012	(Shaheed)
169.	3125895	Sep Maqsood Ahmed	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2012	(Shaheed)
170.	3372920	Sep Ayaz Khan	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2012	

Ser	Army No	Rank & Name	Unit	Date of Award	Remarks
171.	3374436	Sep JAWad Ali	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2012	(Shaheed)
172.	3376017	Sep Syed Jaffar Hussain Shah	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2012	(Shaheed)
173.	3469977	Sep Mujahid Hussain	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2012	(Shaheed)
174.	3759781	Sep Muhammad Ali Moavyia	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2012	(Shaheed)
175.	3107250	Nk Ayaz Ali	4 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2012	(Shaheed)
176.	PA-30562	Lt Col Adil Rehmani	4 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2012	
177.	PA-35372	Maj Khalid Nawaz	4 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2012	
178.	1074512	Hav Jamil Ahmed	4 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2012	(Shaheed)
179.	1085948	Lnk Saqib Rehan	4 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2012	
180.	3103061	Lnk Muhammad Arif	4 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2012	
181.	1747317	Sep Abne Amin	4 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2012	
182.	2417340	Sep Salman Ali	4 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2012	
183.	3667467	Sep Asad Abbas	4 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2012	
184.	PA-46241	Lt Zahid Mehmood	4 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2013	(Shaheed)
185.	1093250	Sep Khalid Shabir Ali	4 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2013	
186.	2416614	Sep Sikandar Zeb	6 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2013	
187.	3133385	Sep Aamir Yasin	4 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2013	
188.	3135259	Sep Inam Ullah	6 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2013	(Shaheed)
189.	3476181	Sep Ahmad Khan	4 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2013	(Shaheed)
190.	PA-33421	Lt Col Hameed Ullah Khan, FF	1 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2013	
191.	PA-43696	Capt Wasim Ud Razi	3 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2013	(Shaheed)
192.	1734366	Hav Abdul Ghafoor	3 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2013	(Shaheed)
193.	4316550	Hav Kafeel Ahmed	3 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2013	(Shaheed)
194.	3116138	Lnk Muhammad Shafiq	3 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2013	(Shaheed)
195.	3122593	Lnk Kashif Mahmood	3 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2013	(Shaheed)
196.	3351703	Lnk Shoukat Ali	3 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2013	(Shaheed)
197.	1091077	Sep Muhammad Imran	3 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2013	(Shaheed)
198.	1096867	Sep Shahid Anjum	3 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2013	(Shaheed)
199.	2424996	Sep Muhammad Safdar	3 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2013	(Shaheed)
200.	3150448	Sep Wasim Akhtar	3 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2013	(Shaheed)
201.	3160414	Sep Rahmat Ullah	3 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2013	(Shaheed)

Ser	Army No	Rank & Name	Unit	Date of Award	Remarks
202.	3470293	Sep Asim Ali	3 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2013	(Shaheed)
203.	3854866	Sep Tasawar Hussain	3 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2013	(Shaheed)
204.	3855123	Sep Abdul Islam	3 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2013	(Shaheed)
205.	3145692	Sep Imam Bakhsh	6 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2013	
206.	PJO-242984	N/Sub Ali Zaman	1 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2014	(Shaheed)
207.	3346487	Nk Ibrar Muhammad	1 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2014	(Shaheed)
208.	3360407	Lnk Rab Nawaz	1 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2014	(Shaheed)
209.	3154612	Sep Muhammad Jahangir	1 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2014	(Shaheed)
210.	PA-50371	Lt Ahmad Raza	3 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2014	(Shaheed)
211.	PJO-1074089	N/Sub Muhammad Ilyas	3 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2014	
212.	4061962	Lnk Amir Haider	3 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2014	
213.	3108961	Lnk Abid Hussain	3 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2014	(Shaheed)
214.	3133278	Sep Muhammad Ashfaq	3 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2014	(Shaheed)
215.	3142991	Sep Malik Muhammad Javed	3 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2014	(Shaheed)
216.	3773184	Sep Arshad Mehmood	3 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2014	(Shaheed)
217.	PA-25886	Brig Muhammad Ahmed Khan	11 SSB	23 Mar 15	
218.	3106285	Hav Murtaza	2 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	
219.	3386924	Sep Fazal Iqbal,	2 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	(Shaheed)
220.	3738301	Hav Razi Khan,	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	(Shaheed)
221.	3735592	Hav Muhammad Mustafa,	7 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	(Shaheed)
222.	1084624	Nk Shahadat Ali	7 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	
223.	3356308	Lnk Tariq Mehmood,	7 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	(Shaheed)
224.	2860549	Sep Muhammad Siddique	7 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	(Shaheed)
225.	3135775	Sep Ismail Khan	7 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	
226.	4426370	Sep Nizam Ud Din	7 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	
227.	PA-38538	Maj Muhammad Ihsan Ullah	ZATU	23 Mar 15	
228.	PA-48329	Capt Akhtar Nawaz	ZATU	23 Mar 15	
229.	PA-46215	Capt Abid Zaman	ZATU	23 Mar 15	
230.	3360029	Lnk Imran Khan	ZATU	23 Mar 15	
231.	3089428	Hav Muhammad Fareed	7 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	
232.	PA-32878	Lt Col Muhammad Abdullah	3 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
233.	PA-35270	Lt Col Pervez Iqbal	2 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
234.	PA-36291	Lt Col Jawad Hafeez	4 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
235.	PA-38556	Maj Muhammad Idress	2 Cdo	14 Aug 15	

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236.	PA-39333	Maj Muhammad Arif Naeem	5 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
237.	PA-42278	Maj Abid Ali	5 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
238.	PA-45975	Capt SardarJawad Saleem	4 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
239.	PA-46325	Capt Atif Aslam	5 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
240.	PA-46651	Capt Muhammad Adil Shafi	2 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
241.	PA-50774	Capt Umar Awais	2 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
242.	1094709	Sep Muhammad Zaman	4 Cdo	14 Aug 15	(Shaheed)
243.	3161950	Sep Aamir Munir	2 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
244.	3774705	Sep Muhammad Naeem Akram	2 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
245.	PA-52997	Capt Basharat Farid	4 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 16	
246.	3735516	Hav Nabi Bux	4 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 16	
247.	3738498	Hav Mushtaq Ali	4 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 16	
248.	3119112	Nk Nazakat Ali	4 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 16	(Shaheed)
249.	4555355	Sep Asif Ali	6 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 16	
SITARA-I-IMTIAZ (MILITARY)					
1.	PA-24254	Col Sajid Naveed, T Bt and Bar	HQ SSG	14 Aug 2011	
<u>TAMGHA-I-PAKISTAN</u>					
1.	PA-649	Brig Abubakar Usman Mitha, BR	19 BR (HQ SSG)	7 Oct 1959	
<u>TAMGHA-I-QUAID-I-AZAM</u>					
1.	PA-4095	Maj Abdul Shagr Jan, FF	19 BR (HQ SSG)	7 Oct 1959	
<u>HILAL-I-SHUJAAT</u>					
1.	PA-6311	Brig Tariq Mahmood	HQ SSG	14 Aug 1990	
2.	PA-27053	Lt Col Haroon Islam	Zarrar ATU	14 Aug 2007	(Shaheed)
<u>Imtiaz Sanad</u>					
1.	PA-26179	Lt Col Aamir Hameed Awan	2 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 05	(Shaheed)
2.	1729028	Lnk Muhammad Afsar	2 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 05	
3.	2594777	Lnk Waris Khan	2 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 05	
4.	2389239	Lnk Ghazanfar Mehmood	Karrar Coy	23 Mar 07	
5.	PA-40561	Capt Bilal Zafar	Karrar Coy	14 Aug 07	
6.	PA-26713	Lt Col Muhammad Ikram Ul Haq	4 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 07	
7.	PA-32374	Maj Kaleem Ullah Butt	4 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 07	
8.	PA-39352	Capt Ali Sheharyar Saadi	4 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 07	
9.	PA-39430	Capt Qaiser Nawaz	4 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 07	

Ser	Army No	Rank & Name	Unit	Date of Award	Remarks
10.	PJO-178267	N/Sub Muhammad Ali	Z ATU	14 Aug 07	
11.	No 1077990	Nk Ashiq Hussain	Z ATU	14 Aug 07	
12.	3101959	Lnk Manzoor Ahmed	Z ATU	14 Aug 07	
13.	374235	Lnk Ishaque Ali	Z ATU	14 Aug 07	
14.	3357870	Sep Shoukat Ali Setthi	Z ATU	14 Aug 07	
15.	3091398	Sep Aftab Ahmed	Z ATU	14 Aug 07	
16.	3046161	Hav (Now N/Sub) Muhammad Ishtiaq	4 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 08	
17.	2393670	UP/Nk Bakht Zamin	2 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 08	
18.	PJO-64936	N/Sub Muhammad Nawaz	PTS	14 Aug 08	
19.	7354802	Hav Javid Iqbal Tarar	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	14 Aug 08	
20.	3109631	Lnk Hafiz inayat Ur Rehman	3 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 08	
21.	3347150	Lnk Khalid Khan	3 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 08	
22.	2853224	Sep Awon Ali	3 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2009	
23.	2855867	Sep Manzoor Hussain	3 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2009	
24.	PA-431115	Capt Faheem Bashir	1 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2009	
25.	PJO-178646	N/Sub Muhammad Daud	3 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2009	
26.	3097199	Hav Naseer Ahmed	6 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2009	
27.	2396486	Nk Sher Muhammad	5 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2009	
28.	PA-39525	Capt Arbab Nasrullah	7 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2010	
29.	PA-42248	Capt Hamza Bin Tariq	1 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2010	
30.	PA-43070	Capt Zeeshan Haider	7 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2010	
31.	PA-43354	Capt Sher Dil Khan	7 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2010	
32.	1074199	Hav Barkat Ali	7 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2010	
33.	1746418	Sep Abid Ul Haq	1 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2010	
34.	3136619	Sep Muhammad Nisar Ali	3 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2010	
35.	4325352	Sep Sarfaraz Khan	3 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2010	
36.	PA-29300	Lt Col Malik Naveed Ahmed	1 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2011	
37.	PA-37899	Maj Azeem Sajjad Dar	SOS (SSG)	14 Aug 2011	
38.	PA-38283	Maj Ihteram Ahmed, T.Bt	2 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2012	
39.	1091345	Sep Rao Muhammad Amjad	2 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2012	
40.	2415098	Sep Arshad Mehmood	2 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2012	
41.	1739003	Lnk Ali Hussain	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2012	
42.	6400779	Lnk Abdul Qayyum	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2012	
43.	4334438	Sep Maqsood Ahmed	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2012	
44.	3109546	Sep Noor Ullah	4 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2013	

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45.	3132467	Sep Nawaz Khan	SSG, 8 FF	23 Mar 2013	
46.	PA-46711	Lt Nauman Ahmed	1 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2013	
47.	PA-46897	Lt Khuram Shahzad	1 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2013	
48.	3125696	Lnk Abdul Khalique	1 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2013	
49.	3766315	Nk Asiq Hussain	6 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2013	
50.	PA-43369	Capt Mostajab Haider Saqib	6 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2013	
51.	3119069	Sep Muhammad Aksar	6 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2013	
52.	3133682	Sep Maqsood Ali	6 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2013	
53.	PA-44541	Capt Yassar Iqbal Khattak	1 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2014	
54.	PA-44756	Capt Zohaib Nawaz Judga	1 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2014	
55.	PA-42795	Capt Tariq Ahmed Mirza	3 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2014	(Shaheed)
56.	3351314	Nk Wisal Mehmood	3 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2014	
57.	1093268	Sep Farrukh Shahzad Khan	3 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2014	
58.	1098788	Sep Muzaffar Ali	3 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2014	
59.	2421283	Sep Yasar Nadeem	3 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2014	
60.	PA-35270	Lt Col Pervez Iqbal	2 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2015	
61.	PA-39343	Maj Muhammad Sajid Asim	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2015	
62.	4332483	Sep Khitab Gul	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2015	
63.	PA-50048	Capt Arbab Abdul Basit Khan	7 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2015	
64.	PJO-3333299	N/Sub Ghulam Asghar	ZATU	23 Mar 2015	
65.	3841310	Nk Muhammad Imran Hussain	ZATU	23 Mar 2015	
66.	1083974	Lnk Faiz UI Islam	ZATU	23 Mar 2015	
67.	1086219	Lnk Muhammad Farooq	ZATU	23 Mar 2015	
68.	4318842	Lnk Faryad Ali	ZATU	23 Mar 2015	
69.	1091113	Sep Muhammad Shakeel	ZATU	23 Mar 2015	
70.	3144823	Sep Sami Ullah	ZATU	23 Mar 2015	
71.	PA-36313	Lt Col Naveed Waqas	5 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
72.	PA-37350	Maj Mudassar Hussain	4 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
73.	PA-43393	Maj Mohsin Raza	4 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
74.	PA-46610	Capt Syed Farasat Ali Bukhari	4 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
75.	PA-46898	Capt Waseem Ishaq	5 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
76.	PA-46998	Capt Mubashir Azam	2 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
77.	PA-47382	Capt Muhammad Laraib	2 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
78.	PA-51746	Lt Farooq Ahmed Butt	2 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
79.	PJO-4308848	N/Sub Muhammad Taj	2 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
80.	3103836	Hav Aziz Ur Rehman	2 Cdo	14 Aug 15	

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81.	3139503	Sep Abdul Jalil	2 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
82.	3147217	Sep Umar Draz	2 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
83.	3162601	Sep ShoaibGul	2 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
84.	3769020	Sep Muhammad Irfan	2 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
85.	3771177	Sep Arsalan Amjad	2 cdo	14 Aug 15	
86.	3853849	Sep Muhammad Waris Shahban	5 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
87.	3374433	Sep Muhammad Ali	4 Cdo	23 Mar 16	
COMMENDATION CARDS					
1.	PA-2102	Lt Col Muhammad Ayoob Arif, FF	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1966	
2.	PA-5643	Capt Wahid Arshad Gejial, FF	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1966	
3.	PSS-5856	Capt Muhammad Khan, BR	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1967	
4.	PA-5654	Capt Muhammad Sadiq, Arty	HQ SSG	14 Aug 1965	Shaheed
5.	PA-6310	Capt Abul Rehman Jarral, AC	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1966	
6.	PJO-5976	Sub Zardad Khan, Engrs	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1966	
7.	PJO-150157	Sub Latif Shah, PR	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1966	
8.	PJO-1705509	Sub Mehrban, BR	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1966	
9.	3233568	Hav Amir Afzal, BR	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1966	
10.	6567540	Hav Muhammad Bashir ASC	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1966	
11.	1227852	Hav Maqbool Ahmed, Arty	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1966	
12.	PJO-151397	N/Sub Muhammad Hussain, PR	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1966	
13.	PJO-190901	N/Sub Allah Din, FF	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1966	
14.	4132439	Lnk Fazal Rehman, BR	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1966	
15.	4133485	Hav Bashir Ahmed, BR	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1966	
16.	3247251	Hav Muhammad Sadiq, BR	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1966	
17.	2437556	Sep Asad Badshah, BR	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1966	
18.	1250603	Lnk Muhammad Anwar, Arty	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1966	
19.	2653428	Nk Qazi Khan, BR	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1966	
20.	1019488	Swr Abdul Qadeer, AC	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1966	
21.	2653424	Nk Sher Zaman, BR	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1966	
22.	2654630	Lnk Mushtaq Hussain, FF	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1966	
23.	2218685	Lnk Isa khan, PR	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1966	
24.	PJO-5088	N/Sub Kabir Khan, Arty	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	1 Dec 1971	
25.	PA-7191	Maj Salman Ahmed, FF	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	7 Dec 1971	
26.	1244534	Hav Dil Muhammad, Arty	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	1972	
27.	PA-6820	Maj Mumtaz Ali	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	Dec 1971	

Ser	Army No	Rank & Name	Unit	Date of Award	Remarks
28.	PA-13011	Capt Ashfaq Ahmed	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1978	
29.	PA-13180	Capt Mansoor Iqbal	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1978	
30.	3050305	Sep Babar Khan, Arty	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1988	
31.	1377598	Lnk Amir Ahmed, Engr	Zarrar Coy (SSG)	14 Aug 1989	
32.	2877836	Lnk Abdul Hadi, Arty	Zarrar Coy (SSG)	14 Aug 1989	
33.	PA-27210	Maj Muhammad Ashraf Kamal, Sind	Ex SSG	23 Mar 2004	
<u>COAS COMMENDATION CARDS</u>					
1.	PA-4058	Maj Nishat Ahmed, Arty	16 SP	5 Dec 1961	
2.	PA-6253	Capt Khalid Mehmood, Arty	27 FF	23 Mar 1967	
3.	PA-5641	Maj S A Durrani, FF	23 FF	5 Dec 1961	
4.	PA-5122	Maj Abdul Rauf, BR	HQ SSG	5 Dec 1961	
5.	PJO-24168	SM Muhammad Ashraf, PR		27 May 1966	
6.	PJO-26315	SM Abdul Manan, FF	3 Cdo Bn (SSG)	25 May 1966	
7.	PJO-31613	Sub Inayat Ullah, ASC		17 Jun 1967	
8.	PJO-170373	Sub Muhammad Bashir Ahmed BR	HQ SSG	10 Jun 1966	
9.	PJO-150384	Sub Anar Muhammad, PR	HQ SSG	10 Jun 1966	
10.	PJO-170559	Sub Mehrban, PR	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	5 Dec 1961	
11.	PJO-171202	N/Sub Mian Muhammad, BR		10 Jun 1966	
12.	3239427	Nk Nasrullah, BR		5 Dec 1961	
13.	6787456	Hav Muhammad Amin Azad, AMC		17 Jun 1967	
14.	2650966	Hav Khanan Khan, BR		5 Dec 1961	
15.	6259647	Hav Muhammad Bashir, Sig	Gp Sig Coy (SSG)	17 Jun 1967	
16.	2335251	Hav Gohar Imam, PR	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	30 Jun 1966	
17.	3046232	Lnk Ghulam Rashid, BR		5 Dec 1961	
18.	3638201	Lnk Sardar Ali, PR		5 Dec 1961	
19.	3839022	Hav Manzoor Hussain, PR	3 Cdo Bn (SSG)	5 Dec 1961	
20.	6264005	Nk Muhammad Ilyas, Sig	Gp Sig Coy (SSG)	30 Dec 1966	
21.	6264882	Sig Ghulam Haider, Sig	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	11 Jun 1968	
22.	1317215	Sep Noor Ahmed, Engrs	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	1 Feb 1969	
23.	PA-6311	Maj Tariq Mahmood, SJ, BR	HQ SSG	27 Mar 1969	Twice 14 Aug 1969
24.	6380297	Hav Yousaf Hussain, ASC	PTW	24 Jun 1969	
25.	2341866	Hav Muhammad Khan, RTW	PR	24 Jun 1969	
26.	1236085	Nk Muhammad Ayub, Arty	PTW	24 Jun 1969	

Ser	Army No	Rank & Name	Unit	Date of Award	Remarks
27.	6260088	Hav Habib Gul, Sig	Musa Coy (SSG)	28 Aug 1969	
28.	1231899	Hav Muhammad Ramzan, Arty	Musa Coy(SSG)	28 Aug 1969	
29.	1311909	Nk Muhammad Saddique, Engrs		28 Aug 1969	
30.	PA-6929	Capt Javid Latif Kahlon, ASC	Musa Coy (SSG)	14 Aug 1969	
31.	PJO-150384	Sub Anar Muhammad, PR	Musa Coy(SSG)	15 Jul 1970	
32.	PJO-170373	Sub Muhammad Bashir Ahmed	HQ SSG	14 Aug 1970	
33.	PJO-37939	Sub Muhammad Fazal Shah, EME	PTW	14 Aug 1970	
34.	PJO-7147	N/Sub Muhammad Ali, Engr	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1970	
35.	PJO-151748	N/Sub Allah Ditta, PR	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1970	
36.	1309503	Hav Allah Yar, Engr	Musa Coy (SSG)	14 Aug 1970	
37.	1311909	Nk Muhammad Siddique, Engrs	Musa Coy (SSG)	14 Aug 1970	
38.	PJO-1455	N/Sub Fateh Khan, AC	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1970	
39.	6263284	Nk Muhammad Saleem, Sig	Musa Coy(SSG)	14 Aug 1970	
40.	1318507	Spr Rab Nawaz, Engrs	Musa Coy (SSG)	14 Aug 1970	
41.	PJO-170832	Sub Muhammad Sharif, BR	PTW	7 Jan 1971	
42.	PJO-17009	SM Niamat Khan, BR	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	12 Feb 1972	
43.	PJO-45508	Sub Khaksar Ahmed, ACC	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Jun 1972	
44.	PJO-5-51	N/Sub Fazal Hussain, Arty	3 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Jun 1972	
45.	PJO-171582	N/Sub Ghulam Hussain, Arty	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Jun 1972	
46.	6261213	Hav Abdul Latif, FF		23 Mar 1972	
47.	6795196	Nk Muhammad Riaz,. AMC		23 Mar 1976	
48.	2453341	Nk Muhammad Din, BR	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1976	
49.	2462570	Nk Muhammad Muzafar, BR	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1976	
50.	6258413	Hav Rab Nawaz, Sig	Gp Sig (SSG)	Jan 1976	
51.	PA-4941	Lt Col K.G. Butt, SJ, Engrs	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	1973	
52.	PA-7310	Maj Tahir Ali Qureshi, FF	HQ SSG	1975	
53.	PA-9025	Maj Muhammad Nazir, PR	HQ SSG	1975	
54.	PA-13843	Capt Zahid Mehmood, PR	3 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1978	
55.	PSS-8412	Maj Sultan Amir, FF	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Jun 1977	
56.	PA-11613	Maj Farooq Ahmed, FF	PTW	14 Jun 1977	
57.	PA-13346	Capt Tanver Ahmed Raja, Arty	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Jun 1977	
58.	2217121	Hav Haq Nawaz, PR	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Jun 1977	
59.	2250161	Lnk Safdar Hussain, PR		14 Jun 1977	
60.	2219572	Hav Mukhtar Ali, PR	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Jun 1977	
61.	1065362	Sep Yar Muhammad	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	Feb 1992	

Ser	Army No	Rank & Name	Unit	Date of Award	Remarks
62.	1043389	Hav Muhammad Ikram	Zarrar Coy	May 1992	
63.	2661296	Nk Sher Bahadar	3 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1978	
64.	PJO-172237	Sub Muhammad Ishaq	PTS (SSG)	13 Aug 1978	
65.	PJO-151397	SM Muhammad Hussain		14 Aug 1978	
66.	2958710	Sep Muhammad Khalil Rana		14 Aug 1978	
67.	PJO-4351	SM Mumtaz Hussain, Arty	HQ SSG	Nov 1978	
68.	2559943	Lnk Muhammad Maqsod, Arty		Nov 1978	
69.	2945971	Sep Muhammad Ashraf, Arty		Nov 1978	
70.	PJO-7147	Sub Mehmood Ali, Engrs		Nov 1978	
71.	PJO-7443	N/Sub Muhammad Bashir, Engrs		Nov 1978	
72.	1318339	Hav Abdul Rasheed, Engrs		Nov 1978	
73.	1347123	Lnk Muhammad Riaz, Engrs		Nov 1978	
74.	PJO-9424	Sub Ghazanfar Ali, Sig	Gp Sig Coy (SSG)	Nov 1978	
75.	PJO-9980	N/Sub Gulab Shah, Sig	Gp Sig Coy (SSG)	Nov 1978	
76.	PJO-49359	N/Sub Rab Nawaz Khan, Sig	Gp Sig Coy (SSG)	Nov 1978	
77.	PJO-49511	N/Sub Muhammad Rusam, Sig	Gp Sig Coy (SSG)	Nov 1978	
78.	6269257	Hav Muhammad Aslam, Sig	Gp Sig Coy (SSG)	Nov 1978	
79.	6261743	Hav Muhammad Rafiq, Sig	Gp Sig Coy (SSG)	Nov 1978	
80.	6259841	Hav Abdul Aziz, Sig	Gp Sig Coy (SSG)	Nov 1978	
81.	6260565	Hav Abdul Rasheed, Sig	Gp Sig Coy (SSG)	Nov 1978	
82.	6262931	Hav Aziz Ahmed, Sig	Gp Sig Coy (SSG)	Nov 1978	
83.	6268886	Hav Atta Muhammad, Sig	Gp Sig Coy (SSG)	Nov 1978	
84.	6261688	Hav Amanat Ali, Sig	Gp Sig Coy (SSG)	Nov 1978	
85.	6254802	Hav Muhammad Rafiq Hamid, Sig	Gp Sig Coy (SSG)	Nov 1978	
86.	6260617	Hav Muhammad Aslam, Sig	Gp Sig Coy (SSG)	Nov 1978	
87.	6261934	Hav Faroz Kha, Sig	Gp Sig Coy (SSG)	Nov 1978	
88.	6262854	Hav Safdar Ali Sig	Gp Sig Coy (SSG)	Nov 1978	
89.	6263292	Hav Abdul Ali, TJ, Sig	Gp Sig Coy (SSG)	Nov 1978	
90.	6263692	Hav B.A. Mirza, Sig	Gp Sig Coy (SSG)	Nov 1978	
91.	6265847	Hav Manzoor Hussain, Sig	Gp Sig Coy (SSG)	Nov 1978	
92.	6269175	Hav Niaz Khan, Sig	Gp Sig Coy (SSG)	Nov 1978	
93.	6283566	Hav Muhammad Aslam Javid, Sig	Gp Sig Coy (SSG)	Nov 1978	
94.	6282995	Nk Muhammad Afzal, Sig	Gp Sig Coy (SSG)	Nov 1978	
95.	PJO-151748	Sub Allah Ditta, PR		Nov 1978	
96.	1251264	Hav Adalat Hussain, PR		Nov 1978	
97.	2258092	Hav Ali Akbar, PR	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	Nov 1978	

Ser	Army No	Rank & Name	Unit	Date of Award	Remarks
98.	2267047	Nk Muhammad Mushtaq Cheema, PR	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	Nov 1978	
99.	PJO-170767	SM Atta Muhammad, BR		Nov 1978	
100.	PJO-171103	SM Muhammad Ayub, BR		Nov 1978	
101.	PJO-171696	Sub Waina Khan, BR		Nov 1978	
102.	PJO-171675	Sub Muhammad Anwar, BR		Nov 1978	
103.	PJO-171299	Sub Ghulam Rasul, BR		Nov 1978	
104.	PJO-171730	Sub Nazir Khan, BR		Nov 1978	
105.	PJO-172379	Sub Shamroz Khan, BR		Nov 1978	
106.	PJO-172742	N/Sub Kaman Elahi, BR		Nov 1978	
107.	PJO-173076	N/Sub Shah Muhammad, BR		Nov 1978	
108.	PJO-172589	N/Sub Muhammad Ishaq, BR		Nov 1978	
109.	PJO-172041	N/Sub Abdul Basti, BR		Nov 1978	
110.	2535585	Hav Muhammad Boota, BR		Nov 1978	
111.	2432777	Hav Muhammad Irshad, BR		Nov 1978	
112.	2444278	Hav Ali Majeed, BR		Nov 1978	
113.	2445835	Hav Bashir Ahmed, BR		Nov 1978	
114.	1252730	Hav Muhammad Ishaq, BR		Nov 1978	
115.	2445845	Hav Naser Akhtar, BR		Nov 1978	
116.	2467940	Hav Ghulam Hussain, BR		Nov 1978	
117.	2485161	Sep Muhammad Anwar, BR		Nov 1978	
118.	1259520	Hav Abdul Rashid, BR		Nov 1978	
119.	2485161	Sep Muhammad Anwar		Nov 1978	
120.	2484893	Sep Manzoor Hussain, BR		Nov 1978	
121.	2509717	Sep Shah Jehan, BR		Nov 1978	
122.	2675682	L/Hav Aurangzeb, FF		Nov 1978	
123.	2679089	Lnk Muhammad Sadique, FF		Nov 1978	
124.	2788766	Sep Abdul Hamid, AK		Nov 1978	
125.	6805968	Nk Muhammad Khalid Ali, AMC		Nov 1978	
126.	PJO-41811	SM Irshad Ali Khan, ACC		Nov 1978	
127.		Nk Manzoor Khan, PR		Nov 1978	
128.	PA-13394	Capt Javed Iqbal, AC	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1979	
129.	PSS-14658	Capt Ch Muhammad Mukhtar, Sind	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1979	
130.	PA-16029	Capt Waqar Burhan, BR		23 Mar 1979	
131.	PA-16250	Capt Abdul Rehman Bilal, PR		23 Mar 1979	
132.	PA-15354	Capt Tariq Ihtesham, BR	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1979	
133.	6283415	Nk Hadayat Khan, Sig		23 Mar 1980	

Ser	Army No	Rank & Name	Unit	Date of Award	Remarks
134.	2463024	Nk Nazar Hussain, BR	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	28 Jan 1982	
135.	2263820	Lnk Muhammad Javed, PR		28 Jan 1982	
136.	2969269	Sep Ali Shah, Arty	3 Cdo Bn (SSG)	28 Jan 1982	
137.	2954639	Sep Nazir Ahmed, Arty	3 Cdo Bn (SOU)	28 Jan 1982	
138.	PSS-14428	Capt Sayed Qasim Abbas, BR	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	24 Mar 1982	
139.	PSS-15367	Capt Syed Farooq Haider Pasha, AK	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	24 Mar 1982	
140.	PA-17278	Capt Muhammad Rafique, BR	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	24 Mar 1982	
141.	PA-17731	Capt Khawar Aftab, AK	3 Cdo Bn (SSG)	24 Mar 1982	
142.	6280386	Nk Muhammad Amjad, Sig		10 Apr 1982	
143.	PJO-7598	Sub Allah Yar, Engrs	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	17 Jan 1984	
144.	PJO-115173	N/Sub Muhammad Zaman, Arty		17 Jan 1984	
145.	2664101	Hav Mian Ahmed, FF		17 Jan 1984	
146.	2248785	Hav Khushi Muhammad, PR		17 Jan 1984	
147.	2692127	Nk Muhammad Aslam, PR		17 Jan 1984	
148.	PSS-14639	Maj Syed Javed Abar Shah, FF	3 Cdo Bn (SSG)	14 Aug 1983	
149.	6287328	Hav Amanat Ali, Sig	3 Cdo Bn (SSG)	25 Sep 1983	
150.	PJO-172237	Sub Muhammad Ishaq, BR	PTS (SSG)	10 Jan 1984	
151.	PTC-116607	Capt Aftab Ahmed, AMC	3 Cdo Bn (SSG)	22 Mar 1984	
152.	1373274	Lnk Muhammad Khurshid Khan, Engrs	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	17 Jan 1984	
153.	PSS-14363	Maj Muhammad Aslam Khan,ASC	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1985	
154.	PA-15364	Maj Tariq Ehtesham, BR	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1985	
155.	PA-17282	Capt Irshad Rahim, Arty	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1985	
156.	PA-18813	Capt Tila Mohammad, FF	3 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1985	
157.	PA-19027	Capt Muhammad Riasat, BR	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1985	
158.	PA-19582	Capt Nabil Azmat ,Sind	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1985	
159.	PA-19902	Capt Safraz Ali Khan, ASC	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1985	
160.	1271418	Hav Muhammad Hussain,Arty	Musa Coy (SSG)	4 Jun 1985	
161.	2969542	Lnk Muhammad Sharif, Arty	Musa Coy (SSG)	4 Jun 1985	
162.	PJO-171856	SM Abdul Muntaqim, BR	HQ SSG	8 Dec 1986	
163.	PJO-0113539	Sub Muhammad Nawaz, Arty	PTS (SSG)	18 May 1986	
164.	PSS-14376	Maj Muhammad Hafeez Mirza, Sig	Gp Sig Coy (SSG)	1986	
165.	PSS-14376	Maj Muhammad Hafeez Mirza, Sig	Gp Sig Coy (SSG)	1988	
166.	PSS-14376	Maj Muhammad Hafeez Mirza, Sig	Gp Sig Coy (SSG)	1991	
167.	PA-12921	Maj Safdar Attique Awan, AK	3 Cdo Bn (SSG)	1987	
168.	PJO-161326	N/Sub Ismail Khan, AC	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 1987	
169.	PJO-174496	N/Sub Muhammad Ashraf, BR	3 Cdo Bn (SSG)	20 Dec 1987	

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170.	2498268	Nk Khurshid Ali, BR	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	20 Dec 1987	
171.	2509006	Nk Razique Hussain, BR	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	20 Dec 1987	
172.	PA-9299	Lt Col Muhammad Sarfraz Khan	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	1988	
173.	PJO-171687	SM Abdul Hussain Khan, BR	3 Cdo Bn (SSG)	1988	
174.	PJO-152578	SM Isa Khan, PR	HQ SSG	1988	
175.	PJO-180475	Sub Noor Ahmed,	PTS (SSG)	1987	
176.	PJO-116398	N/Sub Ghulam Mehmood	PTS (SSG)	1988	
177.	1393158	Sep Sultan Khan, Engrs	Zarrar Coy (SSG)	1989	
178.	PJO-49684	Sub Muhammad Arif	PTS (SSG)	1989	
179.	PA-20020	Maj Abid Ali Shah, T Bt, Sind	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	1992	
180.	1043389	Hav Muhammad Ikram	Zarrar Coy (SSG)	1991	
181.	6293259	Hav Muhammad Asghar, Sig	HQ SSG	1992	
182.	PJO-181326	Sub Riaz Hussain	Musa Coy (SSG)	1993	
183.	1379895	L/Hav Muhammad Safdar, Engrs	Musa Coy (SSG)	1993	
184.	2360673	Sep Iqbal Hussain	Musa Coy (SSG)	1993	
185.	2303514	Hav Shaukat Hayat	3 Cdo Bn (SSG)	1996	
186.	PA-21229	Maj Raja Tariq Mehmood	Musa Coy (SSG)	1993	
187.	PA-19093	Maj Muhammad Ahmed, FF	HQ SSG	14 Aug 1993	
188.	PA-23068	Maj Abid Rafique 3, PR	HQ SSG	14 Aug 1993	
189.	2550526	Lnk Basharat Hussain, BR	HQ SSG	14 Aug 1993	
190.	PA-20790	Maj Syed Imam Baqir, FF	Zarrar Coy (SSG)	23 Mar 1994	
191.	255003	Nk Khalid Mehmood, BR	Zarrar Coy (SSG)	23 Mar 1994	
192.	3027307	Nk Mehmood Shmed	Zarrar Coy (SSG)	23 Mar 1993	
193.	2989997	Lnk Shamshad Ali	Zarrar Coy (SSG)	23 Mar 1993	
194.	2974058	Hav Muhammad Anwar Shakeel	2 Cdo Bn (SSG)	15 Apr 1995	
195.	1710855	Sep Toqeer Ahmed, Engrs		1965	
196.	2379973	L Hav Basharat Hussain	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	15 Nov 2003	
197.	3046107	Hav Sajjad Hussain Ejaz, Arty	3 Cdo Bn (SSG)	5 Jul 2004	
198.	PA-28643	Maj Asad Farooq	1 Cdo Bn (SSG)	23 Mar 2004	
199.	PJO-63497	SM Fazal Din	4 Cdo Bn (SSG)	15 Nov 2005	
200.	PJO-63497	SM Fazal Din	4 Cdo Bn (SSG)	15 Nov 2005	
201.	3070591	Hav Muhammad Naeem Bhatti	4 Cdo Bn (SSG)	15 Nov 2005	
202.	1737367	Sep Muhammad Naseer	Karrar Coy	15 Apr 2006	(Shaheed)
203.	PA-40360	Capt Saad Bin Khalid	4 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2008	
204.	PA-40642	Capt Adnan Javed	4 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2008	
205.	PJO-164623	N/Sub Muhammad Rehman	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2009	

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206.	PA-40806	Capt Irfan Hayat Ahmed Khan	5 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2009	
207.	PA-41133	Capt Haider Ali	5 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2009	
208.	PA-42158	Capt Muhammad Zafeel Butt	3 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2009	
209.	PA-27077	Lt Col Sana Ullah Malik	3 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2010	
210.	PA-39343	Maj Muhammad Sajid Asim	3 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2010	
211.	PA-41647	Capt Naveed Aslam	3 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2010	
212.	PA-42442	Capt Adnan Tauqeer	6 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2010	
213.	PA-43744	Lt Hassan Iftikhar	3 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2010	
214.	PA-44678	Lt Usma Rehman Ranjha	7 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2010	
215.	PA-42793	Capt Simon Shafique	SOS	23 Mar 2011	
216.	PA-34186	Maj Ahmed Jawad	7 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2011	
217.	PA-37374	Maj Sajjad Ali	7 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2011	
218.	PA-37704	Maj Muhammad Kashif Naseem	5 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2011	
219.	PA-38577	Maj Chaudhry Ramzan Murtaza	7 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2011	
220.	PA-38691	Capt Ameer Haider	7 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2011	
221.	PA-41388	Capt Raja Ghulam Mustafa	HQ 22 SSB	14 Aug 2011	
222.	PA-42228	Capt Syed Ali Atif Raza Zahid	7 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2011	
223.	PA-43360	Capt Syed Furqan Farooq	5 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2011	
224.	PA-33297	Lt Col Raja Azhar Ayub Kayani	2 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2012	
225.	PA-35270	Maj Pervez Iqbal	2 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2012	
226.	PA-38538	Maj Muhammad Ihsan Ullah	2 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2012	
227.	PJO-65573	N/Sub ZAheer Abbas	2 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2012	
228.	3122081	Lnk Aurangzeb	2 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2012	
229.	4312140	Hav Tanweer Shahzad	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2012	
230.	2852648	Nk Abdullah Baig	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2012	
231.	2852411	Lnk Fida Ullah	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2012	
232.	PA-43304	Capt Majid Ali	4 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2013	
233.	PJO-122114	N/Sub Barkat Ali	4 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2013	
234.	4413060	Nk Muhammad Abid	1 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2013	
235.	4315965	Lnk Syed Wajid Ali Shah	1 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2013	
236.	3732412	Hav Aman Ullah Khan	6 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2013	
237.	7363884	Lnk Saeed Ahmed	6 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2013	
238.	1092041	Sep Muhammad Aslam	6 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2013	
239.	3133558	Sep Adnan Khan	6 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 2013	
240.	PA-50170	Capt Muhammad Sajjad	1 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2014	

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241.	PJO-158867	Sub Muhammad Khan	1 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2014	
242.	4312192	Hav Shahid Islam	1 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2014	
243.	3461075	Hav Abdul Jabbar	3 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2014	
244.	3759090	Hav Ijaz Ahmed	3 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2014	
245.	4318064	Hav Muhammad Hussain	3 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2014	
246.	2408401	Lnk Muhammad Ameer	3 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2014	
247.	3750241	Sep Muhammad Tufail	3 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2014	
248.	3852680	Sep Nazakat Ali	3 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2014	
249.	PJO-3342794	Sub Sultan Mehmood	3 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2014	
250.	PJO-3066987	N/Sub Barkat Ali	4 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 2014	
251.	PJO-123626	N/Sub Muhammad Arif	SOS	23 Mar 2014	
252.	PA-45376	Capt Adnan Salah Din Sahibzada	7 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 14	
253.	PJO-3633317	Sub Khalid Mehmood	7 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 14	
254.	1723914	Hav Ijaz Ahmed Nasir	3 Cdo Bn	14 Aug 14	
255.	PA-50339	Capt Muhammad Aslam	2 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	
256.	PA-50843	Lt Azhar Hayat	2 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	
257.	4314288	Hav Iftikhar	2 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	
258.	1749047	Nk Muhammad Zaman	2 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	
259.	PA-34384	Lt Col Adnan Bashir Ch	4 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	
260.	PA-43612	Capt Muhammad Numan Khan	4 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	
261.	3777267	Sep Ghulam Abbas	4 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	
262.	PA-34249	Lt Col Muhammad Kashif Hamayoun	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	
263.	PA-36313	Lt Col Naveed Waqas	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	
264.	PA-39516	Maj Shahid Aslam	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	
265.	PA-40662	Maj Imran Ali Shah	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	
266.	PA-44255	Capt Javed Alam	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	
267.	PA-46613	Capt Ejaz Mohsin	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	
268.	PA-44637	Capt Kamran Syed	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	
269.	PA-50080	Capt Faisal Waqar	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	
270.	PA-50240	Capt Syed Muaaz Anwar	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	
271.	PJO-4301353	N/Sub Amjad Pervez	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	
272.	PJO-4309013	N/Sub Sher Azam	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	
273.	4317229	Hav Muzahir Ali	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	
274.	1084129	Nk Haider Zaman	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	
275.	3355242	Lnk Muhammad Banaras	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	
276.	1752265	Sep Aqil Hussain	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	

Ser	Army No	Rank & Name	Unit	Date of Award	Remarks
277.	3372393	Sep Misbah Ud Din	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	
278.	PA-34447	Lt Col Amjad Qayyum Raja	7 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	
279.	PA-46599	Capt Saad Hayat Khan	7 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	
280.	PA-50855	Lt Haris Bin Aftab	7 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	
281.	PJO-2380969	N/Sub Hassan Akhtar	7 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	
282.	3119185	Nk Gul Shair	7 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	
283.	2425050	Lnk Hashim Ali	7 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	
284.	3357466	Lnk Arif Hussain	7 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	
285.	3850037	Sep Muhammad Akbar Ud Din	7 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	
286.	7769684	Sep Shah Said	7 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 15	
287.	3654678	Hav Maqsood Ahmed	11 SSB	23 Mar 15	
288.	PA-35231	Lt Col Tahir Mehmood	ZATU	23 Mar 15	
289.	PA-40620	Maj Aamir Shahzad	ZATU	23 Mar 15	
290.	PJO-1704965	Sub Habib Ur Rehman	Musa Coy	23 Mar 15	
291.	PA-39578	Maj Muhammad Aamir Ghumman	2 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
292.	PA-41097	Maj Muhammad Yousaf	2 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
293.	PA-44253	Capt Muhammad SaifullahBaig	11 SSB	14 Aug 15	
294.	PA-45772	Capt Majid Ali	6 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
295.	PA-45938	Capt Asmar Ahmed	2 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
296.	PA-50248	Capt Ch Najam Us Saqib	5 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
297.	PA-50746	Capt Usman Farooq	4 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
298.	PA-50768	Capt Muhammad Usman Shahid	6 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
299.	PJO-3078610	Sub Muhammad Ishfaq	2 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
300.	PJO-3448270	Sub AkhtarZaman	6 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
301.	PJO-3085761	N/Sub Muhammad Farooq	2 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
302.	PJO-4305616	N/Sub Mazhar Hussain	2 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
303.	2849482	Hav Fida Hussain	5 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
304.	3339641	Hav Rajwali Khan	6 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
305.	3734819	Hav Zafar Iqbal	4 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
306.	3738498	Hav Mushtaq Ali	4 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
307.	3662320	L/Hav Fazal Karim	11 SSB	14 Aug 15	
308.	3102614	Nk Noor Ud Din	4 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
309.	1744261	Lnk Saqib Imran	4 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
310.	3117461	Lnk Farooq Ahmed	5 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
311.	3466206	Lnk Muhammad Hafeez	5 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
312.	1762744	Sep Zahid Hussain	5 Cdo	14 Aug 15	

Ser	Army No	Rank & Name	Unit	Date of Award	Remarks
313.	3147274	Sep Muhammad Ramzan	2 Cdo	14 Aug 15	
314.	PA-36217	Maj Iftikhar Hussain	4 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 16	
315.	PA-41243	Maj Safdar Ali Khan	6 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 16	
316.	PA-42442	Maj Adnan Tauqeer	6 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 16	
317.	PA-50062	Capt Asad Amjad Mir	6 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 16	
318.	PA-47354	Capt Abdul Wali	4 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 16	
319.	PA-51750	Capt Sajid Ur Rehman	4 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 16	
320.	PJO-3077842	N/Sub Muhammad Jahangir	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 16	
321.	1080047	Hav Amjad	2 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 16	
322.	3742706	Hav Khalid Raza	2 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 16	
323.	4318689	Nk Muhammad Nadeem Khan	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 16	
324.	3751743	Lnk Amir Zeb	6 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 16	
325.	1089134	Lnk Intikhab Alam	6 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 16	
326.	1092091	Sep Nasir Mehmood	5 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 16	
327.	3168021	Sep Mamnoon Ur Rehman	6 Cdo Bn	23 Mar 16	
328.	2394836	Hav Rahim Khan	Amph Wing (MUSA) SSG	14 Aug 16	
329.	2421519	Sep Javed Abbas Khan	Amph Wing (MUSA) SSG	14 Aug 16	
330.	2417303	Sep Jawwad Ahmed	Amph Wing (MUSA) SSG	14 Aug 16	

HILAL-I-IMTAIZ MILITARY

1.	PA-15079	Maj Gen Tahir Mahmood	HQ SSG	23 Mar 2006	
2.	PA-17278	Brig Ch Muhammad Rafique	HQ 11 SSB	23 Mar 2007	
3.	PA-19528	Maj Gen Furrukh Bashir	HQ SSG	23 Mar 2011	
4.	PA-23068	Maj Gen Abid Rafique	HQ SSG	14 Aug 2014	

TAMGHAI IMTAIZ MILITARY

1.	PA-22164	Lt Col Raja Tahir Yasin	HQ SSG	23 Mar 2007	
2.	PA-22925	Lt Col Mazhar Altaf	CMH Murree	14 Aug 2008	

NOMIAL ROLL OF SHAHEED OFFICERS BUT NOT AWARDED

1.	PA-3940	Maj Muhammad Sarwar	1 Cdo Bn	06 Sep 1965	Shaheed
2.	PA-5656	Maj Kazim Kamal Khan	9 Punjab	29 Mar 1971	Shaheed
3.	PA-6368	Maj Muhammad Asjad Latif	HQ SSG	29 Mar 1971	Shaheed
4.	PA-7487	Capt Muhammad Saeed	2 Cdo Bn	29 Mar 1971	Shaheed
5.	PA-7005	Maj Asad Ali Khan	2 Cdo Bn	04 Dec 1971	Shaheed
6.	PSS-7677	Capt Ahmed Zia Khan	2 Cdo Bn	04 Dec 1971	Shaheed
7.	PA-7443	Capt Muhammad Sikandar	2 Cdo Bn	28 Mar 1971	Shaheed
8.	PA-6607	Maj Nasib Ullah Khan	Ord	21 nov 1972	Shaheed

Ser	Army No	Rank & Name	Unit	Date of Award	Remarks
9.	PA-9101	Capt Muhammad Saleem	3 Cdo Bn	16 Cot 1973	Shaheed
10.	PA-13328	Capt Muhammad Masood	3 Cdo Bn	10 Jun 1977	Shaheed
11.	PA-13517	Capt Aurang Zeb	1 Cdo Bn	12 Nov 1977	Shaheed
12.	PA-7671	Maj Syed Faiz akbar Shah	1 Cdo Bn	06 May 1979	Shaheed
13.	PA-1658	Capt Khalid Bashir Khan	3 Cdo Bn	06 Jul 1980	Shaheed
14.	PA-29942	Capt Saad Mehmood Khattak	1 Cdo Bn	19 Aug 1988	Shaheed
15.	PA-24832	Capt Sher Rehman	1 Cdo Bn	08 Apr 1992	Shaheed
16.	PA-34511	Capt Khurram Hafeez Bajwa	2 Cdo Bn	15 May 1999	Shaheed
17.	PA-	Maj Misbah Ud Din	1 Cdo Bn	21 Jun 2005	Shaheed
18.	PA-16006	Maj Gen Amir Faisal Alvi	HQ SSG	19 Nov 2008	Shaheed
19.	PA-42493	Capt Atif Hassan	2 Cdo Bn	07 Jun 2011	Shaheed
20.	PA-22284	Capt Safdar Khan	2 Cdo Bn	01 Jul 1992	Shaheed